Washington v. Denney

Opinion handed down August 13, 2018

            Ecclesiastical Denzel Washington was an inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center (“Crossroads”) in Missouri.[1]  He suffered from asthma and other respiratory ailments that were aggravated by secondhand smoke.[2]  While Crossroads was nominally a smoke-free facility, in reality a large portion of the population smoked and were permitted to do so in their cells.[3]  This smoke-intensive environment aggravated Washington’s condition, which led him to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to protect his Constitutional rights.[4]  Washington brought suit against a group of prison officials alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.[5]  Washington prevailed, collecting compensatory and punitive damages in a federal district court.[6]  A three-judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury’s findings of fact but vacated the award of punitive damages and remanded the case for further proceedings on damages.[7]

State v. Stricklin

Opinion handed down June 26, 2018

            A Missouri mother awoke one morning in January of 2013 to discover her two-year old daughter crying and bleeding from her genitals.[1]  She took her to a hospital where she underwent surgery and spent five days recuperating.[2]  Suspicion fell on the mother’s boyfriend, Thomas A. Stricklin (“Stricklin”), who was staying in the house at the time of the incident.[3]  In a December 2016 trial, Stricklin was convicted of first-degree statutory sodomy, partially based on evidence collected in a police interrogation wherein Stricklin was not given Miranda warnings.[4]  The trial court admitted the evidence on a finding that the interrogation was not custodial.[5]  In a divided decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District reversed and remanded the case, holding that, at a certain point, the interrogation became custodial and therefore portions of the interview should have been suppressed on Miranda grounds.[6]

Miller v. State

Opinion handed down on July 31, 2018

In Miller v. State, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed a grant of postconviction relief to a defendant who challenged his conviction based on the revocation of his probation.[1]  The question before the court was whether the trial court made “every reasonable effort” to hold the hearing before the end of his probation term.[2]  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did make “every reasonable effort” to hold the hearing prior to the expiration of the probation term, despite allowing for continuances, because the continuances were agreed to by both parties.[3]

Spence v. BNSF Ry. Co.

Opinion issued May 22, 2018, and modified on the Court's own motion June12, 2018

            Sherry Spence sued BNSF Railway (“BNSF”) for wrongful death in 2013 after her husband, Scott Spence, was struck and killed in his pickup truck by a BNSF train at a railway crossing.[1]  The case went to trial in 2015, and the jury returned a multi-million dollar verdict for Sherry Spence.[2]  After the verdict, BNSF filed a motion for a new trial based chiefly on the intentional nondisclosure of a jury member.[3]  The circuit court overruled the motion, and BNSF appealed.[4]  The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, holding that BNSF had waived its right to seek relief based on juror nondisclosure.[5]

Kohner Properties, Inc. v. Johnson

Opinion handed down July 3, 2018

In a divided opinion, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a 3-2 per curiam opinion,[1] holding that when a tenant asserts a breach of the implied warranty of habitability as a defense in an action by a landlord to recover rent, and the tenant retains possession of the property, then a trial court may institute an in custodia legis procedure, which requires a tenant to place unpaid rent into an escrow account to be distributed at the conclusion of the litigation.[2]   

State v. Ajak

Opinion handed down April 3, 2018

            Daniel Ajak was charged with three counts of domestic assault and one count of resisting arrest under section 575.150 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.[1]  A jury acquitted him of two of the three domestic assault charges, and the prosecutor dismissed the remaining domestic assault charge when the jury could not reach a verdict.[2]  The jury did, however, convict Mr. Ajak of resisting arrest.[3]  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, Judge Laura Denvir Stith writing for the majority, reversed Mr. Ajak’s conviction, holding that any resistance by Mr. Ajak occurred after his arrest had been effected, and therefore did not constitute resisting arrest under section 575.150.[4]