State v. Brooks[1]

Opinion handed down February 23, 2010.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri unanimously held that during trial, the State’s repeated references to a defendant’s post-Miranda silence violated his constitutional rights.[2] The prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument, audio evidence offered by the State, and the prosecutor’s examination of certain witnesses all contained statements that, after being Mirandized, the defendant had refused to offer an explanation of what had happened at the crime scene.[3] Although the trial court attempted to cure some of these violations by instructing the jury to disregard the State’s comments, it failed to properly instruct the jury to disregard other violative comments, and the curative effect of the court’s instruction to the jury was doubtful.[4] Finally, exculpatory evidence presented by the defense was not frivolous, and, although the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was substantial, it was not overwhelming.[5] The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment and remanded the case.[6]

Akins v. Director of Revenue
Opinion handed down on February 23, 2010[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed what constitutes a “conviction” for the purpose of determining when the Missouri Department of Revenue is required to revoke the driving privileges of a driver for ten years due to the driver receiving more than two convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that “conviction” means “a judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of an offense or a crime.”[2] As such, the defendant’s license was properly revoked even though his convictions arose from the same incident of driving while intoxicated.[3]

Derousse v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Opinion handed down December 8, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (hereinafter “Insurer”) uninsured motorist coverage policy was too narrow and, therefore, that the policy’s coverage was governed by Missouri Revised Statute section 379.203.1, which requires the insurer to provide compensation for purely emotional damages. [2] Consequently, the trial court’s summary judgment order on behalf of the insurer was improper, and the case was remanded. [3]

Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Pratte

Opinion handed down December 8, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri confronted the caseload crisis of the Missouri public defender system in three consolidated cases. In two of the cases, the Supreme Court of Missouri limited the ability of district public defender offices to control their caseload. In the third case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that it was statutorily impermissible for trial court judges to appoint public defenders to represent indigent defendants in the attorney’s private capacity.

Gill v. State [1]

Opinion handed down December 1, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial.[2] Counsel failed to present evidence of sexually explicit material on the computer of the victim, evidence which should have been used by the defense to rebut the state’s evidence of the victim’s good character.[3] Although the state gave defense counsel a report detailing the contents of the victim’s computer, defense counsel did not diligently review the report and failed to recognize the sexually explicit file names listed in the report.[4] A reasonably competent attorney would also have interviewed the investigator who had knowledge of the contents of the computer.[5] This deficient performance prejudiced the defendant because, had the jury heard an alternative description of the victim, the jury may have decided that death was not the proper punishment for the defendant.[6] The court reversed and remanded the judgment as to the penalty phase.[7]

State of Missouri v. John L. Richard[1]

Opinion handed down November 17, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a Missouri statute[2] prohibiting possession of a firearm while intoxicated was not facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.