Criminal Multi-Charge Malicious Prosecution in Missouri: A New Path to Prevail
Daniels v. Terranova, No. WD 82785, 2020 WL 4758599
(Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2020)
By Jessica Schmitz*
I. Introduction
A man is wrestled to the ground, tazed, and charged with crimes he likely did not commit. He is prosecuted on baseless charges thoughtlessly tacked onto other offenses. These charges are dropped, but the man has suffered uncompensated harms. Malicious prosecution was created as part of a suite of claims available to those wrongfully litigated against in 1698 to compensate for harms such as these.[1] A malicious prosecution claim may be brought by an individual who had a suit lacking probable cause initiated against them which was later terminated in their favor.[2]
Unfortunately for many would-be plaintiffs, malicious prosecution has been frequently disfavored by courts.[3] Missouri courts’ disfavor has resulted in strict adherence to the elements of the malicious prosecution claim.[4] One such element is a lack of probable cause to prosecute the charge in the original proceeding.[5] A special issue arises in proving this element when multiple charges were brought in the original proceeding, only some of which lacked probable cause to prosecute. In Daniels v. Terranova, the court conducted a review of first impression that addressed this multi-charge malicious prosecution issue.[6]
This Post begins in Part II with the particular circumstances under which Daniels was charged and the holding of the court. Part III provides a discussion of the history of the multi-charge malicious prosecution issue. Part IV lays out the court’s decision in Daniels v. Terranova. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes by analyzing the reasonableness of the novel holding in Daniels.
II. Facts and Holding
Nicholas Daniels was in a bar in Columbia, Missouri when he got into an argument with the bar’s bouncer.[7] Four police officers responded to the dispute.[8] The officers ordered Daniels to get on the ground, but he did not immediately comply.[9] A physical altercation broke out during which an officer was punched, and an officer used his taser on Daniels.[10] Daniels fell to the ground and was handcuffed.[11] While cuffing Daniels, officers claimed Daniels “physically resisted their efforts” by flexing his muscles.[12] Daniels was charged with trespass, assault of a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest, but all charges were subsequently dismissed.[13]
After having his case dismissed in federal court, Daniels commenced a state action for malicious prosecution.[14] The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on all claims.[15] Daniels appealed from this judgment to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District on the grant of summary judgement for his malicious prosecution claim.[16] The appeal turned on an issue of first impression in Missouri state court: whether a malicious prosecution action may move forward when some, but not all, of the criminal charges against a defendant are supported by probable cause to prosecute.[17] The court held that a malicious prosecution claim could move forward for one criminal charge, even if others in the same underlying action were supported by probable cause.[18]
III. Legal Background
Malicious prosecution is a tort action that allows for recovery of damages when a civil or criminal suit has been commenced maliciously and without probable cause which was later terminated in the defendant’s favor.[19] In both state and federal malicious prosecution actions, a plaintiff must prove that the officer lacked probable cause to prosecute the underlying charge;[20] however, in addition to the corresponding state-law elements, a plaintiff in federal court must prove they were deprived of a constitutional right.[21] A question arises in state and federal malicious prosecution claims when the original action was initiated on multiple claims or charges: whether a lack of probable cause must be shown for each charge or for just one.[22]
A. Multi-Charge Malicious Prosecution in Missouri
Until Daniels, Missouri state courts had only confronted the issue of multi-charge malicious prosecution when the underlying claims were civil.[23] In Zahorsky v. Griffin, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District created the preeminent precedent addressing this question,[24] and it held that to defeat an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant need only show probable cause to support one claim.[25] The rule set forth in Zahorsky was subsequently applied in federal court where the underlying charges were criminal in nature.[26] In Ciesla v. Christian, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri cited Zahorsky, along with other state-law precedent, holding that an underlying proceeding allows for only one malicious prosecution claim.[27]
The reasoning articulated in Zahorsky, reiterated in Ciesla, was rooted in judicial efficiency concerns.[28] The court was concerned that if parties were allowed to separate successful claims from the unsuccessful ones, an unwieldy amount of new litigation would result.[29] In its discussion the Daniels court acknowledged this Missouri precedent, but in reaching its conclusion relied instead on non-Missouri federal precedent.[30]
B. Multi-Charge Malicious Prosecution Outside of Missouri
When confronting the multi-charge malicious prosecution issue, the majority of federal circuit courts have held a complete defense requires probable cause for each individual offense.[31] However, this holding was not a bright-line rule and has been applied only when the plaintiff was additionally burdened by the charge lacking probable cause.[32]
Courts have varied in how this additional burden may be shown.[33] Some have found the requirement satisfied when the plaintiff established that he suffered, or could suffer, an additional physical or psychological harm attributable to the charge or charges lacking probable cause as in Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate.[34] Other courts have focused on the seriousness of the charge itself rather than the harm attributable to it as in Posr v. Doherty.[35] Still other courts have focused on the burden in terms of how far the prosecution actually progressed versus the nature of the charges themselves as in Wright v. City of Philadelphia and Johnson v. Knorr.[36]
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District in Daniels applied the precedent of Holmes, Posr, and Johnson in determining the outcome of its first impression review of the criminal multi-charge malicious prosecution issue.[37]
IV. Instant Decision
The primary issue on appeal was the grant of summary judgement for Daniels’s malicious prosecution claim.[38] The court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the officers with regard to the malicious prosecution claim for the resisting arrest charge.[39] But it found there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers had probable cause for the charges of trespass and assault of an officer.[40]
Next, the court considered whether the finding of probable cause on the resisting arrest offense precluded a claim of malicious prosecution on the others.[41] In answering this question, the court rejected the holding in Ciesla, noting that federal case law interpreting state law was not binding.[42] The court held “the existence of probable cause to prosecute one criminal offense does not preclude a claim of malicious prosecution for other charged offenses.”[43] The court noted this “charge-specific approach” applied where the underlying criminal proceeding involved multiple charges “arising from the same incident or set of facts.”[44]
In reaching its decision, the court relied on non-Missouri circuit court precedent.[45] The court promoted the federal precedent as the “majority approach” citing Holmes, Posr, Johnson, and others.[46] The court did not mention the constitutional requirement distinction between a state and federal claim for malicious prosecution,[47] and it did not include any discussion pertaining to the “deprivation of liberty” hurdle advanced by the circuit courts.[48] The court supported its decision through public policy rationale and reasoned that if the case were decided differently, officers would be free to tack on baseless charges, insulated from any potential suit, so long as one charge had the requisite probable cause.[49] Thereby harms suffered by criminal suspects from being charged with offenses lacking probable cause would go unanswered.[50]
V. Comment
“There is no greater tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of the law and in the name of justice.”[51] Malicious prosecution claims serve to protect against this tyranny of baseless litigation and redress harm, but it is well established that these claims are disfavored.[52] Underlying the sentiment against malicious prosecution claims is a preference for promoting judicial economy.[53] The balance between redress of harm and judicial economy has been essential in court decisions on the issue of multi-charge malicious prosecution,[54] and a weighing of each makes it evident that the novel decision in Daniels is overwhelmingly supported by policy concerns, even if the impact of the decision may not have a wide reach.
A. Judicial Economy: Two Sides of the Coin
Judicial economy is a public policy that favors efficiency in the judicial system.[55] This policy argument was referenced by Missouri cases as a reason to rule in favor of probable cause to prosecute for one charge defeating malicious prosecution for all.[56] However, this case law almost exclusively dealt with malicious prosecution stemming from underlying civil claims.[57]
The probable cause requirement[58] and overall methods of practice differ for civil and criminal cases. For example, in civil cases a plaintiff may plead in the alternative.[59] As a result, more instances arise where one of the multiple claims lacks probable cause to prosecute. Therefore, a rule requiring all claims to lack probable cause for a successful malicious prosecution suit makes sense in a civil context as such claims would be brought too frequently. On the other hand, in the criminal context, where pleading in the alternative is not available, there will inherently be fewer malicious prosecution claims, so judicial economy is not as strong of a consideration.
Conversely, a judicial economy argument could be made to favor the Daniels decision. As some scholars have noted, “[T]he judicial process is also harmed by those who use the courts as instruments with which to maliciously injure their fellow men.”[60] If officers are permitted to tack on charges unsupported by probable cause without fear of repercussions, substantial judicial resources will be wasted. Therefore, it is possible that judicial economy concerns stemming from the increase in litigation caused by the Daniels decision might be offset by a reduction in baseless charges brought in the first place.
This concern over an influx of new litigation due to Daniels is weakened further by a review of the potential damages available to a plaintiff for redressing harm suffered in multi-charge malicious prosecution circumstances.
B. Redressing Harm: Is There a Harm to Redress?
A primary goal underlying tort law is redressing harm,[61] but what harm is suffered by a plaintiff who is prosecuted on multiple charges, where only some charges lack probable cause? When all charges lack probable cause, the harm is easy to identify as the defendant must endure a suit that should never have been brought. When only one of several claims brought is baseless, however, the true harm suffered is not as easy to determine, particularly when no additional jail time or money spent is alleged. This concern was central in the circuit courts’ decision to add an additional deprivation requirement for a malicious prosecution claim on one of multiple charges.[62]
In Daniels there was no additional physical harm because taking away the charges lacking probable cause would not have impacted Daniels’s jail time, bail price, etc.[63] There were, however, still psychological and emotional harms attributable to the baseless charge. Even if multiple charges carry the same physical costs, they may not be perceived the same way in society. In Daniels’s case, the charge of resisting arrest might result in a different stigma than that of assaulting a police officer, especially in a state like Missouri where resisting arrest is an easy charge to support.[64] The name of the crime may also imply different levels of wrongdoing that impact the defendant’s life in myriad ways.
Other potential psychological, emotional, or reputational harms for a plaintiff like Daniels in a criminal case could come from the fear of jail time and losing his freedom. Some consideration might also be paid to the psychological toll related to the potential racial justice implications of officers charging an African American man, like Daniels, with baseless charges. It might be that we, as a society, are less likely to tolerate a lack of accounting for someone’s harm when it is placed in a criminal context, as the court in Daniels was.
All things considered, the tort law policy of redressing harms supports the decision made in Daniels. Even without an additional concrete harm, substantial reputational and psychological harm may be suffered by someone who has unfounded charges tacked onto legitimate ones.
C. Damages
An opportunity to redress harms suffered, as the Daniels court has provided plaintiffs, does not equate to recovering damages. In a malicious prosecution claim a plaintiff can recover compensatory and punitive damages.[65] Such “damages are recoverable for every element of the injury, including mental and physical suffering, injury to fame and reputation, and the general impairment of social standing."[66] But, without a severe compensable harm, clearly attributable to the baseless charge, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to find an attorney willing to pursue the action. When compensatory damages would be nominal, two important issues come to mind: (1) whether the damage is calculated based only on the charge lacking probable cause, and (2) whether attorney fees may be recovered.
An early decision from the Supreme Court of Missouri, Boogher v. Bryant, is instructive as to whether the damage calculation would include only harms sustained under the baseless charge or under all the charges.[67] The Boogher court reasoned that having demonstrated there was a joining of a justified and unjustified charge, a plaintiff did not have the “burden of showing that her damage was specifically attributable to the malicious prosecution...”[68] Although decided over a century ago, Boogher provides legal precedent that might allow a plaintiff to recover damages not attributable specifically to the baseless claim. For a plaintiff like Daniels, who lost his job after being charged, this issue is crucial as it would be nearly impossible for Daniels to prove his termination was only due to the baseless claims.[69]
It is well established that in a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff can recover for attorney fees incurred in defending the underlying suit.[70] Attorney fees however might not always be incurred in the initial defense. The question becomes whether attorney fees incurred in bringing the malicious prosecution suit may be recovered. If so, even if the harm suffered would not allow a large recovery, an attorney might be more willing to take the case. In Missouri there is no general fee-shifting statute for tort claims, and there does not appear to be case law where a court has awarded a malicious prosecution plaintiff with the attorney fees incurred in bringing the claim. Without a provision in which an attorney can recover their fees, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to find an attorney to file his claim.
All things considered, the policy support for the Daniels court’s decision to turn away from Missouri precedent is strong. Even if it does not allow for every baseless charge to be remedied, the decision made by the Daniels court is an important step to preventing injustice.
VI. Conclusion
The Daniels court has taken an appropriate step away from Missouri civil precedent so that a defendant charged with multiple counts in an underlying criminal suit may bring a malicious prosecution claim even if there was probable cause to support one of the charges. While this decision of first impression strays away from the generally accepted policy of disfavoring malicious prosecution, it provides an avenue for fighting injustice while remaining limited enough to prevent an onslaught of cases that would clog the judicial system.
* B.A., University of Minnesota, 2013; M.A., Georgetown University, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021.
[1] Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 Yale L.J. 1218, 1229 (1979).
[2] 34 Robert H. Dierker & Richard J. Mehan, Missouri Practice Personal Injury and Torts Handbook § 27:1(a) (2020 ed.). A malicious prosecution tort action may be brought under state law or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court. Erin E. McMannon, The Demise of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort Law from the Fourth Amendment, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479, 1480 (2019).
[3] Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 Yale L.J. 1218, 1229 (1979); Sanders v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Mo. banc 1984).
[4] Copeland v. Wicks, 468 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Mo. banc 2015).
[5] 34 Robert H. Dierker & Richard J. Mehan, Missouri Practice Personal Injury and Torts Handbook § 27:2(1) (2020 ed.).
[6] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[7] Id.
[8] Id.; Daniels v. City of Columbia, Missouri, No. 2:15-CV-04187-NKL, 2016 WL 6394496, at *1 (Mo. App. Oct. 26, 2016).
[9] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 812 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[10] Daniels v. City of Columbia, Missouri, No. 2:15-CV-04187-NKL, 2016 WL 6394496, at *3 (Mo. App. Oct. 26, 2016); Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[11] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 813 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 803-4 “A nolle prosequi is a prosecutor's formal entry on the record indicating that he or she will no longer prosecute a pending criminal charge.” State v. Buchli, 152 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Mo. App. 2004).
[14] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 804 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 814.
[18] Id.
[19] 52 Am. Jur. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 1 (2020).
[20] There is a distinction between probable cause to arrest and probable cause to initiate a legal proceeding, the malicious prosecution element is focused solely on the latter. 34 Robert H. Dierker & Richard J. Mehan, Missouri Practice Personal Injury and Torts Handbook § 27:2(5)(a) (2020 ed.).
[21] Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991).
[22] See, e.g., Jonathan Simonds Pyatt, An Action for Malicious Prosecution Lies When at Least One of Several Possible Grounds of Recovery Lacks Probable Cause and Is Brought with Malice: Crowley v. Katleman, 23 Pepp. L. Rev. 1073, 1074 (1996).
[23] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, at note 14 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[24] Zahorsky v. Griffin., 690 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. App. 1985).
[25] Id. at 151. See also Joseph H. Held & Assocs., Inc. v. Wolff, 39 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Mo. App. 2001) (holding that the original proceeding could bring about only one claim for malicious prosecution and therefore separate counts in the complaint would not support separate actions).
[26] Ciesla v. Christian, No. 1:14CV000165 ACL, 2016 WL 1245197, at *1 (Mo. App. Mar. 30, 2016).
[27] Id. at *5.
[28] Id.
[29] Zahorsky v. Griffin., 690 S.W.2d 144, 150-51 (Mo. App. 1985); Joseph H. Held & Assocs., Inc. v. Wolff, 39 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Mo. App. 2001); Ciesla v. Christian, No. 1:14CV000165 ACL, 2016 WL 1245197, at *5 (Mo. App. Mar. 30, 2016).
[30] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 815 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[31]See, e.g., Costello v. Milano, 20 F. Supp. 3d 406, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Harrington v. Wilber, 743 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (S.D. Iowa 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 678 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 2012).
[32] See e.g., Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007); Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2007).
[33] See e.g., Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007); Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2007).
[34] Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that unlike probable cause to arrest, when it pertains to probable cause to prosecute the number and nature of the charges matter because with additional charges the costs and psychic toll on the defendant increases). See also Freeman v. Troutt No. 3:10-CV-0697, 2012 WL 5439160, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2012) (holding the additional, groundless charge added to the plaintiff’s bond was not enough to show deprivation of liberty as he was already in jail and couldn’t show that but for this bond he would have been released) and Warner v. Freeman, No. 3:14CV1192(DFM), 2017 WL 4227655, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2017) (holding that plaintiff could not show additional deprivation of liberty because they were arrested on all charges, released on bond the same day, and appeared in court on all the charges not just the groundless one).
[35] Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991) (reasoning that if probable cause wasn’t required for each underlying charge officers could tack on more serious charges in their reports that would support higher bails or lengthier detentions without concern for liability since probable cause on the lesser charges would insulate them from retribution).
[36] Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 598 (3d Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 84-5 (3d Cir. 2007). In Wright the plaintiff was not able to proceed with malicious prosecution claims because one of the underlying charges was supported by probable cause, but in Johnson the plaintiff could. The distinction was that in Wright there was only discreet involvement of law enforcement. Whereas in Johnson the initiation of criminal proceedings was more extensive. Kollock-Mann v. Morante, No. CV 15-4708 (NLH/KMW), 2017 WL 772326, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017).
[37] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 816 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[38] Id. at 803. This malicious prosecution claim stemmed from the underlying criminal prosecution of Daniels for trespass, assault of a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest.
[39] Id.
[40] For the trespass charge, the disputed fact was whether the requisite notice of trespass was given to Daniels, and for assault it was whether Daniels was the person who punched an officer during the arrest. Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, at 803, 12 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020). “A person commits the offense of trespass in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully”; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.140.1 (2018). “A person does not commit the offense of trespass…unless…notice against trespass is given…” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.140.2 (2018).
[41] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 814-15 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[42] Id. at 816.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. The particular phraseology of “charge-specific approach” to identify this rule was used by the Massachusetts district court in Bertram v. Viglas, Civil No. 19-11298 LTS, 2020 WL 1892187, at *6-7 (D. Mass. April 16, 2020), but does not appear in most other cases that have ruled on this issue.
[45] Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 815-16 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[46] Id. at 815.
[47] Id. at 815-16.
[48] Id.
[49] Id. at 816.
[50] Harms might include greater costs or an increased psychological toll. Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007). On September 29, 2020 a motion for rehearing and/or application for transfer to Supreme Court was denied.[50]
[51] The Spirit of the Laws 52 (1748).
[52] Sanders v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Mo. banc 1984).
[53] Sanders v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Mo. banc 1984).
[54] See e.g. Daniels v. Terranova, No. 611 S.W.3d 799, 815-16 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020); Ciesla v. Christian, No. 1:14CV000165 ACL, 2016 WL 1245197, at *5 (Mo. App. Mar. 30, 2016).
[55] Judicial Economy, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
[56] Ciesla v. Christian, No. 1:14CV000165 ACL, 2016 WL 1245197, at *5 (Mo. App. Mar. 30, 2016).
[57] Daniels v. Terranova, No. 611 S.W.3d 799, at note 14 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020).
[58] Probable cause to instigate a criminal prosecution exists when there is evidence strong enough to warrant “an ordinarily cautious person to believe the accused is guilty of the offense charged.” 34 Robert H. Dierker & Richard J. Mehan, Missouri Practice Personal Injury and Torts Handbook § 27:2(5)(a) (2020 ed.) (citing Haswell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 1977)). Probable cause to initiate a civil suit is defined as a reasonable belief both in the facts alleged and that the claim could be valid. 34 Robert H. Dierker & Richard J. Mehan, Missouri Practice Personal Injury and Torts Handbook § 27:2(4)(a) (2020 ed.) (citing State v. Mummert, 875 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. banc 1994)).
[59] Zahorsky v. Griffin., 690 S.W.2d 144, 150-51 (Mo. App. 1985). In Missouri a party is permitted to plead in the alternative under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 509.110 (2018).
[60] Jonathan Simonds Pyatt, An Action for Malicious Prosecution Lies When at Least One of Several Possible Grounds of Recovery Lacks Probable Cause and Is Brought with Malice: Crowley v. Katleman., 23 Pepp. L. Rev. 1073, 1077 (1996).
[61] 74 Am. Jur. 2D Torts § 2 (2020).
[62] See e.g., Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007); Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2007).
[63] In none of the filings are facts alleged as to the time spent in jail or amount of money spent on bail if any. The only harm specifically alleged by the plaintiff is a loss of job, a scholarship, and future work opportunities. Plaintiff’s Petition, Daniels v. Terranova, No. 611 S.W.3d 799, 803-4 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020) (No. 17BA-CV00033) 2016 WL 11707093. If harms were suffered in jail time or bail spent, you would have expected to see them in the pleadings and could therefore infer that Daniels was not harmed in this specific manner.
[64] Case law has interpreted the elements of resisting arrest as being fairly easy to meet. 32 Robert H. Dierker, Missouri Practice Criminal Law § 47:4 (3 ed. 2019).
[65] 7 Am. Jur. 2D Proof of Facts § 181 (2020).
[66] Young v. Jack Boring's, Inc., 540 S.W.2d 887, 897 (Mo. App. 1976) (quoting Foley v. Union House Furnishing Co., 60 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Mo. App. 1933)).
[67] Boogher v. Bryant, 86 Mo. 42 (1885).
[68] Singleton v. Perry, 289 P.2d 794, 799–800 (1955) (quoting Boogher v. Bryant, 86 Mo. 42, 42 (1885)); Boogher v. Bryant, 86 Mo. 42, 49 (1885).
[69] Plaintiff’s Petition, Daniels v. Terranova, 611 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Mo. App. Aug. 18, 2020) (No. 17BA-CV00033) 2016 WL 11707093.
[70] A. L. Azores, Attorney’s Fees as Element of Damages in Action for False Imprisonment or Arrest, or for Malicious Prosecution, 21 A.L.R.3d 1068 (1968) (“It has generally been held or recognized that in an action for false imprisonment or arrest or in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff may recover as an element of damages attorneys' fees incurred by him as a result of the unlawful imprisonment or arrest or the malicious prosecution in question.”). See also Ruth v. St. Louis Transit Co., 71 S.W. 1055 (Mo. App. 1903).
