A
Missouri mother awoke one morning in January of 2013 to discover her two-year
old daughter crying and bleeding from her genitals.[1] She took her to a hospital where she
underwent surgery and spent five days recuperating.[2] Suspicion fell on the mother’s boyfriend,
Thomas A. Stricklin (“Stricklin”), who was staying in the house at the time of
the incident.[3] In a December 2016 trial, Stricklin was convicted
of first-degree statutory sodomy, partially based on evidence collected in a
police interrogation wherein Stricklin was not given Miranda warnings.[4]
The trial court admitted the evidence on
a finding that the interrogation was not custodial.[5] In a divided decision, the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District reversed and remanded the case, holding that,
at a certain point, the interrogation became custodial and therefore portions
of the interview should have been suppressed on Miranda grounds.[6]
I. Facts and Holding
On
January 31, 2013, Stricklin met Police Officer, Brad Judge, at a police station
where he was patted down and taken to an interview room with Police Officer, Stacy
Minze, and a social services case worker.[7] The three met for a little more than an hour.
Stricklin initially indicated he thought the two-year-old sustained the injuries
to her genitalia by falling on a toy.[8] Officers Judge and Minze pressed Stricklin
and stated they did not believe him, which caused Stricklin to ask for a
lawyer.[9] Officer Minze told Stricklin that it was his
choice to obtain counsel, but advised Stricklin that he was being given an
opportunity to explain things in their meeting.[10]
Eighteen
minutes into the interrogation the discussion became argumentative, at which
point Officer Judge stated, “Well, I’m gonna step out and let you talk to these
two ladies. When I come back in, if you
haven’t settled this up, and straightened it out, you’re probably going. You’re going in cuffs. I don’t believe you for one minute.”[11] Officer Judge then left the room, whereupon
Stricklin asked for an attorney and was again told “[t]hat’s your choice.”[12] Officer Minze relayed to Stricklin that, if
the perpetrator was not identified, the two-year-old would have to take
“anti-AIDS” medication, which would make her physically ill.[13] Upon hearing this, Stricklin began to ask
what would happen if he admitted to causing the injury.[14]
Stricklin
inquired, “[a]m I gonna go to jail?” to which Officer Minze stated, “Yeah, you
will probably go to jail.”[15] Officer Minze urged Stricklin to reveal more information
about the two-year-old’s injury and stated that if Stricklin made a confession,
it would make a difference in how the
court viewed him.[16] Stricklin asked, “Either which way I’m going
to jail tonight? According to [Officer
Judge], correct?”[17] Officer Minze responded, “Well you’re talking
to me now. Let’s deal with one thing at
a time.”[18] At that point Stricklin began negotiating the
possibility of turning himself in at a later time and inquired about what
charges would be filed against the perpetrator.[19] Finally, to “keep [the two-year-old] out of
trouble,” Stricklin admitted to finding the two-year-old crying in the night
with her diaper at her ankles.[20] After picking her up, he told Officer Minze
that he tripped on a toy, fell, and digitally penetrated the victim.[21] After making these oral statements, Stricklin
wrote a letter to the mother reiterating that the injuries were a result of an
accident, and inquired about the future of their relationship.[22]
At trial the defense filed motions
to suppress the audio recording of the interview as well as Stricklin’s written
statement.[23] Stricklin argued the interview became
custodial and his Miranda rights and
right against self-incrimination were violated when his requests for an
attorney were not recognized.[24] The trial court denied Stricklin’s motions to
suppress and admitted the audio recording and written statement.[25]
II. Legal Background
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court of
the United States took action to curb the coercive effect of police
interrogations where “[e]ven without employing brutality . . . the very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on
the weakness of individuals.”[26] The Court held that “the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those
rights must be fully honored.”[27] The result of Miranda was that, following arrest, a criminal suspect must be
informed of his “right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.”[28] Central to these “Miranda rights” is the requirement that the individual be “in
custody.”[29]
Howes v. Fields provides a synopsis of
the test used to determine when an interrogation becomes custodial. [30] In Howes,
a prisoner was questioned by police about other crimes they believed he
committed before his current sentence.[31] The Supreme Court of the United States
defined “custodial” as “circumstances that are thought generally to present a
serious danger of coercion.”[32] The Court declined to establish a
“categorical rule” for determining when an interrogation becomes custodial and
the suspect becomes eligible for Miranda
warnings.[33] Instead, the Court wrote that it is necessary
to undertake a comprehensive review of the circumstances to determine whether a
“reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave.”[34] In particular, the Court emphasized that factors
such as the location and duration of the questioning, as well as the making of
statements and use of restraints during the questioning as part of the
comprehensive inquiry.[35]
The
Supreme Court of Missouri has addressed custody interrogation numerous times,
including in State v. Hill, where a
man voluntarily went to a police station for an interview with an officer while
his wife waited in the lobby.[36] He was informed on arrival that he was free
to go and that the door was unlocked, but he was escorted to the restroom upon
request.[37] He ultimately admitted to the accusations,
but was allowed to leave with his wife.[38] In Hill,
the court decided the interrogation did not become custodial, so Miranda warnings were not necessary.[39]
The “ultimate inquiry” the court must
make is whether the individual’s freedom was impaired to the same degree as a
formal arrest.[40] The court found no “arrest-like restraints”
given the explicit warnings of the interrogating officer, the fact that the interviewee’s
wife was waiting, and that the conversation only lasted for one hour.[41]
III. Instant Decision
In State v. Stricklin, the Missouri Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s admission of Stricklin’s written
statement and part of the audio recording and remanded the case for a new
trial.[42] The appellate court could only overturn the
trial court’s decision on the motion to suppress if it found the decision
“clearly erroneous,” – that is, if the court was “left with the definite and
firm impression a mistake ha[d] been made.”[43] In order to determine if Stricklin’s interrogation
had been conducted “in custody,” the court had to identify the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation and then decide if a reasonable person would have
felt able to leave.[44] The court listed several factors for
evaluating how free a suspect would feel to terminate an interrogation,
including whether the questioning was conducted over a long or short period of
time, whether physical restraints were used, whether the suspect was informed
that the questioning was voluntary, and whether strong arm tactics were used.[45] The court noted the standard for determining
if an interrogation took place “in custody” was not whether it would have been
awkward for the suspect to leave, but whether a reasonable person “would have
believed that the officers were going to insist on restraining him from
[leaving] . . . .”[46]
The
majority identified as key to their decision the moment Officer Judge warned
Stricklin he was “probably going in . . . in cuffs” and left the room.[47] The court held that a reasonable person would
not have felt able to end the interrogation, at least not until Officer Judge
returned, and so from this moment on Stricklin was in custody.[48] Further, without a clear indication of how to
“straighten it out,” a reasonable person would have felt compelled to stay.[49] The court also noted that, while Stricklin
was informed that he was not under arrest, he was not expressly told he could
refuse to cooperate.[50]
The
court also pointed out that the “atmosphere [of the interrogation] was police
dominated,” as it was conducted in a closed room of a police station.[51] The combative style of the interview was also
noted by the court.[52] Officer Judge informed Stricklin that he knew
he caused the two-year-old’s injury, and when Stricklin asked if he was going
to jail if he confessed, Officer Minze affirmatively.[53] When Stricklin asked if he could leave and
return at a later date, Officer Minze informed him he would have a bond.[54] All of these factors, combined with the fact
that Stricklin was arrested immediately following the interrogation, led the
court to the conclusion that Stricklin was in custody at the time of his
questioning.[55]
The majority of the Missouri Court
of Appeals decided that Stricklin’s interrogation became custodial when Officer
Judge left the room after making the threatening statement about Stricklin
leaving in cuffs.[56]
The appellate court found that because a
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave after that statement, they reversed
the trial court’s inclusion of the confession obtained following Stricklin’s
interaction with Officers Judge and Minze on Miranda grounds.[57]
Chief
Judge Lisa P. Page argued in her dissent that the circumstances present in Stricklin are similar to State v. Hill, where the court did not
find the interrogation to be in custody.[58] In concluding that Stricklin’s interrogation
was not conducted in custody and that a reasonable person would not have felt
unable to terminate the questioning, she emphasized that Stricklin came to the police
station voluntarily, was not physically restrained, and was interviewed for a
short time.[59] These were the same or similar circumstances
the suspect in Hill confronted.[60] According to Chief Judge Page, the officers’ utilization
of a strategy to elicit Stricklin’s confession did not automatically create a
“duty to issue Miranda warnings.”[61]
IV. Comment
The
majority reached the correct decision, highlighting the importance of police
adherence to the spirit of Miranda. The crux of this appeal asks if the officers,
in any way, created an environment that would restrict a reasonable person’s
ability to end the questioning. The
majority was correct in identifying the statement of Officer Judge as central
to the custody determination. Officer
Judge’s comment to Stricklin, implying a requirement that Stricklin remain in
the room and alluding to an impending arrest, is what distinguishes Stricklin from Hill and gives the majority the better argument. In Hill
the defendant was explicitly told he could leave, and the officer made no
statements or actions to undercut that understanding, at least not to the extent
Officer Judge did by warning Stricklin he would be leaving “in cuffs.”[62]
The
tragedy of this case is the failure to secure justice for a victimized
child. This is not a case of outright
police indiscretion or abuse of power.
It was merely a routine, voluntary questioning that, but for one
statement, would not have required Miranda
warnings. The holding of Stricklin should stand as a reminder to
law enforcement that every action and statement during voluntary interrogations
can be critical and should be geared towards ensuring the interviewee feels
able to leave. The coercion techniques
utilized when Miranda was issued are
a far cry from the police questioning environment in which Stricklin found
himself, but the subjective “totality of the circumstances” test used to
determine custody casts a wide net of protection.
-Chris Mathews
[1] State v.
Stricklin, No. ED 105350, 2018
WL 3117544, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018),
reh’g denied (July
31, 2018).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at *3.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at *9.
[7] Id. at *1.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at *2.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at *3.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at *1.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455
(1966).
[27] Id. at 467.
[28] Id. at 444.
[29] Id. at 467. “At the outset,
if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed . . . .” Id.
[30] Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09
(2012).
[31] Id. at 502.
[32] Id. at 508–509.
[33] Id. at 508.
[34] Id. at 509 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
[35] Id.
[36] State v. Hill, 247 S.W.3d 34, 43
(Mo. 2008) (en banc).
[37] Id.
[38] Id. at 43–44.
[39] Id. at 52.
[40] Id. at 46.
[41] Id. at 44, 51–52.
[42] State v. Stricklin, No. ED 105350,
2018 WL 3117544, at *9 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
[43] Id. at *3 (citing State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. 2016) (en
banc)).
[44] Id. at *5
[45] Id. at *4.
[46] Id. at *5 (quoting State v. Quick, 334 S.W.3d 603, 617 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2011)).
[47] Id. at 6.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id. at *7.
[52] Id.
[53] Id.
[54] Id.
[55] Id.
[56] Id. at *9.
[57] Id. at *2, *9.
[58] Id. (Page, C.J., dissenting).
[59] Id. at *10.
[60] Id.
[61] Id. at *10 (citing State v. Sardeson, 220 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007)).
[62] Id. at *2 (majority
opinion); State v.
Hill, 247 S.W.3d 34, 49 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
