State ex rel. McCree v. Dalton

Opinion handed down March 19, 2019

In a plurality opinion of three judges, the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to issue a writ of mandamus.[1]  In this case the circuit court refused to dismiss a driving while intoxicated charge when the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) was below .08% and no evidence was presented that the defendant was intoxicated.[2]  Judge Patricia Breckenridge issued a concurring opinion and Chief Justice Zel M. Fisher issued a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Judges George W. Draper III and Laura Denvir Stith.[3]

Lampley v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights

Opinion handed down February 26,2019

            In 2014, two State of Missouri employees filed related charges of discrimination and retaliation against their employer.[1]  The charges, filed with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”), alleged discrimination based on sex under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“Act”).[2]  The Commission determined the discrimination complaints were based on sexual orientation, which is not a protected group within the Act and administratively closed the matter.[3]  The closure of the complaint denied the plaintiffs right-to-sue letters, and so they asked the circuit court to force the Commission to issue such letters.[4]  The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the Commission, which was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri.[5]  The Supreme Court of Missouri ruled in favor of the employees and held that the discrimination alleged was not based on sexual orientation but rather sex stereotyping, which does fall under the category of sex in the Act, and that the Commission should be compelled to issue right-to-sue letters.[6]

R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District

 Opinionhanded down February 26, 2019

I. Introduction

          R.M.A., a transgender student attending high school in the Blue Springs R-IV School District (“School District”), brought a discrimination lawsuit against the School District and the Blue Springs School District Board of Education (“School Board”) alleging both entities unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his sex in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).[1]  After filing his lawsuit, the School District and School Board (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the circuit court sustained “without explanation.”[2]  R.M.A. appealed.[3]  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court’s entry of judgment against R.M.A., holding that the facts set forth in his petition, if taken as true, establish a claim for sex discrimination under the MHRA.[4]

State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell

Opinion handed down February 26, 2019

In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided whether a motion to compel the production of documents was properly granted after a trial court entered a final judgment in a dissolution action.[1]  The court held that a trial court may grant a motion to compel when it does so to effectuate the terms of its prior judgment.[2]

State v. Patrick

Opinion handed down January 8, 2019

            At 7:30 a.m. November 7, 2016, a phone call was made to 911.[1]  The caller, identified in court documents as H.P., called 911 to report a disturbance from the night before involving her son, Derrick Patrick (“Patrick”).[2]  Police were dispatched to the family residence and an investigation ensued.[3]  The police investigation explored allegations of an altercation between Patrick and family members the evening before, but during the course of the 911 call, another possible altercation arose – this time between Patrick and H.P.[4]  Patrick was charged with third degree domestic assault, a class A misdemeanor, for an alleged altercation with H.P. during the phone call she made to 911.[5]  A bench trial was held in Boone County, Missouri, that included the admission of portions of a police officer’s body camera footage and a recording of H.P.’s 911 call.[6]  Patrick was found guilty by the trial court.[7]  Patrick appealed the decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 911 call and the police body camera footage.[8]

Rodriguez v. Swartz

Opinion handed down August 7, 2018

            In 2010 and 2012, while on duty, two different Border Patrol agents shot from American soil across the border into Mexico, each killing a Mexican teenager.[1]  This post centers on the civil case levied against the border agent involved in the latter incident; it ultimately forms legal conclusions on the viability of holding the agent civilly liable for money damages based on a Bivens claim.[2]  Part I reviews the facts and holding of the case.  Part II lays out the two major legal frameworks at play.  Part III examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the matter, which both antagonizes and rejects that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[3]  The remaining Part offers a commentary on both the soundness of the Ninth Circuit’s decision and a prediction of the future.

Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University

 Opinion handed down January 15, 2019

I. Introduction

            Dr. Shereen Kader, Ph.D., an Egyptian national, worked for Harris-Stowe State University from 2007-2009.[1]  In 2009, a new dean evaluated Dr. Kader’s performance.[2]  Dr. Kader believed her scores on the performance evaluation were unfair and discriminatory.[3]  Dr. Kader wanted to bring her attorney to a human resources meeting planned to take place between the new dean and Dr. Kader.[4]  In response, the new dean allegedly told Dr. Kader that bringing her attorney to the meeting would result in “visa complications” – the alleged statement was significant to Dr. Kader because her ability to live and work in the United States depended on acquiring a new visa when her then-current visa expired in 2010.[5]  Shortly before Dr. Kader’s visa expired, she applied for a different visa – known as an “extraordinary person” visa – but was denied.[6]  Harris-Stowe did not appeal the denial and soon thereafter declined to renew Dr. Kader’s teaching contract based on her lack of a valid visa.[7]  Dr. Kader sued under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), alleging that Harris-Stowe unlawfully retaliated against her and unlawfully discriminated against her based on her race and national origin.[8]  After a jury trial, Dr. Kader was awarded $750,000 in compensatory and $1.75 million in punitive damages on her retaliation and national origin discrimination claims.[9]  However, Harris-Stowe appealed, arguing the jury instructions in the case were “erroneous and prejudicial.”[10]  The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed, and the judgment in favor of Dr. Kader was reversed and remanded for a new trial.[11]

Whose Right to Try?: Eligibility of the Severely Mentally Ill Under the Right to Try Act of 2017

I. Introduction

In May of 2018, the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017 (“Right to Try Act”) was signed into law in order to “authorize the use of unapproved medical products by patients diagnosed with a terminal illness” as an “alternative pathway alongside, existing expanded access policies of the Food and Drug Administration [(“FDA”)]. . . .”[1]  While drafting the law, questions arose over what types of diseases and conditions would be covered by the Right to Try Act and whether those differed from existing laws allowing access to investigational drugs.[2]

Given that nearly 45,000 Americans die of suicide each year,[3] and that people with severe mental illnesses have a twenty-times higher risk of suicide than the general population,[4] such questioning by the drafters begs another: Does the Right to Try Act allow patients with severe mental illnesses access to experimental drugs absent a comorbid physical condition?