Opinion handed down on February 23, 2010[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed what constitutes a “conviction” for the purpose of determining when the Missouri Department of Revenue is required to revoke the driving privileges of a driver for ten years due to the driver receiving more than two convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that “conviction” means “a judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of an offense or a crime.”[2] As such, the defendant’s license was properly revoked even though his convictions arose from the same incident of driving while intoxicated.[3]
I. Facts
On July 20, 2006, Justin Akins was driving while intoxicated and struck another vehicle.[4] The collision injured three other people.[5] Akins subsequently pled guilty to three separate counts of second degree vehicular assault.[6] Following his plea, the Missouri Director of Revenue revoked his driving privileges for ten years under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 302.060(9) for receiving more than two convictions for driving while intoxicated.[7] Akins challenged the revocation arguing that, as his three convictions arose out of one incident, his convictions should actually be considered one conviction.[8] The trial court and the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District upheld the denial of driving privileges.[9] The Supreme Court of Missouri took the case up on appeal. As the issue was one statutory interpretation, the standard of review was de novo.[10]
II. Legal Background
The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the term “conviction” in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 302.060(9) does not refer to all the findings of guilt springing from a single incident, but refers to each and every individual determination that an offense has been committed.[11] The Supreme Court of Missouri based its reasoning on the plain language of the statute and the cannon of statutory construction known as expressio unius.[12] To determine the plain meaning of the term, the court first cited the definitions of “conviction” and “convict” from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language.[13] “A ‘conviction’ is the act of proving, finding, or adjudging a person guilty of an offense or crime.”[14] “The word ‘convict’ means ‘to find or declare guilty of an offense or crime by the verdict or decision of a court or other authority.”[15] Given these definitions, the court reasoned that the definitive concept of the term is that there has been a judicial determination that an offense has been committed.[16] Therefore, what matters is the number of convictions, not the number of separate incidents resulting in conviction.[17]
Beyond the plain meaning of the term, the court further buttressed its interpretation of the statute by utilizing the cannon of statutory construction known as expressio unius.[18] The court noted that Missouri Revised Statutes Section 558.016.3 defines a persistent offender as “one who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times.”[19] Similarly, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 558.016.5 defines a persistent misdemeanor offender as “one who has pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of two or more class A or B misdemeanors committed at different times.”[20] The court reasoned that these sections evidence that when the legislature wishes to determine sentencing based on separate incidents it expressly states its intention to do so.[21] Since it did not expressly state as such in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 302.060(9), the statute determines whether a license is required to be revoked according to the number of convictions and not the number of incidents leading to a conviction.[22] As such, the Director of Revenue properly revoked the driving privileges of Justin Akins.[23]
In reaching its conclusion the Supreme Court of Missouri noted that it was overturning the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District’s case of Harper v. Director of Revenue.[24] Harper defined conviction in a broader sense as a “judgment or sentence.”[25] The court rejected this interpretation.[26] It reasoned that the interpretation would result in the application of the statute turning on a trial court’s administrative determination of whether to enter separate judgments on each conviction or to consolidate the convictions into one judgment.[27] The court also further rejected the Court of Appeals’s assertion that applying the statute to multiple convictions resulting from a single accident would be inconsistent with legislative purpose because it would lead to absurd results.[28] The court reasoned that applying the statute to multiple convictions resulting from a single accident would serve the legislature’s purpose in that it would further deter drunk driving.[29]
III. Commentary
As with many issues of statutory construction, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Akins was faced more with a choice and a question of policy than with a question as to the truth of the matter. It is highly speculative to assume that those responsible for drafting the statutory sections relating to the licensing of public vehicles in Missouri were intimately familiar with the precise language of the criminal code. It is also highly speculative to assume that any state legislature was aware of the difference in the precise language between the two provisions. While cannons of statutory construction lend themselves to well-reasoned and clean judicial opinions, they often do not reflect the legislative reality of what is referred to as “the sausage factory of legislation.”
The Supreme Court of Missouri, nobly enough, sided against drunk drivers and in favor of public safety. Given the lack of Missouri legislative history materials available, it is impossible to say whether prior state legislatures would have approved of this interpretation. However, this policy choice of the court in favor of public safety is one that the current state legislature and public will likely applaud.
- Sean A. Smith
[1] No. SC 90181 (Mo. February 23, 2010). The West reporter citation is Akins v. Director of Revenue, 303 S.W. 3d 563 (Mo. banc 2010).[2] Id. at 565.
[3] Id. at 567.
[4] Id. at 564.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.; Akins v. Director of Revenue, No. ED 92173, 2009 WL 1515118 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009).
[10] Akins v. Director of Revenue, 303 S.W. 3d 563, 564 (Mo. 2010).
[11] Id at 565.
[12] Id. at 565-66.
[13] Id. at 565.
[14] Id. (citing to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 499 (3d ed.1993)).
[15] Id. (citing to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 499 (3d ed.1993)).
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 565-66.
[19] Id. at 565. (citing to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.016.3 (2000)).
[20] Id. (citing to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.016.5 (2000)).
[21] Id at 565-66.
[22] Id at 566.
[23] Id.
[24] Id at 567.
[25] Id at 566.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
