Rodriguez v. Swartz

Opinion handed down August 7, 2018

            In 2010 and 2012, while on duty, two different Border Patrol agents shot from American soil across the border into Mexico, each killing a Mexican teenager.[1]  This post centers on the civil case levied against the border agent involved in the latter incident; it ultimately forms legal conclusions on the viability of holding the agent civilly liable for money damages based on a Bivens claim.[2]  Part I reviews the facts and holding of the case.  Part II lays out the two major legal frameworks at play.  Part III examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the matter, which both antagonizes and rejects that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[3]  The remaining Part offers a commentary on both the soundness of the Ninth Circuit’s decision and a prediction of the future.

Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University

 Opinion handed down January 15, 2019

I. Introduction

            Dr. Shereen Kader, Ph.D., an Egyptian national, worked for Harris-Stowe State University from 2007-2009.[1]  In 2009, a new dean evaluated Dr. Kader’s performance.[2]  Dr. Kader believed her scores on the performance evaluation were unfair and discriminatory.[3]  Dr. Kader wanted to bring her attorney to a human resources meeting planned to take place between the new dean and Dr. Kader.[4]  In response, the new dean allegedly told Dr. Kader that bringing her attorney to the meeting would result in “visa complications” – the alleged statement was significant to Dr. Kader because her ability to live and work in the United States depended on acquiring a new visa when her then-current visa expired in 2010.[5]  Shortly before Dr. Kader’s visa expired, she applied for a different visa – known as an “extraordinary person” visa – but was denied.[6]  Harris-Stowe did not appeal the denial and soon thereafter declined to renew Dr. Kader’s teaching contract based on her lack of a valid visa.[7]  Dr. Kader sued under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), alleging that Harris-Stowe unlawfully retaliated against her and unlawfully discriminated against her based on her race and national origin.[8]  After a jury trial, Dr. Kader was awarded $750,000 in compensatory and $1.75 million in punitive damages on her retaliation and national origin discrimination claims.[9]  However, Harris-Stowe appealed, arguing the jury instructions in the case were “erroneous and prejudicial.”[10]  The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed, and the judgment in favor of Dr. Kader was reversed and remanded for a new trial.[11]

Whose Right to Try?: Eligibility of the Severely Mentally Ill Under the Right to Try Act of 2017

I. Introduction

In May of 2018, the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017 (“Right to Try Act”) was signed into law in order to “authorize the use of unapproved medical products by patients diagnosed with a terminal illness” as an “alternative pathway alongside, existing expanded access policies of the Food and Drug Administration [(“FDA”)]. . . .”[1]  While drafting the law, questions arose over what types of diseases and conditions would be covered by the Right to Try Act and whether those differed from existing laws allowing access to investigational drugs.[2]

Given that nearly 45,000 Americans die of suicide each year,[3] and that people with severe mental illnesses have a twenty-times higher risk of suicide than the general population,[4] such questioning by the drafters begs another: Does the Right to Try Act allow patients with severe mental illnesses access to experimental drugs absent a comorbid physical condition?

A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter

Opinion handed down October 16, 2018

A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. (“A-1”) gave high interest loans to Meeka Hunter in an amount totaling $800.[1]  Hunter eventually defaulted on the loans when she owed over $7,000.[2]  A-1 filed a lawsuit against Hunter and she counterclaimed.[3]  The loan contracts contained an arbitration provision that required the borrower to use the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) to settle disputes.[4]  However, the NAF was unable to arbitrate her dispute after it was prosecuted by the Minnesota Attorney General and required by the court to stop arbitrating commercial disputes.[5]  A-1 motioned to compel arbitration and have the court assign another arbitrator.[6]  The circuit court did not compel arbitration and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed because the language of the arbitration provision contemplated that the parties would arbitrate before only the NAF.[7]

State Conference of NAACP v. State

Opinion handed down October 30, 2018

On September 14, 2016, the Missouri General Assembly successfully overturned Governor Jay Nixon’s veto of House Bill 1631 (“HB 1631”).[1]  HB 1631 replaced the then-existing voter identification requirements in Missouri with more stringent standards (“Voter ID Law”).[2]  The Missouri State Conference for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the League of Women Voters of Missouri, and Christine Dragonette (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), sued the State of Missouri and the Missouri Secretary of State (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that the funding provisions of the Voter ID Law were not satisfied, and therefore the voter identification requirements should not be enforced.[3]  The Circuit Court of Cole County granted the Defendants’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings, effectuating a dismissal without prejudice of the Plaintiffs’ complaint.[4]  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.[5]

Kelsay v. Ernst

Opinion handed down September 27, 2018

I. Introduction

            After an apparent misunderstanding at a local pool, Melanie Kelsay found herself arrested and seriously injured.[1]  She claimed a police officer used excessive force when arresting her, and she sued the officer for violating her rights under the Fourth Amendment.[2]  The officer responsible for Kelsay’s injuries moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity.[3]  The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska held the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.[4]  On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the officer did not violate Kelsay’s clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment.[5]