Opinion handed down March 9, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the jurisdictional guidelines in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) were statutory in nature, and, as such, an Appellant cannot raise the jurisdictional challenge on appeal if the alleged error was not preserved at trial. The court held further that the trial court’s finding that Missouri was the proper forum under the UCCJA to litigate custody of the child was supported by the evidence. Finally, the court held that the trial court’s additional finding that the modification of the custody decree was proper due to changed circumstances was supported by substantial evidence.
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
City of Springfield v. Adolph Belt, Jr.[1]
Opinion handed down March 2, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the City of Springfield's adjudication process for tickets issued from automated red light cameras was void.[2]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the City of Springfield's adjudication process for tickets issued from automated red light cameras was void.[2]
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
State v. Brooks[1]
Opinion handed down February 23, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri unanimously held that during trial, the State’s repeated references to a defendant’s post-Miranda silence violated his constitutional rights.[2] The prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument, audio evidence offered by the State, and the prosecutor’s examination of certain witnesses all contained statements that, after being Mirandized, the defendant had refused to offer an explanation of what had happened at the crime scene.[3] Although the trial court attempted to cure some of these violations by instructing the jury to disregard the State’s comments, it failed to properly instruct the jury to disregard other violative comments, and the curative effect of the court’s instruction to the jury was doubtful.[4] Finally, exculpatory evidence presented by the defense was not frivolous, and, although the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was substantial, it was not overwhelming.[5] The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment and remanded the case.[6]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri unanimously held that during trial, the State’s repeated references to a defendant’s post-Miranda silence violated his constitutional rights.[2] The prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument, audio evidence offered by the State, and the prosecutor’s examination of certain witnesses all contained statements that, after being Mirandized, the defendant had refused to offer an explanation of what had happened at the crime scene.[3] Although the trial court attempted to cure some of these violations by instructing the jury to disregard the State’s comments, it failed to properly instruct the jury to disregard other violative comments, and the curative effect of the court’s instruction to the jury was doubtful.[4] Finally, exculpatory evidence presented by the defense was not frivolous, and, although the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was substantial, it was not overwhelming.[5] The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment and remanded the case.[6]
Akins v. Director of Revenue
Opinion handed down on February 23, 2010[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed what constitutes a “conviction” for the purpose of determining when the Missouri Department of Revenue is required to revoke the driving privileges of a driver for ten years due to the driver receiving more than two convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that “conviction” means “a judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of an offense or a crime.”[2] As such, the defendant’s license was properly revoked even though his convictions arose from the same incident of driving while intoxicated.[3]
Opinion handed down on February 23, 2010[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed what constitutes a “conviction” for the purpose of determining when the Missouri Department of Revenue is required to revoke the driving privileges of a driver for ten years due to the driver receiving more than two convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that “conviction” means “a judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of an offense or a crime.”[2] As such, the defendant’s license was properly revoked even though his convictions arose from the same incident of driving while intoxicated.[3]
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Derousse v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Opinion handed down December 8, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (hereinafter “Insurer”) uninsured motorist coverage policy was too narrow and, therefore, that the policy’s coverage was governed by Missouri Revised Statute section 379.203.1, which requires the insurer to provide compensation for purely emotional damages. [2] Consequently, the trial court’s summary judgment order on behalf of the insurer was improper, and the case was remanded. [3]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (hereinafter “Insurer”) uninsured motorist coverage policy was too narrow and, therefore, that the policy’s coverage was governed by Missouri Revised Statute section 379.203.1, which requires the insurer to provide compensation for purely emotional damages. [2] Consequently, the trial court’s summary judgment order on behalf of the insurer was improper, and the case was remanded. [3]
Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Pratte
Opinion handed down December 8, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri confronted the caseload crisis of the Missouri public defender system in three consolidated cases. In two of the cases, the Supreme Court of Missouri limited the ability of district public defender offices to control their caseload. In the third case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that it was statutorily impermissible for trial court judges to appoint public defenders to represent indigent defendants in the attorney’s private capacity.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri confronted the caseload crisis of the Missouri public defender system in three consolidated cases. In two of the cases, the Supreme Court of Missouri limited the ability of district public defender offices to control their caseload. In the third case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that it was statutorily impermissible for trial court judges to appoint public defenders to represent indigent defendants in the attorney’s private capacity.
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