In Re The Matter Of T.Q.L[1]

Opinion handed down Dec. 18, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Petitioner, M.M.A., and Respondent, L.L., had a relationship which was thought to have resulted in the birth of a child, T.Q.L.  Over the years, M.M.A. fulfilled the role of T.Q.L.’s father.  Eventually M.M.A. and L.L.’s relationship ended and a paternity test revealed that M.M.A. was not the biological father.  M.M.A. filed a petition alleging unfitness of both L.L. and the child’s biological father, ultimately seeking third-party custody and visitation.  The circuit court dismissed M.M.A’s petition for failure to state a claim.  M.M.A. brought this action for reinstatement of his petition seeking third-party custody and visitation of T.Q.L.  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and reinstated M.M.A.’s petition. The Court held that M.M.A. could petition the court for third-party custody and visitation.

American Federation of Teachers v. Ledbetter[1]

Opinion handed down November 20, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

At trial, the American Federation of Teachers and its St. Louis affiliate, Local 420, (together “the union”), claimed that the Construction Career Center Charter School District and the individual members of its Board of Education (“the board”) failed to satisfy its duty to bargain collectively under article I, section 29, of the Missouri Constitution.[2]  The trial court granted summary judgment declaring that the board had no duty to “meet and confer” or to bargain collectively in good faith with the union.[3]  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court, holding that that article I, section 29 guarantees employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively, which includes a duty for the board to meet and confer in good faith.[4]

S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District[1]

Opinion handed down October 17, 2012

Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

On January 11, 2012, the Lee's Summit R-7 School District ("the School District") suspended twin brothers Steven and Sean Wilson ("the Wilsons”) for 180 days because of inappropriate content posted on a website the Wilsons created.[2]  The Wilsons sued the School District alleging the School District violated their rights to free speech.  The Wilsons also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to lift their suspensions.[3]  The District Court granted the injunction, effectively allowing the Wilsons to return to school, but the School District appealed.[4]  A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit overturned the District Court’s preliminary injunction.[5]  The brothers had not met two of the four elements of their claim, and the panel held that they likely would not be successful on the merits.[6]  The speech was punishable under the famous Tinker analysis and the harm was purely speculative.[7]

Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, Mo.[1]

Opinion handed down October 16, 2012

Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

 

The city of Manchester, Missouri, implemented an ordinance that banned protesters from being within 300 feet of a burial site, one hour prior to, during, or after a funeral. Two members of the infamous Westboro Baptist Church brought suit against the City of Manchester claiming that the ordinance violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutional. The Eighth Circuit en banc held that the Phelps-Ropers failed to prove that the ordinance was unconstitutional and reversed the district court’s judgment, vacating the injunction and award of nominal damages.

Doe v. Toelke[1]

Opinion handed down September 25, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The state appealed a circuit court’s judgment that the state’s sex offender registration act is unconstitutional as applied to John Doe.  In a 6-0 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment to the extent it holds the circuit court was without authority to address the applicability of a federal registration act, and that the state registration requirements violate the state constitution as applied to Doe. The Court affirmed the judgment in that it does not order the state to destroy the Doe’s registration records.

State v. Stover[1]

Opinion handed down September 25, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Melvin Stover, Jr. appealed his conviction and sentence of twelve years without probation or parole for the class A felony of trafficking drugs in the first degree.  On appeal, Mr. Stover claimed that the trial court erred in: (1) overruling his motion for acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact that he knowingly possessed the contraband; (2) overruling his motion to suppress the contraband seized during the search of his vehicle because the detention was conducted without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and lasted beyond the time reasonably required to complete a traffic ticket; (3) overruling his motion to suppress evidence of incriminating statements made during the detention and prior to the arresting officers issuing a Miranda warning; (4) allowing into evidence his refusal to consent to a search of the vehicle; (5) allowing Corporal Hagerty’s testimony that he received a commendation from the DEA for making the largest PCP seizure in the history of the United States until 2003; and (6) overruling his objection to the verdict-directing instruction because it did not require the jury to find that he knew of the content and character of the PCP or that he was aware of its presence and nature.  The Supreme Court denied five of Stover’s six points on appeal, but reversed and remanded because it held that the verdict-directing instruction the trial court gave the jury resulted in manifest injustice since it failed to require the state to prove one element of the crime—that Stover knew the content or character of the substance found in the briefcase in the trunk of his rented vehicle.