Derousse v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Opinion handed down December 8, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (hereinafter “Insurer”) uninsured motorist coverage policy was too narrow and, therefore, that the policy’s coverage was governed by Missouri Revised Statute section 379.203.1, which requires the insurer to provide compensation for purely emotional damages. [2] Consequently, the trial court’s summary judgment order on behalf of the insurer was improper, and the case was remanded. [3]

Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Pratte

Opinion handed down December 8, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri confronted the caseload crisis of the Missouri public defender system in three consolidated cases. In two of the cases, the Supreme Court of Missouri limited the ability of district public defender offices to control their caseload. In the third case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that it was statutorily impermissible for trial court judges to appoint public defenders to represent indigent defendants in the attorney’s private capacity.

Gill v. State [1]

Opinion handed down December 1, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial.[2] Counsel failed to present evidence of sexually explicit material on the computer of the victim, evidence which should have been used by the defense to rebut the state’s evidence of the victim’s good character.[3] Although the state gave defense counsel a report detailing the contents of the victim’s computer, defense counsel did not diligently review the report and failed to recognize the sexually explicit file names listed in the report.[4] A reasonably competent attorney would also have interviewed the investigator who had knowledge of the contents of the computer.[5] This deficient performance prejudiced the defendant because, had the jury heard an alternative description of the victim, the jury may have decided that death was not the proper punishment for the defendant.[6] The court reversed and remanded the judgment as to the penalty phase.[7]

State of Missouri v. John L. Richard[1]

Opinion handed down November 17, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a Missouri statute[2] prohibiting possession of a firearm while intoxicated was not facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.

Cicle v. Chase Bank USA

Opinion handed down October 6, 2009[1]
Link to 8th Circuit Opinion

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that a consumer credit card agreement’s provisions barring participation in a class-action lawsuit and compelling arbitration for any subsequent dispute were not unconscionable.

United States v. Robert Collier[1]

Handed down September 21, 2009
Link to 8th Cir. Opinion


The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri lacked authority to lower the sentence of defendant Robert Collier for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.[2] Although the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) had been amended to reduce the offense levels for crack cocaine offenses,[3] this amendment did not lower Collier’s sentencing range because his offense level was taken from the career offender guideline, not the crack cocaine guideline.[4]

In re Larry D. Coleman[1]

Opinion handed down September 15, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a lawyer violated rules of professional responsibility by creating an improper fee agreement with his client, improperly accepting a settlement on the client's behalf, failing to provide information to the client after withdrawal, and comingling the client's funds with his own funds. The court stayed execution of a one-year suspension of the attorney's license and placed him on probation for one year.

Merriweather v. State [1]

Opinion handed down September 1, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial when the state failed to disclose the alleged victim’s criminal convictions prior to her testifying at his trial. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 25.03 imposes an affirmative duty of good faith upon the state to find any information that may be in the possession or control of other government personnel. A search by the prosecutor of other databases that were available to the state would have revealed that the victim had a criminal record. Because the state failed to uncover and disclose those records to the defense prior to trial, the state had to show that it acted diligently in its search, and the court found that the state did not meet this burden. Because the state’s case rested entirely on the testimony of the victim, the state’s failure to uncover and disclose the criminal history of the witness prejudiced the defendant. The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

Committee for Educational Equality v. State of Missouri

Opinion handed down September 1, 2009 [FN 1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Missouri’s public education funding formula does not violate the Missouri Constitution, nor was it an irrational or arbitrary act by the legislature to rely on the Missouri State Tax Commission’s 2004 assessment in crafting the funding formula.

Committee for Educational Equality v. State of Missouri

Opinion handed down September 1, 2009

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Missouri’s public education funding formula does not violate the Missouri Constitution, nor was it an irrational or arbitrary act by the legislature to rely on the Missouri State Tax Commission’s 2004 assessment in crafting the funding formula.

I. Background

Plaintiffs alleged that Missouri’s school funding formula is unconstitutional in that it is disparate and inadequate in its support of public education. [FN 2] They contend that the formula is flawed because it incorrectly calculates tax assessment data, which then renders incorrect “local effort” contributions and directly affects the adequacy and equity of Missouri public education funding. [FN 3] Defendants argued that the funding produced under the formula is adequate because it complies with the funding mandate outlined in article IX, section 3(b) of the Missouri Constitution, which requires the State to contribute no less than twenty-five percent of the State’s revenue to fund public education. [FN 4] The trial court agreed with the Defendants that the funding formula is in compliance with the mandate set forth in the Missouri Constitution and dismissed the assessment calculation challenges on standing and jurisdictional grounds. [FN 5] The trial court also rejected the Plaintiff’s claim that the legislature wrongly relied on the State Tax Commission’s 2004 assessment data. [FN 6]

Plaintiffs raised four categories of challenges to Missouri’s funding formula on appeal: (1) the formula inadequately funds schools in violation of article IX of the Missouri Constitution; (2) the formula violates equal protection; (3) the formula violates Missouri’s Hancock Amendment; and (4) the legislature violates article X of the Missouri Constitution and certain statutes by incorporating inaccurate assessment figures into the formula. [FN 7]

II. Procedural Issues

The court first addressed the standing of three different groups of plaintiffs: school district organizations, taxpayers, and students. [FN 8] “Standing requires that a party seeking relief has some legally protectable interest in the litigation so as to be affected directly and adversely by its outcome.” [FN 9]

A. School District Organizations

The court found that the school districts had standing to assert the alleged violation of article IX, section 1(a) because under their interpretation they would be entitled to more funds. [FN10] Also, the school districts had standing to challenge the State’s reliance on certain tax assessments because they allege this impacts their duty to provide free public education under article IX, section 1(a). [FN11] The court also found that the school districts did not have standing to assert equal protection violations or violations of the Hancock Amendment because they are not persons within the protection of the due process and equal protection clauses, and the Hancock Amendment by its terms does not grant standing to school districts or their representative organizations. [FN 12]

B. Taxpayers

The court found that plaintiff taxpayers did have standing to raise assessment challenges to the extent that they allege the State is spending tax revenue improperly under articles IX and X of the Missouri Constitution. [FN 13] However, the court also found that the taxpayers did not have standing to bring equal protection claims on behalf of public school students generally. [FN 14]

C. Students

The court found that the students had standing because their interests in public education are directly affected, and their claims were not moot because some of them remain in public school. With respect to those who are not in school, their claims were not moot because they presented claims capable of repetition that may otherwise evade review. [FN 15]

Because at least one plaintiff had standing to raise each claim, the court considered each of the challenges. [FN 16]

D. Defendant-Intervenors

The trial court allowed permissive intervention to three taxpayers seeking to join the State’s defense of the school district funding formula. [FN 17] The court reviews permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion. [FN 18] Under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 52.12(b), permissive intervention is provided in three circumstances: (1) when allowed by statute; (2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common; or (3) when the State is seeking intervention in a case raising constitutional or statutory challenges. [FN 19] The court found that none of the three circumstances was applicable in the present case, and the trial court erred in allowing the permissive intervention. [FN 20] However, intervention error does not merit reversal unless the plaintiffs were harmed. [FN 21] The court found that the Plaintiffs did not demonstrate a specific harm or specify litigation costs caused by the improper intervention, and, therefore, the intervention does not require reversal. [FN 22]

III. School Funding Formula Does Not Violate Article IX

The court reviewed the trial court’s interpretation of the Missouri Constitution de novo. [FN 23]

Article IX, section 3(b) of the Missouri Constitution provides,

In event the public school fund provided and set apart by law for the support of free public schools, [sic] shall be insufficient to sustain free schools at least eight months in every year in each school district of the state, the general assembly may provide for such deficiency; but in no case shall there be set apart less than [25] percent of the state revenue, exclusive of interest and sinking fund, to be applied annually to the support of the free public schools. [FN 24]

Plaintiffs did not argue that the funding formula fails under section 3(b) of article IX but argued that it fails section 1(a). Section 1(a) states,

A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state within ages not in excess of [21] years as prescribed by law. [FN 25]

Plaintiffs argued that section 1(a) dictates a separate funding requirement from 3(b), which requires the legislature to provide “adequate” education funding in excess of the twenty-five percent funding requirement in section 3(b). [FN 26]

The court found that section 1(a) is purely aspirational and as such does not constitute a separate funding requirement beyond section 3(b). [FN 27] Since the State had met the twenty-five percent funding requirement under section 3(b), the Plaintiffs’ contention that the funding formula is unconstitutional because it fails section 1(a) was without merit. [FN 28]

IV. School Funding Formula Does Not Violate Equal Protection

Plaintiffs contended that Missouri’s funding formula violates article I, section 2 of the Missouri Constitution, which guarantees equal rights and opportunities under the law. [FN 29] The Missouri Constitution provides that the law cannot treat similarly situated persons differently without adequate justification. [FN 30] If the law impacts a fundamental right, the court will use strict scrutiny review, but where a fundamental right is not impacted, the court will use rational-basis review. [FN 31] Education is not a fundamental right under the United States Constitution’s equal protection provisions. [FN 32] The court found that education is not a fundamental right under the Missouri Constitution. Because the Missouri Constitution contemplates disparate funding schemes for public schools throughout the State and because there is no free-standing adequacy requirement or an equalizing mandate, the court found that the Plaintiffs failed to show that the funding formula impacts a fundamental right. [FN 33]

Because education is not a fundamental right under the Missouri Constitution, the court reviewed the funding formula under rational-basis review, under which it will uphold the law if it is justified by any set of facts. [FN 34] The court found that funding schools in a way that combines State and local funds with State funds going disproportionately to schools with fewer local funds cannot be said to be irrational as part of the legislature’s legitimate attempt to fund public educations pursuant to article IX, section 1(a) of the Missouri Constitution. [FN 35]

IV. School Funding Formula Does Not Violate the Hancock Amendment

The Plaintiffs alleged that the funding formula violates section 16 of the Hancock Amendment by requiring new programs without funding them and violates section 21 by reducing the state-financed portion of certain educational programs. [FN 36] Section 23 of the Hancock Amendment details the available remedies to taxpayers and only allows for declaratory relief. [FN 37] The court had previously found that section 23 cannot be read as a waiver of sovereign immunity for money judgments against the state but rather must be read to grant a judgment relieving a local government of the duty to perform an inadequately funded and required service or activity. [FN 38] In this case, the Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment to require the State to increase school funding, a remedy the court found to be unavailable under the Hancock Amendment. [FN 39] Because the Plaintiffs disaffirmed that they desired to be released from any mandate, the court found that their Hancock Amendment challenge failed. [FN 40]

V. School Funding Formula Does Not Violate Article X or Other Statutes

Plaintiffs argued that the funding formula violates the Missouri Constitution article X, sections 3, 4, and 14 and that it violates several Missouri statutes. [FN 41] The court said that the constitutional and statutory provisions cited by the Plaintiffs speak to what the State Tax Commission must do and outline procedures for the mandates of school funding. [FN 42] The Plaintiffs' claim, however, was not that the Commission acted improperly (the Commission is not a party to this case) but that the legislature acted improperly in relying on the Commission’s reports in calculating the funding formula. [FN 43] The concurring and dissenting opinion issued by Judge Wolff in this case criticized the equality of the Missouri tax assessment scheme, and it highlighted that unconstitutionally disparate taxation is disallowed pursuant to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinion in Missouri ex rel. School District of City of Independence v. Jones. [FN 44] However, the court found that the issue of Missouri’s assessment scheme and its relationship to the funding of public education was not a question before the court in this case, and, therefore, the court refused to address it. [FN 45]

The court found that the constitutional provisions invoked by the Plaintiffs do not restrict the legislature’s discretion in shaping the public school formula and, in the absence of a constitutional bar, the legislature has plenary power to craft the funding formula. [FN 46] Therefore, the Plaintiff’s only remaining argument was that the legislature acted irrationally or arbitrarily in its reliance on the Commission’s 2004 assessment data. [FN 47]

The Plaintiffs relied on a Public Policy Research Center Report (PPRC) conducted by the University of Missouri-St. Louis in 2006, which concluded that the funding formula under review was based on assessment calculations that varied widely throughout the state and were unacceptably low because they did not reflect market values to argue that the legislature’s reliance on the Commissions 2004 assessment was irrational. [FN 48] The court rejected this assertion for multiple reasons. [FN 49] First, the court said the report was created after the funding formula, so the legislature did not have access to the report when creating the formula. [FN 50] Second, the court said that even if the 2004 Commission data is imperfect, it cannot be said that reliance on it by the legislature was irrational. [FN 51] The court found that the legislature incorporated the information it had at the time, and the fact that there is perhaps a better or more proper assessment practice available after the fact was not determinative under the great discretion granted to the legislature under rational-basis review. [FN 52]

The court found that the legislature’s reliance on the 2004 Commission data was permissible because it was a rational attempt toward the legitimate end of funding Missouri’s public schools. [FN 53] The court said its role is not to assess the wisdom of the legislature’s judgments, which would violate the separation of powers. [FN 54] Likewise, the court found that the legislature’s decisions to phase in the new formula over seven years and to freeze the 2004 data was not irrational because it could serve to promote continuity between funding systems, and the freezing of the assessment data is consistent with the legislature’s revisiting of public education funding every ten years. [FN 55]

Therefore, the court found no error in the trial court’s findings that upheld the funding formula for Missouri public schools. [FN 56]

VI. Commentary

The Plaintiffs’ argument in this case was essentially a policy argument against the way the Missouri legislature has decided to fund Missouri public education. The Missouri Constitution has little to say, other than the twenty-five percent minimum of State revenues that must be allocated to public education, which can be interpreted as an affirmative requirement upon the legislature. The court does not say that the Plaintiffs’ policy reasons to question the legislature’s judgment are invalid. In fact, the court explicitly puts aside that question because it finds its role is not to second guess the legislature in this area but to ensure that the legislature has met its affirmative obligations under the Missouri Constitution and that it has not impermissibly discriminated in any way. The concurring judge in this case was willing to address questions that the majority was not because he felt it justifiable to consider whether the Missouri tax assessment scheme was itself valid. The majority felt it improper to consider this issue because the Missouri Tax Commission was not a party to the case. The question here was not whether the tax assessment was itself valid but whether the legislature committed a constitutionally deficient error in its reliance on the 2004 Missouri tax assessment. Because education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution or the Missouri Constitution, the court conducted a rational-basis review and concluded that the legislature had acted rationally. If the Plaintiffs proceed further, they have two clear alternatives available to them: first, they may be able to attack the Missouri tax assessment scheme itself by bringing an action against the Missouri Tax Commission; and second, they could bring their policy arguments to the legislature itself, which is, arguably, the more proper forum in which to address these issues.

- Bradley S. Dixon

[FN 1] No. 89010 (Mo. Sept. 1, 2009). The West reporter citation is Committee for Educational Equality v. State,294 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).

[FN 2] Id. at *1. The current formula being challenged is located at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 163 (Supp 2008). The simplified formula is [weighted average daily attendance] x [state adequacy target] x [dollar value modifier] = subtotal of dollars needed – [local effort] = state funding. Id.

[FN 3] Id.

[FN 4] Id. at *3.

[FN 5] Id.

[FN 6] Id.

[FN 7] Id.

[FN 8] Id.

[FN 9] Id. (citing Mo. State Med. Ass’n v. State, 256 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).

[FN 10] Id. at *4

[FN 11] Id.

[FN 12] Id.

[FN 13] Id. at *5. See Ste. Genevieve Sch. Dist. R-II v. Bd. of Alderman, 66 S.W. 3d 6, 11 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (finding that a taxpayer had standing to seek a declaratory judgment that the city was acting beyond its authority where a redevelopment project would cost the school district and the city future tax revenue).

[FN 14] Id. See Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (claims of equal protection rights generally may not be raised by third parties).

[FN 15] Id.

[FN 16] Id.

[FN 17] Id.

[FN 18] Id. at *6.

[FN 19] Id.

[FN 20] Id.

[FN 21] Id. (citing St. Louis County v. Vill. of Peerless Park, 726 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987).

[FN 22] Id.

[FN 23] Id. at *7.

[FN 24] Id.

[FN 25] Id.

[FN 26] Id.

[FN 27] Id. at *8.

[FN 28] Id.

[FN 29] Id.

[FN 30] Id.

[FN 31] Id.

[FN 32] Id. at *9. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

[FN 33] Id.

[FN 34] Id.

[FN 35] Id. at *10.

[FN 36] Id. See Mo. Const. art. X, §§ 16-24.

[FN 37] Id. See Taylor v. State, 247 S.W.3d 546, 548 (Mo. banc 2008).

[FN 38] Id. See Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. State, 896 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Mo. banc 1995).

[FN 39] Id.

[FN 40] Id. at *11.

[FN 41] Id.

[FN 42] Id.

[FN 43] Id.

[FN 44] Id. (citing 653 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)).

[FN 45] Id. at *12

[FN 46] Id.

[FN 47] Id.

[FN 48] Id. at *2, *12.

[FN 49] Id. at *12.

[FN 50] Id.

[FN 51] Id.

[FN 52] Id.

[FN 53] Id. at *14

[FN 54] Id.

[FN 55] Id.

[FN 56] Id.

Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc.[1]
Opinion handed down August 4, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the voluntary payment doctrine was not available as a defense to the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.[2] When a plaintiff pays money to a defendant due to the defendant’s violation of the Act, allowing the defendant to use this doctrine would circumvent the Act’s purpose of protecting consumers and “regulat[ing] the marketplace to the advantage of those traditionally thought to have unequal bargaining power as well as those who may fall victim to unfair business practices.”[3]

State of Missouri v. Robert M. Oliver
Opinion handed down August 4, 2009 [FN 1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court’s refusal to suppress evidence seized without a warrant was not clearly erroneous because of the inevitable discovery doctrine and that the subsequent warrant to search the items was not invalid because, regardless of any alleged impermissible evidence in the supporting affidavit, the affidavit was supported by sufficient independent probable cause. Further, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions on counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and promoting child pornography.

State ex rel. Ashby Road Partners, LLC v. State Tax Commission[1]
Opinion handed down August 4, 2009.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the State Tax Commission of Missouri could require a complaining taxpayer to provide evidence of the true market value of the properties in dispute, that the tax commission is not bound to accept the true market value originally calculated by the assessor, and that, while the assessor cannot advocate for a higher assessed value than the one he determined for the relevant assessment period, he is free to put forth evidence of higher true market value in defense of a discrimination claim.

Weigand v. Edwards
Opinion handed down August 4, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a father who owed more than $10,000 in child support had to post a bond for the owed amount before he could petition the courts for modification of child custody. The court found that the statute requiring a bond in the full amount owed does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States or Missouri Constitutions under a balancing of interests test. Likewise, the court found that the statute is not an unreasonable or arbitrary barrier in violation of the open courts provision of the Missouri Constitution. The court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Edward’s petition.

Jones v. Mid-Century Insurance
Opinion handed down June 30, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed whether a particular car insurance policy reduced the amount an insured motorist could recover from an accident with an underinsured individual. The court looked at whether this amount was reduced by deducting the amount the insured motorist received from the underinsured individual from the coverage limit of the insurance policy or by deducting the amount received from the motorist’s total damages and then applying the policy’s coverage limit. The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the particular insurance contract deducted the amount received from the motorist’s total damages and then applied the policy’s coverage limit. The reasoning behind the court’s holding is not clear because, while the court appears to rely on the proposition that inconsistencies in an insurance contract are resolved in favor of the insured, the court asserts that the contract can be interpreted in a manner that gives meaning to all subsections of the contract.

Miller v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission[1]
Opinion handed down June 30, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a worker's injury, suffered while at work but not caused by the work itself, did not arise out of his employment and therefore did not entitle him to workers' compensation benefits.

State ex rel. Henley v. Bickel[1]
Opinion handed down June 16, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed plaintiffs to sue an automobile passenger under joint venture and master-servant theories for negligence arising from a motor vehicle accident and made absolute the passenger’s writ of prohibition to prevent the lawsuit. The majority found that the plaintiffs’ petition did not plead sufficient facts to show the passenger had a “realistic right of control” under either theory.[2] Judges Fischer and Teitelman dissented, arguing that the “normal rules of procedure” provided a remedy and the issuance of the writ circumvented the trial court and appellate processes.[3]

Doe v. Keathley

Opinion handed down June 16, 2009. [1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

I. Introduction

The Missouri Supreme Court held that the federal Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) imposes an independent obligation on sex offenders living in Missouri to register, even if they would not been required to register under state law.

State of Missouri v. Jacob R. Pribble

Opinion handed down May 26, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 566.151, a newly enacted emergency measure that criminalizes enticement of a child, is not unconstitutional. Specifically, the court held that the prescribed punishment was not cruel and unusual, and the statute itself was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Finally, the court held that the statute was enacted pursuant to a valid and supported legislative determination that an emergency existed so as to justify the waiver of the standard ninety-day waiting period before a newly enacted law takes effect.

State v. Gaw

Opinion handed down May 26, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a criminal suspect's waiver of Miranda rights is valid even if he was previously questioned on the same subject while in custody and prior to receiving a Miranda warning. The court held that statements made both before and after a Miranda warning were admissible if the questioning officer did not intentionally undermine Miranda by withholding the warning.

Jay Wolfe Imports Missouri, Inc. v. Director of Revenue

Opinion handed down May 5, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that an auto dealership was not entitled to corporate income tax apportionment on income from vehicles purchased by out-of-state buyers. Before apportionment of a corporation’s income is allowed, the corporation must first have income produced outside of Missouri. When a buyer purchases and takes delivery of an auto in Missouri, the sale is deemed to have occurred wholly within Missouri, even if the buyer lists an out-of-state address in the dealership’s records. The court affirmed the tax assessment of the Director of Revenue and the Administrative Hearing Commission.

Susan M. Cannon (Randall) v. James R. Cannon

Opinion handed down April 14, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 452.375 of the Missouri Revised Statutes was constitutional and not applied retroactively to a convicted felon prohibited from having unsupervised visitation with his children due to a post-conviction amendment to section 452.375. The court stated that no one has a vested right in the “anticipated continuance of the existing law.”[2] The court also held that the statute did not deprive him of his fundamental right to associate with his children because he was allowed supervised visitation; nor did the statute violate his equal protection rights.

State v. The Hon. Paul Parkinson

Opinion handed down April 14, 2009[1]
Link to Missouri Supreme Court Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri, in regards to the procedures for committing sexually violent predators, addressed the effect of the Department of Corrections (DOC) providing a psychological analysis to the Attorney General and the sexual predator multidisciplinary review team that was performed by a psychologist without a license in Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri came to several conclusions. First, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the failure of the state to follow the procedural requirements of Section 632.483 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, the procedures for notifying the Attorney General of a potential sexually violent predator, constitutes a legal error and is not a jurisdictional defect that deprives a court of its subject matter authority to hear a case. Second, a properly prepared end-of-confinement report by a Missouri-licensed psychologist is not a condition precedent to the Attorney General’s right to file a petition seeking to have an individual declared a sexually violent predator (SVP) or for a court’s authority to hear a case on the issue. Third, the error was waived by not raising the issue for three years during which time the trial court entertained various other motions. Fourth, even if the error was not waived, failure of the DOC’s psychological assessment to be performed by a psychologist licensed by Missouri was not prejudicial for a series of reasons: the psychologist was licensed in the state of Texas and was licensed in the state of Missouri several months after issuance of the assessment; despite the error in the formation of the report, the multi-disciplinary committee’s recommendation was that the individual was not a SVP; the Attorney General has discretionary authority to seek someone declared a SVP whatever the contents of the DOC’s psychological assessment or multidisciplinary committee report; and the initial psychological assessment by the DOC is not the psychological assessment used when a trial court determines whether an individual is a sexually violent predator.

Middleton v. Mo. Dept. of Corrections

Opinion handed down February 24, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that execution protocols propounded by the Missouri Department of Corrections (“DOC”) are exempted from the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”) requirements of notice and public comment prior to adoption of a rule. The Court held that because DOC protocol decisions are not a product of rulemaking, notice and public comment are not required.

Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations

Opinion handed down February 24, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that eight counts of a nine-count petition challenging the constitutional validity of the 2005 amendments to Missouri’s workers’ compensation statutes were neither justiciable nor ripe for review. Regarding the remaining count, the Court held that the amendments removed certain injuries previously covered by workers’ compensation from the scope of the workers’ compensation system, and workers suffering such injuries may now seek compensation for those injuries from their employers at common law.

Roberts v. State[1]

Opinion handed down February 10, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a trial court decision rejecting a defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The defendant’s motion stemmed from an alleged misunderstanding in the negotiation of his plea agreement. In its decision, the Court voiced a disfavored view of group pleas, holding that the defendant’s appeal would have failed but for the fact that his plea was entered in a group plea with eight other unrelated defendants. In dicta, the Court indicated that group plea mechanisms, often used to promote judicial economy, are disfavored because they may be less likely to fulfill due process requirements. Though it stopped short of invalidating the practice, the decision suggests the Supreme Court of Missouri and other Missouri appellate courts will analyze motions for post-conviction relief derived from a group plea setting more closely in the future.

J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla[1]

Opinion handed down Jan. 27, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the statutory provision requiring a parent to post a bond prior to filing a petition to modify a child custody order is not jurisdictional in nature.[1] This holding abrogates a prior case, Miller v. Miller,[2] which determined that the statutory condition is a matter of personal jurisdiction.

State v. Teer[1]

Opinion handed down January 27, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri invalidated the sentence received by a defendant convicted of manslaughter because after the case had been submitted to the jury, the state amended the charges to allege that the defendant was also a prior felony offender, in contravention of statutory procedure. Because the prior offender status led to a longer sentence, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the action constituted prejudicial error and reversed the sentencing.

Lawrence v. Beverly Manor[1]

Opinion handed down January 13, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Missouri Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement found in a nursing home admission contract did not bind a plaintiff in a wrongful death action against the nursing home because a wrongful death claim is not "derived through" an underlying tort claim of the decedent.[2] The lawsuit, therefore, could proceed without arbitration. The holding clarified a previous decision where the Court stated that, for the purpose of venue, a wrongful death claim is not a new cause of action but one "derivative of the underlying tortious acts."[3]

Bechtel v. Missouri Department of Social Services[1]

Opinion handed down January 13, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

I. Introduction

In January, 2009, the Missouri Supreme Court found that a provision of the legislatively overhauled PersonalCare Assistance (PCA) program, which excluded individuals who had a legal guardian appointed for reasons of mental disability violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Appellant, a woman with a disability who had received benefits under the PCA program before the change, was subsequently denied PCA benefits after the amendment’s passage. The Court did not decide whether funding Appellant received under the Missouri Health Net program was a “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA.