Puc-Ruiz v. Holder[1]

Opinion handed down December 23, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an administrative ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals that allowed the United States to deport an illegal alien who was Mexican citizen. Puc-Ruiz is a case of first impression for the Eighth Circuit in which the appellant alleged that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The court ruled that the Fourth Amendment violation did not reach the standard of “egregious” to warrant suppression of evidence and denied all petitions for review, thus allowing the deportation to proceed.

State v. Andrews[1]

Opinion handed down December 21, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

In cases where juveniles between the ages of twelve and seventeen are alleged to have committed a felony, the juvenile division may hold a certification hearing in which it may decide to transfer jurisdiction of the juvenile’s case to a court of general jurisdiction, where the juvenile may be tried as an adult. In State v. Andrews, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Missouri’s juvenile certification statute did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as applied in Apprendi v. New Jersey when the certification determination was made by a judge rather than a jury and when the only possible sentence under Missouri law for a minor convicted of first degree murder is life without parole. Additionally, the court held that sentencing a minor to life without parole for first degree murder does not deprive him of his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment as provided by the Eighth Amendment.

In re Finnegan[1]

Opinion handed down December 21, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected a recommendation that a family court commissioner be made to retire because the recommending commission lacked the authority to do so. The court ruled that the Commission on Retirement, Removal, and Discipline only had authority to make decisions regarding judges, members of judicial commissions, and members of the commission itself.

Moore v. State[1]

Opinion handed down December 7, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

A convicted felon in the State of Missouri has only one available avenue to correct an allegedly improper trial or conviction. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 provides that such a felon must make a claim that his conviction is improper due to (a) ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, (b) the sentencing court’s improper exercise of jurisdiction, or (c) an excessive sentence in violation of the law.[2] This case involves a defendant, Anthony Moore, who was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. Moore was informed by the judge at his sentencing that he would have ninety days to file for relief under 29.15 and received a copy of the court’s mandate from the court clerk that triggered the ninety day countdown; however, he waited 218 days and filed after the deadline. As a result, the lower court rejected Moore’s motion, and Moore appealed to this court, claiming that his appellate counsel ineffectively failed to notify him of the mandate. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the dismissal of Moore’s 29.15 motion.

United States v. Redzic[1]

Opinion handed down December 6, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s convictions for mail fraud and wire fraud under an “honest services” theory, a theory that was not explicitly stated in the indictment, trial arguments, or jury instructions, did not amount to a constructive amendment of the indictment. The court also held that defendant’s bribery conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

Cole v. Roper[1]

Opinion handed down November 5, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief for a death row inmate convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree assault, first-degree burglary, and two counts of armed criminal action. The inmate argued a Batson challenge, ineffective assistance of counsel, due process violations, and prosecutorial misconduct.

City of Lake Saint Louis v. City of O’Fallon[1]

Opinion handed down October 26, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri examined whether municipalities may bring declaratory judgment actions to solve boundary disputes with other municipalities. Individuals are prohibited from bringing such actions, but it was not clear if the prohibition extended to municipalities and other public corporations. The court said that the public policy reasoning behind prohibiting individuals from bringing such actions does not apply to municipalities. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri allowed Lake St. Louis to bring a declaratory judgment action against O’Fallon to determine the boundary between the two cities.

Deck v. Teasley[1]

Opinion handed down Oct. 26, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

In Deck v. Teasley, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed an action arising out of a traffic accident. After interpreting Missouri Revised Statutes section 490.715.5, the circuit court limited the plaintiff’s evidence of medical damages to the amount of money actually paid to the providers by Medicare coverage, supplemental insurance, and the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 490.715.5 supplies a rebuttable presumption that the dollar amount paid to satisfy the medical providers is the proper value of medical treatment when determining damages. The court found that the plaintiff had properly rebutted this presumption by presenting sufficient evidence that the amount billed was the actual value of her treatment. Additionally, the court held that testimony about possible future medical treatment, including surgery, is relevant and admissible, even if such treatment is not reasonably certain to occur at the time of trial.

State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McBeth[1]

Opinion handed down September 21, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Missouri imposes an ad valorem tax on electric utility facilities, requiring each company to “file a report with the county assessor describing its local property situated in the county and the ‘true value in money thereof.’”[2] Once the assessor receives that report, she certifies its accuracy, values the property, and sends her report to the state tax commission.[3] This case involved a dispute over the assessor’s valuation of Kansas City Power & Light Company’s two Platte County facilities.[4] A local school district and two of its school board members (collectively “West Platte”) brought suit against the Platte County assessor, arguing that she violated state law by undervaluing KCPL’s property, leading to a loss of revenue to the district.[5] After West Platte filed suit, KCPL intervened and filed motions to dismiss, which were denied by the Honorable Gerald McBeth of the Vernon County Circuit Court.[6] As a result, KCPL petitioned the Court of Appeals “to prohibit [Judge McBeth’s] purported exercise of jurisdiction over the lawsuit,” but the petition was denied.[7] The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, instituting preliminary and permanent writs of prohibition and holding that “KCPL and the assessor’s motions to dismiss should have been granted” because West Platte lacked standing to challenge KCPL’s assessments and the assessor did not violate any statutory requirements.[8]

Westerfeld v. Independent Processing, LLC[1]

Opinion handed down September 20, 2010.
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the meaning and applicability of the “local-controversy exception” to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. In particular, the court said that, for the purposes of the “significant defendant” provision of the exception, a court must consider a class action suit as a whole, instead of separately examining significant defendant status for each count, as the district court did. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further consideration.

In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation[1]

Opinion issued September 15, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

In a consolidated class action dispute regarding federal laws pertaining to certification of organically produced goods, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that (1) state laws that interfere with the federal certification process are subject to conflict preemption and (2) if preemption defeats the purpose of the Federal law, the state law claims are not preempted.

United States v. Miller[1]

Opinion handed down September 9, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a conviction for felony possession of a firearm. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to misstate the burden of proof needed to find the defendant guilty. The case was reversed and remanded.

Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc.[1]

Opinion handed down August 31, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s finding that a class arbitration waiver was substantively unconscionable but reversed the judgment allowing the action to proceed to arbitration. The court ruled that the only appropriate remedy was to strike the entire arbitration agreement.

Peoples Bank v. Frazee[1]

Opinion handed down August 31, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed an action to register a foreign default judgment against the guarantor of a loan. The guarantor filed a limited appearance in order to quash the foreign judgment for a lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that the guarantor had sufficient minimum contacts for the foreign state to properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Brinker Missouri, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue[1]

Opinion handed down August 31, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri examined a restaurant corporation’s claim that the purchases of kitchen equipment, non-disposable tableware, furniture and other items are exempt from Missouri’s use tax. The court interpreted the use tax narrowly, holding that restaurants are not entitled to the “production exemption” because they do not qualify as “plants” and that restaurant food service is not the same as manufacturing a product. Additionally, the court held that restaurants are not entitled to the “sale exclusion” because cutlery, furniture, and other items are not permanently transferred to customers and customers are not charged additional consideration for their temporary use.

State ex rel. Bobbie Jean Proctor and Vincent Proctor v. Honorable Edith L. Messina[1]

Opinion handed down August 31, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)’s general rule that ex parte communications with a litigant patient’s physician are prohibited did not preempt Missouri law because prior Missouri case law never created a right for attorneys to engage in voluntary and informal ex parte communication with a plaintiff’s physician. Rather, Missouri case law only confirmed that, prior to HIPAA, there was no state or federal law that prohibited such informal communications with a plaintiff’s physician. Furthermore, the court held that HIPAA’s regulation allowing disclosure of a patient’s protected health information in the course of “judicial proceedings” does not apply to an informal meeting for ex parte communications. Therefore, the trial court erred in issuing an order advising a plaintiff’s non-party treating physicians that they may or may not participate in informal discovery using ex parte communications because the ex parte meeting is not considered a “judicial proceeding.”

Ruhl v. Lee’s Summit Honda[1]

Opinion issued August 31, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held (1) an agreement to arbitrate disputes regarding the purchase of a vehicle requires arbitration of a claim that a dealer unlawfully charged a fee to prepare legal documents to finance vehicles; and (2) the trial court did not err in declaring a class arbitration waiver unconscionable when a single plaintiff’s recovery would total approximately $800. In sum, the court determined that the claim was within the scope of the arbitration agreement; however, the agreement’s class action waiver was unconscionable and could not be severed from the arbitration agreement.

Watson v. CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc.[1]

Opinion handed down August 30, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a ruling by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granting summary judgment in favor of an employer accused of maintaining a racially hostile work environment. In holding that summary judgment was improper, the Eighth Circuit found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs were subjected to a racially hostile work environment and whether the employer appropriately handled the incidents of harassment.

State ex rel. Laughlin v. Bowersox[1]

Opinion handed down August 23, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri discharged a man after he served over fifteen years in prison for burglary and property damage after finding that the circuit court in which the man was convicted and sentenced lacked jurisdiction. The court held that federal courts should have heard the defendant’s case because the offense occurred on federal property and the defendant’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction in an earlier proceeding did not bar his petition for habeas corpus relief.

White v. Director of Revenue[1]

Opinion issued August 3, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that the arresting police officer lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Adam White for driving while intoxicated. The contested issue of probable cause is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment. Since the government did not request written findings at trial, the trial court could have disbelieved the director of revenue’s (“director”) evidence. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment was not against the weight of the evidence.

State v. Bateman[1]

Opinion handed down August 3, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of deliberation when a defendant had adequate opportunity to terminate the confrontation, previously threatened the deceased, and brought a deadly weapon to the scene of the crime. Additionally, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defense’s Batson challenge when it found that the prosecutor’s strike of an African-American juror during voir dire was not racially motivated.

School District of Kansas City v. State[1]

Opinion issued August 3, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

In 2005, the Missouri legislature permitted charter schools to become local education agencies within public school districts. School District of Kansas City has a bold impact on state funding to public schools but, because of the law’s language, only affected the Kansas City Missouri School District (“KCMSD”). The KCMSD and three Missouri taxpayers brought suit against the state, arguing that the law violated the Missouri Constitution by allowing transfer of funds from KCMSD to the Kansas City charter schools and by creating an unfunded mandate for school districts to uphold. After a non-jury trial, the circuit court of Cole County rejected KCMSD’s claims and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed.

State ex rel. Garcia v. Goldman [1]

Opinion handed down July 16, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a seven-year period between when the defendant was indicted and when he was arrested for first degree assault violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial, reasoning that too many witnesses and too many years had slipped away for the state to show that the defense was unimpaired.

Vaca v. Missouri[1]

Opinion handed down June 15, 2010
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a criminal appellant’s defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the sentencing phase of a trial when he failed to consider calling a mental health expert to testify even though the counsel was apprised of the jury’s interest in appellant’s mental condition during the guilt phase. The court additionally held that the defense strategy of linking the defendant to a fourth robbery for which he had not been charged was reasonable, and, therefore, defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective on this point. The court determined that appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief should have been granted in part. Ultimately the judgment was upheld in part, remanded in part, and reversed in part.

Anderson v. Durham D & M, L.L.C.[1]

Opinion handed down May 26, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a ruling of a United States Court for the Western District of Missouri, granting summary judgment for a bus company accused of maintaining a racially hostile work environment and of discriminating against an employee because of his age and race.

Hayes v. Price[1]

Opinion handed down May 25, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court erred in submitting a comparable fault instruction because the defendant in this motor vehicle accident suit did not present evidence that the plaintiff was able to take evasive measures to avoid the accident. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. The plaintiff’s offer of settlement did not comply with section 408.040.21 because it included a demand for production of documents and statements from third parties.

State v. Williams[1]

Opinion handed down May 25, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri once again reinforced the standard that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense when he may be acquitted of a more serious offense and convicted on the lesser offense. Further, the court reemphasized that affirmative evidence is not required on the defendant’s part for such an instruction and that the jury may make any inferences from the evidence, even if that means believing some parts and disbelieving other parts of the evidence presented by either side.

Public Water Supply District No. 3 of Laclede County v. City of Lebanon [1]

--> Opinion handed down May 14, 2010
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals examined 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b) which protects rural districts’ utilities financed by a federal loan from competition with surrounding municipalities by not allowing municipalities to extend service to coverage within the area covered by the district. The Eighth Circuit held that the City of Lebanon, Missouri did not violate § 1926 by continuing to provide sewer and water services to pre-existing customers within the District’s boundaries. The court limited the services protected under § 1926(b) to those that are financed by the federal loan. Additionally, the court held that even though a developer or customer may not want to receive services from a rural district, if those services are available at a reasonable cost, the rural district is entitled to the customers.

Smith v. Pace[1]

Opinion handed down May 11, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Attorney Carl Smith petitioned the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, to quash a subpoena for a grand jury in Douglas County, accusing the prosecuting attorney and judge overseeing the grand jury of conspiring to conceal misconduct. Mr. Smith argued that his words were constitutionally protected speech, but a jury found him guilty of criminal contempt, and the judge sentenced him to 120 days in jail. The Supreme Court of Missouri issued a writ of habeas corpus to review the conviction. Ultimately, the court found that both the evidence and jury instructions issued in Mr. Smith’s trial were insufficient and discharged his sentence.

Feldhaus v. Missouri[1]

Opinion handed down April 20, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that sentencing definitions of the Missouri Revised Statutes § 577.023[2] did not violate the void for vagueness doctrine, and, as a result, the appellant’s constitutional rights of due process were not violated.The court reaffirmed that an appellant cannot raise constitutional claims once he has been counseled and voluntarily pleaded guilty.

In re Nessa [1]

Opinion handed down April 9, 2010.
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (hereinafter BAP) held that an individual retirement account (hereinafter IRA), which a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor inherited from her father before filing for bankruptcy, was exempt from the bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code’s exemption for retirement funds. This decision is inconsistent with a Texas bankruptcy court, which had recently held that inherited IRAs do not fall within the federal exemption.

Rentschler v. Nixon[1]

Opinion handed down April 6, 2010, modified on court’s own motion May 11, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held (1) there is no constitutional right to early release from prison; (2) Mo. HB 974 (1990) deals with only one subject: “relating to the department of corrections”; (3) ex post facto considerations only apply to criminal matters; and (4) section 558.011 does not implicate a vested right nor create a new disability.

Hightower v. Myers[1]

Opinion handed down March 9, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the jurisdictional guidelines in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) were statutory in nature, and, as such, an Appellant cannot raise the jurisdictional challenge on appeal if the alleged error was not preserved at trial. The court held further that the trial court’s finding that Missouri was the proper forum under the UCCJA to litigate custody of the child was supported by the evidence. Finally, the court held that the trial court’s additional finding that the modification of the custody decree was proper due to changed circumstances was supported by substantial evidence.

City of Springfield v. Adolph Belt, Jr.[1]

Opinion handed down March 2, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the City of Springfield's adjudication process for tickets issued from automated red light cameras was void.[2]

State v. Brooks[1]

Opinion handed down February 23, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri unanimously held that during trial, the State’s repeated references to a defendant’s post-Miranda silence violated his constitutional rights.[2] The prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument, audio evidence offered by the State, and the prosecutor’s examination of certain witnesses all contained statements that, after being Mirandized, the defendant had refused to offer an explanation of what had happened at the crime scene.[3] Although the trial court attempted to cure some of these violations by instructing the jury to disregard the State’s comments, it failed to properly instruct the jury to disregard other violative comments, and the curative effect of the court’s instruction to the jury was doubtful.[4] Finally, exculpatory evidence presented by the defense was not frivolous, and, although the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was substantial, it was not overwhelming.[5] The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment and remanded the case.[6]

Akins v. Director of Revenue
Opinion handed down on February 23, 2010[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed what constitutes a “conviction” for the purpose of determining when the Missouri Department of Revenue is required to revoke the driving privileges of a driver for ten years due to the driver receiving more than two convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that “conviction” means “a judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of an offense or a crime.”[2] As such, the defendant’s license was properly revoked even though his convictions arose from the same incident of driving while intoxicated.[3]