Sunday, November 15, 2020

June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo

 June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103

Opinion handed down June 29, 2020

By Lucy Downing

I.          Introduction

In a five-four decision, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana law requiring physicians who provide abortions to obtain admitting privileges at a local hospital.  The Court held that the Louisiana admitting privilege requirement, facially identical to a Texas law the Court struck down four years ago in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, was an undue burden on abortion access.  However, the Court missed an opportunity to meaningfully address how targeted regulations of abortion providers (“TRAP laws”) like the admitting priviliges requirement at issue work in the greater context of abortion restrictions to gradually chip away at the abortion right.  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote the plurality opinion.[1]

II.        Background

            In June 2014, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 620 which requires any physician who performs abortions to hold “active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced and that provides obstetrical or gynecological health care services.”[2]  To have “active admitting privileges,” a doctor must be a member in good standing of the hospital’s medical staff with the ability to admit a patient and to provide diagnostic and surgical services to such patient.[3]  Prior to Act 620’s passage, Louisiana law already required abortion providers either to possess local hospital admitting privileges or to have a transfer agreement with a physician who had such privileges.[4]  Act 620 removed that flexibility and attached liability to physicians for failing to comply, possibly leading to “fines of up to $4,000 per violation, license revocation, and civil liability.”[5]

            Several weeks before Act 620 was to take effect in September 2014, three abortion clinics and two abortion providers filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana alleging that Act 620 was unconstitutional as an undue burden on their patients’ rights to obtain abortions.[6]  The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect.[7]  The State opposed the temporary restraining order and urged the district court to hold a hearing on the preliminary injunction as soon as possible, but conceded that the physicians clearly had standing to bring suit.[8]  Instead of ruling on whether to stay Act 620’s effective date, the district court temporarily prohibited the State from enforcing the Act’s penalties and directed the plaintiff doctors to continue their efforts to obtain conforming privileges while keeping the court informed of their progress.[9]

III.       Legal Background

            In June 2015, the District Court held a six-day bench trial on the preliminary injunction.[10]  After hearing live testimony from a dozen witnesses and making extensive factual findings on the issue, the district court declared Act 620 facially unconstitutional and granted the preliminary injunction on its enforcement.[11]

            The State immediately appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit asking for a stay of the preliminary injunction, which the court granted.[12]  The U.S. Supreme Court then granted its own stay at the plaintiffs’ request, leaving the district court’s injunction intact.[13]

            About two months later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, striking down a Texas law nearly identical to the Louisiana law at issue here.[14]  In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court held that “unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right and are therefore constitutionally invalid.”[15]  The Court then undertook a state-specific analysis and assessed the asserted benefits and burdens of the law as it operated in Texas.[16]  Reviewing the record in that case, the Court held that the Texas admitting privilege law did not further the State’s asserted interest in women’s health because it provided no real health benefit—abortions in Texas were extremely safe before the law’s passage, so there was no health-related issue the law attempted to cure.[17]  Futher, the law placed a substantial obstacle in the path of Texas women seeking an abortion because half of the state’s abortion clinics closed after the law went into effect.[18]  The Court then struck down the Texas law, reasoning that the obstacle, “when viewed in light of the virtual absence of any health benefit, imposed an undue burden on abortion access in violation of the Federal Constitution.”[19] 

In light of Whole Woman’s Health, the Court remanded this case to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration and the Fifth Circuit remanded to the district court for further fact-finding and a ruling on the plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction regarding Act 620.[20]  The district court made extensive factual findings on the Act’s purported benefits and its impact on women’s access to abortion in Louisiana.[21]  With respect to the Act’s asserted benefits, the district court found that: (1) abortion in Louisiana “has been extremely safe, with particularly low rates of serious complications”; (2) it “rarely . . . is necessary to transfer patients to a hospital”; and (3) “whether or not a patient’s treating physician has admitting privileges is not relevant to the patient’s care.”[22]  Accordingly, the district court found there was “no significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure,” and, thus, there was “no credible evidence in the record that Act 620 would further the State’s interest in women’s health beyond that which is already insured under existing Louisiana law.”[23]

            As to the Act’s burdens on women’s access to abortion, the district court found that the approximately 10,000 women who obtain abortions in Louisiana each year are served by six doctors at five abortion clinics, and that by the time of its decision, two of those clinics had closed and one of the doctors had retired, leaving only five physicians in the entire state who perform abortions, most of whom were unable to obtain admitting privileges required by Act 620.[24]  The district court further found that the doctors’ inability to obtain privileges was “caused by Act 620 working in concert with existing laws and practices, including hospital bylaws and criteria that preclude or, at least greatly discourage, the granting of privileges to abortion provers.”[25]  Thus, enforcing the Act would “result in a drastic reduction in the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers . . .” and prevent many women seeking a safe, legal abortion in Louisiana from obtaining one.[26]  The district court added that “Act 620 does not advance Louisiana’s legitimate interest in protecting the health of women seeking abortions.  Instead, Act 620 would increase the risk of harm to women’s health by dramatically reducing the availability of safe abortion in Louisiana.”[27]  Moreover, the court found no legally significant distinction between Act 620 and the Texas law struck down in Whole Woman’s Health because Act 620 was modeled after the Texas law, functions in the same manner, and similarly imposes significant obstacles to abortion access with “no countervailing benefits.”[28]  Accordingly, the district court declared Act 620 unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction forbidding its enforcement.[29]

            The State appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.[30]  The Fifth Circuit disagreed with nearly all of the district court’s findings regarding Act 620’s burdens, and it differentiated the Act from the Texas law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health concluding that the burden Act 620 imposes on abortion access is “dramatically less” than that imposed by the Texas law.[31]  In terms of the Act’s asserted benefits, the Fifth Circuit argued that, “unlike Texas, Louisiana presents some evidence of a minimal benefit,” despite the district court’s contrary finding that the law provided no real health benefit to women.[32]

            The U.S. Supreme Court then issued a stay of the Fifth Circuit’s reversal at the plaintiffs’ request and granted certiorari to address the Fifth Circuit’s decision on the merits.[33]  The Court also granted the State’s cross-petition for certiorari challenging the plaintiff’s standing to bring the action.[34]

IV.       Instant Decision

            The opinion first addressed the State’s argument that the plaintiff physicians lacked standing to bring suit on behalf of their patients.  The Court held that the State waived that argument when it conceded the physicians’ standing at the district court in order to obtain a quick decision on the merits.[35]  Further, the Court pointed out its long-standing precedent of allowing abortion providers to invoke the rights of their actual or potential patients in challenges to abortion-related regulations.[36]

            Turning to the merits, the opinion reiterated the proper standard for assessing abortion regulations: “a statute which, while furthering a valid state interest has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”[37]  Further, “unnecessary health regulations impose an undue burden if they have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.”[38]  Noting that the Fifth Circuit did not take issue with the legal standard used by the district court so much as the factual findings it used in reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that “a district court’s findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”[39]  This is a highly deferential standard, and a court of appeals may not reverse a plausible account of the evidence given the record, even if it would have weighed the evidence differently if it had been sitting as the trier of fact.[40]

            With that standard in mind, the Court then carefully assessed whether the district court’s findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that Act 620 was unconstitutional.[41]  It concluded that, in light of the record, “the District Court’s significant factual findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have ample evidentiary support.  None is ‘clearly erroneous.’”[42]  The Court further concluded that “[t]his case is similar to, [and] nearly identical with, Whole Woman’s Health.  And the law must consequently reach a similar conclusion.  Act 620 is unconstitutional.”[43]

V.        Comment and Conclusion

            While the Court’s decision ended up striking down Louisiana’s admitting privilege requirement, its continued use of a state-specific analysis leaves the door open for states to continue strategically restricting abortion using the argument that each state is different.  TRAP laws such as the admitting privileges requirement at issue do not further a legitimate interest in women’s health.[44]  The American Medical Association, American Public Health Association, and American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists oppose these restrictions, recognizing that they serve no legitimate purpose.[45]  Today, abortion procedures are generally quite safe, and TRAP laws ostensibly enacted under the guise of furthering women’s health do no more than subject women to more health risks by making the process of obtaining an abortion more burdensome.[46]  In practice, TRAP laws further strategic legislative goals of eroding the abortion right into nonexistence. 

While admitting privilege requirements have been struck down twice by the Court and blocked in eight states, they are currently still in effect in Missouri, North Dakota, and Utah.[47]  In Missouri, for example, the admitting privilege requirement acts as one piece of a complicated web of restrictions designed to make access to abortion more difficult.[48]  Other anti-abortion measures in Missouri include strict limits on insurance coverage of abortion, a parental consent requirement for minors, a mandate doctors counsel patients in a way that is intended to dissuade them from obtaining the procedure, a mandatory seventy-two-hour waiting period between clinic visits, and other similar restrictions.[49]  As the first state to enact an admitting privilege requirement, Missouri has proven this strategy quite effective as the state is down to one remaining abortion clinic.[50]  However, Missouri is not the only state using this tactic.[51]  While the Court saw the Louisiana law for what it really was, the opinion was limited to Louisiana and failed to meaningfully address how admitting privilege requirements fit into the framework of anti-abortion legislative strategies.  Thus, states like Missouri will likely continue legislating to incrementally strip away abortion access.



[1] While Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh each filed dissenting opinions, this article focuses on the plurality opinion.

[2] June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S.Ct. 2112 (2020).

[3] Id. at 2113 (quotations omitted).

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 2113­–14.

[9] Id. at 2114.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 2292 (2016).

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id..

[20] June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S.Ct. 2112, 2113­–14 (2020).

[21] Id. at 2114-16.

[22] Id. at 2114­–15 (quotations omitted).

[23] Id. at 2115 (quotations omitted).

[24] Id.

[25] Id. (quotations omitted).

[26] Id. at 2115–16.

[27] Id. at 2116.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at 2117.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 2117–18.

[36] Id. at 2118-19.

[37] Id. (quotations omitted).

[38] Id. (quotations omitted).

[39] Id. at 2121 (quotations omitted).

[40] Id.

[41] See id. at 2122–32.

[42] Id. at 2132.

[43] Id. at 2133.

[44] See Elizabeth Nash & Megan Donovan, Admitting Privileges Are Back at the U.S. Supreme Court with Serious Implications for Abortion Access, Guttmacher Inst. (last visited Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/10/admitting-privileges-are-back-us-supreme-court-serious-implications-abortion-access.

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] See A Dark Milestone for Women’s Rights: A State With No Abortion Clinics, N.Y. Times (May 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/opinion/missouri-abortion-clinic.html.

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] See id.

Thursday, October 29, 2020

Perverted Preference?: The Dark Potential of the Contemporaneous Exchange for New Value Exception to Voidable Preferences

 Perverted Preference?: The Dark Potential of the Contemporaneous Exchange

for New Value Exception to Voidable Preferences

In re Gas-Mart USA, Inc., 613 B.R. 168, 170 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2020)

By Sam Brand

 I.                   Introduction

While every area of the law is shaped by public policy considerations, the field of bankruptcy law tends to rely on a different policy rationale at almost every turn.  The most basic goal of a successful bankruptcy is to provide the debtor with the means to either pursue a fresh start or reorganize their debt by creating a sustainable plan.[1]  The most pervasive competing goal with that of the debtor’s wellbeing is the preservation of value for the benefit of creditors.[2]  Put simply, bankruptcy serves primarily as a debtor’s remedy, but the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) attempts to prevent debtors from devaluing the bankruptcy estate which must be used to pay off unsecured creditors.

One way in which the Code seeks to preserve value for the estate is through the concept of a “voidable preference.”  A voidable preference is defined as: (1) a transfer of money or an interest in property by the debtor to a creditor; (2) to settle an antecedent debt; (3) made while the debtor is insolvent; (4) made within the ninety days immediately preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition; and (5) which enables a creditor to receive more than it would receive under Chapter 7[3]  The general rule is that any transfer the court determines to be a voidable preference may be retracted from the creditor, back to the bankruptcy estate.[4]  The main purpose of this seemingly obscure section is to prevent debtors from unfairly providing payment to select creditors just before filing bankruptcy, leaving the remaining creditors to split up the left-over scraps.[5] 

While the aims of preference law are noble, there are several exceptions to the general rule that create problems for bankruptcy trustees trying to preserve the value of the bankruptcy estate.  Through the lens of In re Gas-Mart, this article will discuss the “contemporaneous exchange for new value” exception to preference law contained in § 547(c)(1).  Ultimately, this article will propose that this exception, as it has been applied in In re Gas-Mart, has the potential to be severely abused and may defeat the principles of fairness upon which preference law was founded.

II.                Factual Background

Prior to filing bankruptcy in July 2015, Gas-Mart (the debtor) held deposit accounts at Wells Fargo Bank and issued checks in excess of the balance of the accounts.[6]  Gas-Mart and Wells Fargo entered into an agreement under which Gas-Mart scheduled its repayment of the debt on the accounts and granted Wells Fargo a security interest in all its assets.[7]

In March 2015, Gas-Mart agreed to sell its real estate and personal property from nineteen Gas-Mart locations for a total of $27 million; the contract, which closed on April 30, 2015, required the sold assets to be free of all liens.[8]  To facilitate the requirement that the sold assets were not subject to a lien, Gas-Mart agreed to give proceeds from the sale to its creditors in return for lien releases.[9]  Sun Life, a creditor, agreed to receive roughly $14 million in proceeds from the sale as partial payment of Gas-Mart’s debt in return for a lien release.[10]  Wells Fargo received $1.3 million from the sale in partial payment of its debt in return for a lien release.[11] Additionally, Wells Fargo received a payment from Gas-Mart of $100,000 on April 29, one day before the sale closed.[12] 

III.             Instant Decision[13]

Before digging into the issues in the case, the court discussed what the contemporaneous exchange for new value exception is.[14]  This exception prevents a trustee from avoiding a preferential transfer where the transfer was intended by the debtor and creditor to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor.[15]  The key consideration, and therefore the crux of the issue in this case, is the definition of “new value.”  The court looked to existing case law to determine that the release of a lien can constitute new value.[16]  The court noted the policy rational behind the exception: “Contemporaneous new value exchanges are excepted from avoidance because they ‘encourage creditors to continue doing business with troubled debtors who may then be able to avoid bankruptcy altogether,’ and ‘because other creditors are not adversely affected if the debtor's estate receives new value.’”[17]

As applied to the case, the key issue for the court was whether Sun Life’s release of its liens for less than full payment of its debt allowed Wells Fargo’s lien release to provide Gas-Mart with new value in exchange for the $1.4 million in payment.[18]  As a starting point, the court noted that Wells Fargo’s interest in Gas-Mart’s property was junior to Sun Life’s; Sun Life agreed to release its liens for payment of less than what it was owed, and as a result, funds were made available to pay Wells Fargo, with the excess returning to the debtor.[19]  The trustee objected to this deal in that it did not actually provide “new value” to the debtor.  The trustee argued that if a senior creditor – here Sun Life – “is not paid in full from the value of its collateral as the result of a sale, that release of junior liens on the sale property should have no corresponding value for the purposes of § 547(c)(1)”.[20]

The court disagreed with the trustee.  The court articulated that the lien releases of Wells Fargo and Sun Life were contingent on each other.[21]  While it is true that the lien release of a junior creditor is worthless to the debtor when the senior creditor still possesses a lien, if both creditors release their liens for less than full value, the debtor has acquired new value in reduced debt, despite the fact that the junior lien would have been worthless under ordinary circumstances.[22] 

As a last-ditch effort, the trustee argued that Sun Life agreed to take less than the amount owed because Wells Fargo impermissibly demanded payment in exchange for the release of its junior liens.[23]  The court responded that this demand merely reflected the demands of the buyer in the overall deal and was fully permissible.[24]

IV.             Comment

On its surface, In re Gas-Mart looks like a relatively cut-and-dry case.  It is hard to argue with the court’s finding that new value was added to the bankruptcy estate based on the lien releases of both Sun Life and Wells Fargo.  Yet, when considering the motivations of the parties, the facts do not seem to add up.  The biggest question this case raises is why Sun Life agreed to release its liens in the first place.  As a secured creditor, Sun Life was guaranteed to receive payment in bankruptcy up to the value of the secured collateral.[25]  Therefore, when Sun Life released its liens for far less than their face value, it presumably took on a substantial loss in order to ensure the sale went through.  This begs the question: why?

The most likely answer is that Sun Life intentionally overvalued its liens, so that when it released the liens in return for a kickback from the sale, it was not actually taking a loss.  This theory is nearly impossible to prove, but it is perhaps the only explanation for Sun Life’s bizarre behavior in this case.  In the grander scheme, it does not matter whether this theory is true, but In re Gas-Mart illustrates a way in which a creditor can use the contemporaneous exchange for new value exception to circumvent preference law entirely. 

Valuation of assets in bankruptcy is a notoriously tricky business, so much so that each party usually acquires a separate appraisal, leaving the judge to determine a fair appraisal.[26]  If a creditor succeeds in convincing the court that the value of its lien is greater than the actual value of the asset, a wily creditor could abuse the contemporaneous exchange for new value exception in much the same way as Sun Life.  Rather than waiting for the slow process of bankruptcy to take its course, this creditor could simply agree to release its overvalued lien in exchange for a payment from the debtor for less than the full value of the lien.  When all is said and done, the creditor will have gotten far more than it would likely have received had it merely acquired the property in bankruptcy.

V.                Conclusion

While it is unclear if this is what happened in In re Gas-Mart, judges must be wary of attempts to malign the bankruptcy process through inaccurate valuation practices.  This warning may not shock bankruptcy judges who deal with valuation issues on a near daily basis, but it serves as another reminder that the Bankruptcy Code is not perfect.  While the contemporaneous exchange for new value exception provides room for debtors to bargain with creditors, judges must remain vigilant in order to preserve the value of the bankruptcy estate for the sake of the bankruptcy trustee and any unsecured creditors.



[1] Elizabeth Warren et al., The Law of Debtors and Creditors 6–7 (2014).

[2] Id. at 7.

[3] 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).

4 Id.

[5] Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1986).

[6] In re Gas-Mart USA, Inc., 613 B.R. 168, 170–71 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2020).

[7] Id. at 171.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 171, 174.  This case also involved a tax lien by the IRS, but for the purposes of this article, the tax lien release operated in much the same way as the Wells Fargo release. For the sake of clarity and conciseness, the issue of the tax lien will not be addressed herein.

[10] Id. at 171.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] This case addressed other issues in addition to what is discussed here. This article focuses on the “new value” issue and does not address the issues related to flexibility of the contemporaneous exchange requirement.

[14] In re Gas-Mart, 613 B.R. at 172.

[15] 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1); In re Gas-Mart, 613 B.R. at 172.

[16] In re Gas-Mart, 613 B.R. at 172 (first citing Velde v. Kirsch, 543 F.3d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 2008) (recognizing new value under § 547(c)(1) by release of a lien on debtor's assets); then citing Velde v. Reinhardt, 294 Fed. Appx. 242, 243 (8th Cir. 2008) (same)).

[17] Id. (citing Dietz v. Calandrillo (In re Genmar Holdings, Inc.), 776 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc.), 130 F.3d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1997))).

[18] Id. at 173.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

[26] Douglas G. Baird, Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L.J. 1930-33 (2006).