Tuesday, October 25, 2011

A.E.B. v. T.B.[1]

Opinion handed down October 25, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court lacked authority to order the mother in an initial child custody action to relocate back to a tri-county area in Missouri. The court held that while Revised Statutes of Missouri § 452.377 provides for relocation order procedures, it is inapplicable since it only applies to the modification of an existing child custody and visitation order.


Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Shirley Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, Mo.[1]

Opinion issued October 5, 2011
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

In this case, a three-judge panel from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Manchester, Missouri ordinance regulating funeral protests. While the Court determined the law was unconstitutional under Eighth Circuit precedent, it noted that the Sixth Circuit recently upheld a similar law. In a concurring opinion, Judge Diane E. Murphy suggested that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions might recommend a different analytical approach.


Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Simpson v. Simpson[1]

Opinion handed down October 4, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Mr. Simpson (Husband) appealed the dismissal of his motion to terminate maintenance arguing that the statutory presumption created by Revised Statutes of Missouri § 452.370, that maintenance terminates upon remarriage of the recipient, was not overcome by the written agreement between him and his wife (Wife), because it did not expressly waive the presumption. The Supreme Court of Missouri disagreed, holding that the express language is unnecessary so long as the writing between the parties extends the obligation, expressly or by implication.


Wehrenberg, Inc. v. Director of Revenue[1]

Opinion handed down October 4, 2011.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Revised Statutes of Missouri § 144.014, which imposed a one percent state sales tax on the sale of food items that can be purchased with food stamps, did not apply to Wehrenberg, Inc.’s concession sales in its movie theaters. The court reasoned that because the federal food stamp program defined food as “any food product for home consumption,” that Wehrenberg’s concession sales did not meet this definition.