In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri
decided whether a motion to compel the production of documents was properly
granted after a trial court entered a final judgment in a dissolution action.[1] The court held that a trial court may grant a
motion to compel when it does so to effectuate the terms of its prior judgment.[2]
I.
Background
This
case, like all divorce cases, began with a marriage. Jerry Cullen (“Husband”)
and Janice Scroggins (“Wife”) were married in 1985, and Wife filed for divorce
in 2007.[3] While the two were married, Husband served in
the United States Air Force Reserves.[4] As an Air Force reservist, Husband
accumulated certain retirement benefits.[5] After Wife filed for divorce, the two signed
a marital settlement agreement that provided Wife would be entitled to half of Husband’s
retirement benefits that were earned during their marriage.[6] This settlement agreement was adopted and
entered into by the lower court on April 28, 2009.[7]
The
court’s order required both parties to execute and deliver any documents necessary
to satisfy their obligation under the divorce agreement.[8] The order also had a formula for calculating the
retirement benefits, but that formula was incorrect.[9] Upon realizing this mistake, Wife filed a
Rule 74.06(a) motion to correct the formula in 2013.[10] The court granted Wife’s motion and corrected
the benefit calculation formula.[11]
On
December 7, 2017, Wife began to suspect that she was not receiving the correct
amount of retirement benefits.[12] She attempted to resolve this issue with Husband,
but he was unresponsive.[13] Consequently, Wife filed a motion to compel Husband
to disclose all correspondence from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
relating to his Air Force retirement benefits and to sign an authorization
releasing such records to her.[14] Husband opposed the motion arguing that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the motion was untimely, and the
motion would violate his due process and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”) privacy rights.[15] The court sustained Wife’s motion and Husband
eventually filed for a writ of prohibition.[16] The Supreme Court of Missouri granted Husband’s
preliminary writ of prohibition and subsequently issued its opinion.[17]
II.
Legal Background
The
deciding issue in this case was whether the trial court had the power to compel
Husband to produce documents related to the divorce agreement.[18] However, this case touched on numerous legal
issues. As a preliminary matter, this
case was litigated because Husband and Wife had a dispute arising out of a
marital separation agreement.[19] Marital separation agreements require court
approval, but a court will approve them as long as their terms are conscionable
and do not affect custody, support, and visitation of children.[20] Once a court adopts a separation agreement,
the agreement is treated like a court order.[21]
In
this case, Wife wanted to enforce the spirit of the separation agreement by
filing a motion to compel the production of documents.[22] Husband viewed this motion to compel as a
74.06(b) motion for relief from judgment.[23] Rule 74.06 governs the procedure for obtaining
relief from a final judgment.[24] Rule 74.06(a) grants relief from a final judgment
“at any time” when there is a clerical mistake or oversight that led to an
incorrect judgment.[25] In contrast, Rule 74.06(b) affords a litigant
a one year time frame to obtain relief from a judgment when the judgment was
based on mistake or fraud or when the judgment was irregular.[26] Rule 74.06(b) also provides for relief from a
judgment for a reasonable time period when the judgment is void, satisfied, or
inequitable.[27]
This
case was before the Supreme Court of Missouri because Husband sought a writ of
prohibition, which is “an extraordinary, discretionary remedy”.[28] A party may apply for an extraordinary writ when
that party alleges harm by an action of a court that is not a final judgment.[29] Extraordinary writs are usually not available
when a party can appeal a decision.[30] Essentially extraordinary writs give
appellate courts the power and discretion to maintain the rule of law and
prevent lower courts from acting beyond their authority.[31] Writs of prohibition originated in English
common law, where superior courts exercised their supervisory authority to
prohibit the improper actions of lower courts.[32] The primary purpose of a writ of prohibition
is to prevent lower courts from acting in excess of their jurisdiction.[33]
The
writ of prohibition can be issued in three circumstances:
(1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when
the trial court lacks jurisdiction; (2) to remedy a excess of jurisdiction or
an abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended;
or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not made
available in response to the trial court’s order.[34]
An appellate court
reviewing a lower court has the discretion to grant a writ of prohibition.[35] Essentially, writs of prohibition are only
granted if the lower court lacks the jurisdiction to perform the challenged
action and an appellate court, in its discretion, determines that this violation
is harmful enough to justify an extraordinary writ.[36]
In this case the dissent argued that the writ of
prohibition should have been granted and that the proper procedural remedy for
Wife, if any, was civil contempt.[37] Civil contempt is an action arising out of a
final judgment to enforce the rights and remedies of a private party as a
result of that judgment.[38] An action for civil contempt will lie if
someone knowingly violates a court order.[39] Civil contempt actions become moot if the
non-compliant party complies with the court order.[40]
Trial
courts, as a matter of course, have the power to enter orders and grant motion necessary
to enforce their own judgments.[41] However, “[a] trial court’s inherent
enforcement power applies to the judgment as originally rendered; the trial
court’s power to modify a judgment ceases when the judgment becomes final.”[42] A motion to compel the production of
documents is a discovery tool used to enforce proper discovery requests.[43] So, this case raised an interesting question about
whether the motion to compel the production of documents was merely
effectuating the judgment of the trial court or a discovery request beyond the
scope of the trial court’s jurisdiction.
III.
Instant Decision
A.
Majority
Judge
Patricia Breckenridge wrote the majority opinion joined by Judges George W. Draper,
W. Brent Powell, and Laura Denvir Stith.[44] The court began its decision by stating the
legal standard for writs of prohibition.[45] Next the court addressed the arguments made
by Husband in support of the writ of prohibition.[46] His primary argument was that the circuit
court lacked the authority to give Wife relief from the marital judgment
because the one year time frame had passed.[47] The court stated that the basis of Husband’s
argument was erroneous because Wife’s motion to compel was not limited to one
year after the judgment was entered, as she was not seeking relief from or a
modification to the judgment.[48] Instead the majority found that the trial
court was only effectuating its original judgment.[49]
Next
the court noted that Wife only sought the documents necessary to ensure that
she was receiving the correct amount of benefits from her dissolved marriage.[50] In addition, the judgment required both
parties “to execute all documents necessary to effectuate the division and
transfer of marital property.”[51] Consequently the court concluded that Wife
was not seeking to modify the judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b) but that she
was instead seeking to enforce the judgment against Husband.[52] The majority cited Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., which stated a “court generally has
the inherent power to make such proper orders as are necessary to effectuate
its decrees.”[53]
In concluding its opinion, the court
held that the lower court was only enforcing its original order when it ordered
Husband to turn over documents relating to the retirement benefits he accrued
during the marriage.[54]
B. Dissent
Judge
Mary R. Russell filed a dissenting opinion joined by Judge Paul C. Wilson and
Chief Justice Zel M. Fischer.[55] The
dissent argued that the proper procedure was not followed in the court below.[56] The dissent maintained that the proper
procedural remedy was a civil contempt motion because the judgment was final.[57] The dissent argued that after the judgment
became final the circuit court was deprived of jurisdiction.[58] Because the judgment was final, there would
have to be some rule or statute that would otherwise allow for a modification
of this judgment.[59] Because there was no such rule, the court was
not authorized to modify its judgment or compel the parties to act.[60] However, in the dissent’s view, if Wife had
filed a contempt action then the court could have ordered Husband to comply
with the judgment.[61]
IV.
Comment
This
case concerned a marital settlement that required both parties to “execute any
and all documents necessary to effectuate the [settlement agreement].”[62] Wife sought the production of documents to
ensure that she was receiving all benefits she was entitled to under the
divorce agreement.[63] Wife had no concrete evidence that Husband
was violating the divorce decree, which is why she sought discovery on the
matter.[64] Both sides agreed that the divorce agreement adopted
by the circuit court constituted a final judgment.[65]
Wife
argued that the terms requiring Husband to execute all documents necessary to
effectuate the settlement agreement required him to provide her with
information relating to his retirement benefits after the judgment was entered.[66] Even if this reading of the separation
agreement were correct, there was no clear grant of authority for the trial
court in this case. In light of this
fact, the dissent correctly pointed out that there must be some special rule granting
the circuit court jurisdiction when the case is no longer pending. The majority relied on Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., a case specifying that a court can
generally make orders to effectuate its decrees, particularly those referencing
declaratory judgments.[67] However, the purpose of Wife’s actions in
this case was to modify a finding of the martial separation agreement, not
enforce it.[68] Because Wife sought to modify the order, the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of Missouri should
have issued a permanent writ of prohibition.[69]
-David O'Connell
[1] State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell, No. SC 97008, 2019 WL 925516 (Mo. Feb.
26, 2019) (en banc).
[2] Id. at *1.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at *2.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at *3.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at *1.
[19] Id.
[20] Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 452.325 (2016).
[21] Id.
[22] State ex rel. Cullen, 2019 WL 925516, at *1.
[23] Id.
[24] Mo.
Sup. Ct. R. 74.06.
[25] Mo.
Sup. Ct. R. 74.06(a).
[26] Mo.
Sup. Ct. R. 74.06(b)–(c).
[27] Mo.
Sup. Ct. R. 74.06(b)(4)–(5); Cozart
v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc., 861 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
[28] State ex rel. Cullen, 2019 WL 925516, *3.
[29] Transit Cas. Co. ex rel. Pulitzer Publ’g Co. v. Transit
Cas. Co. ex rel. Intervening Emps.,
43 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Mo. 2001) (en banc), as
modified (Apr. 24, 2001).
[30] State ex rel. Hilburn v. Staeden, 62 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Mo. 2001) (en banc); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.22.
[31] See Smith v. State ex rel.
Rambo, 30 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
[32] Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232, 246
(1865).
[33] State ex rel. Rambo, 30 S.W.3d at 929.
[34] State ex rel. T.W. v. Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41, 43 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)
(quoting State ex rel. Proctor v. Bryson, 100 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Mo. 2003)).
[35] State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 45 (Mo. 2017)
(en banc).
[36] State ex rel. K-Mart Corp. v. Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1999)
(en banc).
[37] State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell, No. SC 97008, 2019 WL 925516, at *6 (Mo.
Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc).
[38] Jafarian-Kerman v.
Jafarian-Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
[39] Chem. Fireproofing Corp. v. Bronska,
553 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
[40] Id.
[41] McLean v. First Horizon Home Loan
Corp., 277 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
[42] Id.
[43] Zurheide-Hermann, Inc. v. London
Square Dev. Corp., 504 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1973).
[44] State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell, No. SC 97008, 2019 WL 925516, at *6 (Mo.
Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc).
[45] Id. at *3.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] Id. at *4.
[49] Id.
[50] Id. at *5.
[51] Id. at *4.
[52] Id.at *4–5.
[53] Id. at *5 (citing Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., 194 S.W.2d 20, 24–25
(Mo. 1946)).
[54] Id. at *7.
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] Id.
[61] Id.
[62] Id. at *8.
[63] Id. at *7.
[64] See id. at *8.
[65] Id. at *4, *7.
[66] Id. at *2.
[67] Id. at *5 (citing Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., 194 S.W.2d 20, 24–25
(Mo. 1946)).
[68] See id.
[69] See id.at *7 (citing
Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Tr., 336 S.W.3d 466, 468–69 (Mo.
2011) (en banc)).
