State ex rel. Strong v. Griffith

Opinion handed down June 7, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

        In Strong v. Griffith, the Supreme Court of Missouri made no exceptions to its death penalty requirements as they pertain to the mentally ill.  That case involved the examination of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Richard Strong, who was convicted and later sentenced to death for his actions in a heinous double murder.  Strong contended that at the time he committed the murders, he was mentally ill, and therefore he was unfit to be executed.  However, the court rejected Strong’s assertion, reasoning he was not entitled to the relief he sought.  Strong was mentally fit at the time of trial, so he was ineligible to be granted a stay of execution under Missouri Revised Statute Sections 552.020 and 552.030.  Additionally, Strong did not present evidence of any past mental illness during the penalty phase, and thus the court had no basis to review the death sentencing under Section 565.032.

Anderson v. Union Electric Co.

Opinion handed down June 16, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

I.  Facts and Holding 

        Union Electric (“UE”) owns the Lake of the Ozarks (“Lake”).^[1]  Anderson owns land along the Lake’s shoreline.^[2]  Anderson alleged that UE prohibited individuals who own real estate along the Lake from building, maintaining, or using docks that extend over the Lake without first obtaining a permit from UE.^[3]  As a condition prerequisite of obtaining these permits, UE is enabled to impose various requirements that regulate the way in which landowners supply electricity to their docks.^[4]  Anderson also alleged that UE required them to pay a “use fee.”^[5] 

        Anderson supplied electricity to her dock; however, she chose not to protect this supply with ground fault interrupt (“GFI”) devices to prevent injury from electrical faults.^[6]  Anderson’s children were killed by a stray electrical current while swimming in the Lake near the dock.^[7]  Anderson alleged that UE was negligent in the following respects: (1) UE failed to “adequately inspect the Anderson dock to ensure adequate ground fault interrupter protection”;  (2) UE failed to include, as a precondition to dock permitting, GFI protective devices at or above the seawall; (3) UE failed to warn dock owners, including the Andersons, “of the need for ground fault interrupter protective devices at or above the dock seawalls”; and (4) “UE failed to warn dock owners along the Gravois arm of anticipated increase in wear and tear on docks as a consequence of the permitting of the [nearby] restaurant property.”^[8]

        UE moved to dismiss Anderson’s suit on the ground that it is immune under the Recreational Use Act (“RUA”):^[9] 

The circuit court agreed, finding “Pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 537.346, Ameren owes no duty of care to any person who enters on the land without charge to keep his land safe for recreational use or to give any general or specific warning with respect to any natural or artificial condition, structure, or personal property thereon.”^[10] 

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s holdings.^[11]

Grider v. Bowling

Opinion handed down May 11, 2015

Link to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion

Duke and Kami Lee Grider filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Springfield, Missouri Police Department, alleging the Department violated the Griders’ statutory and constitutional rights by using excessive force.^[1] Both parties moved for summary judgment, and an interlocutory appeal followed.^[2]  The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that Officer Brandon Bowling was not entitled to qualified immunity, and Officer Bowling appealed.^[3]  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, granting the officer qualified immunity.^[4]

Missouri v. Coleman

Opinion handed down June 16, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

“I need you to do me a favor. . . .  Put the money in this bag;” these and other words and actions led Gary Leland Coleman to a conviction for second-degree robbery.^[1]  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Mr. Coleman argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he forcibly stole money with the use, or threat of use, of force.^[2]  The court, on the facts of the case, and because there is an implicit threat of force when money is demanded without right in a bank, affirmed Mr. Coleman's conviction for second-degree robbery.^[3]

Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc.

Opinion handed down May 26, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

        In Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc. (“CMH”), Mr. Eaton contracted with CMH to purchase a manufactured home.^[1]  On or around September 27, 2012, Mr. Eaton sued CMH for alleged defects in the home.^[2]  Mr. Eaton’s complaint alleged fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation.^[3]

        CMH denied the allegations and moved to dismiss or stay the court action.  Further, CMH moved to enforce the arbitration agreement section of the contract by compelling arbitration between the parties.^[4]  Mr. Eaton replied, arguing the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.^[5] 

        The trial court overruled CMH’s motion to dismiss or stay the court action and compel arbitration.^[6]  On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed the trial court’s holding.^[7]  Upon transfer, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court erred in refusing to compel arbitration.^[8]  The court noted that the anti-waiver clause of the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, but the clause did not render the entire agreement unenforceable.^[9]

Gateway Taxi Management v. Division of Employment Security

Opinion handed down May 12, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion 

        A deputy of the Division of Employment Security (“DES”) determined that Gateway Taxi Management, d/b/a Laclede Cab Company (“Laclede”), owed unemployment taxes because Laclede’s drivers had performed services for “wages” and were “employees” of Laclede.^[1]  Laclede appealed the DES decision to the appeals tribunal, which reversed the determination.^[2]  Thereafter, the DES appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“LIRC”), which reversed the appeals tribunal’s decision on the basis that Laclede’s drivers were employees.^[3]  The instant decision followed, after the court of appeals issued an opinion and the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer.^[4]  The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the LIRC’s ruling after finding that competent and substantial evidence supported the LIRC’s holdings that Laclede paid wages to its drivers for their services and that the drivers were employees of Laclede.^[5]