Opinion handed down September 25, 2012
The state appealed a circuit court’s judgment that the state’s sex
offender registration act is unconstitutional as applied to John Doe. In a 6-0 decision, the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed the judgment to the extent it holds the circuit court was
without authority to address the applicability of a federal registration act,
and that the state registration requirements violate the state constitution as
applied to Doe. The Court affirmed the judgment in that it does not order the
state to destroy the Doe’s registration records.
I. Facts
& Holding
In 1983, John Doe pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree
sexual assault.[2] In 1995, the state’s
sex offender registration act (sections 589.400 to 589.420, RSMo) became
effective, and required Doe to register as a sex offender.[3] In 2010, Doe filed a declaratory judgment
action alleging that the state’s act violates the Missouri Constitution’s
prohibition in article I, section 13 against retrospective operation of laws, and
that he was not required to register under the federal sex offenders
registration and notification act (SORNA).[4] Doe further asserted the
defendants were required to remove his name from the registry and must destroy
all registration records.[5] The parties
tried the case on a stipulated record, and the circuit court declared section
589.400 unconstitutional as applied to Doe.[6] The court declined to address the
applicability of SORNA and also declined Doe’s request that the state be
required to destroy all his registration records.[7] The state appealed.[8]
Initially,
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court erred in declining to
decide whether Doe was required to register pursuant to the federal act because
Article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution provides the circuit court
with original jurisdiction to interpret and apply federal law.[9]
The Court then determined that the circuit court erred in holding
that the state registration requirements violate article I, section 13 as
applied to Doe.[10] The Court noted that
section 589.400.1(7) requires lifetime registration of “[a]ny person who… has
been or is required to register under ... federal ... law.”[11] Further noted
was that Doe admitted in the stipulated record that until 2009, he was required
to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA.[12] In turn, the Court held
that Doe’s past federal registration requirements could impose a present state
registration requirement without violating article I, section 13.[13]
The Court highlighted that while article I, section 13 prohibits
the state from imposing registration requirements based solely on the
commission of a sex crime prior to those requirements’ 1995 enactment, it does not prohibit application of the state
registration requirements to individuals who “are” or “have been” subject to
the independent registration requirements of the federal act.[14] When, as in
Doe’s case “the state registration requirement is based on an independent
federal registration requirement, article I, section 13 is not implicated because
the state registration requirement is not based solely on the fact of a past
conviction.”[15]
Finally, because Doe was required to register under SORA, the
Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment that the defendants were not
required to destroy Doe’s registration requirement.[16]
II. Legal Background
A.
Jurisdiction
Article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution provides that
Missouri’s circuit courts have original jurisdiction over all cases and
matters, civil and criminal. This
jurisdiction allows Missouri courts to interpret and apply federal law.[17]
B.
Constitutional Validity
When reviewing a statute, “a statute is presumed valid and will
not be held unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional
provision,”[18] and the Court “resolves all doubt in favor of the [statute’s]
validity,”[19] further, Article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution
provides:
That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant
of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.
III. Comment
The Court declared that the SORA registration requirements do not
violate article I, section 13 as applied
to Doe.[20] Doe’s challenge gave the Court an opportunity
to address the constitutionality of SORA in its entirety, however, the Court
kept its holding specific. Ideally the
Court could have illustrated potential situations where the statute would be
unconstitutional, if any. However, this
limited holding left the door open for further challenges to SORA in the
future.
- Cody Reinberg
[1] No. SC92380 (Mo. Dec. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=58646. The West reporter citation is Doe
v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
[2] Id. at 1.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 2.
[10] Id. at 5
[11] Id. at 3-4.
[12] Id. at 4.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 5.
[17] See Doe v. Keathely, 290 S.W.3d 719,720 (Mo.
banc 2009).
[18] In re Brasch, 332 S.W.3d 115, 119 (Mo. banc
2011).
[19] Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187, 197 (Mo.
banc 2011).
[20] No. SC92380 at 5.
