Friday, April 30, 2021

Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Department of Social Services

 

Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Department of Social Services, Division of Medical Services, 602 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2020) (en banc)

By Lucy Downing

 

I.          Introduction

            In a six-one decision, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court’s decision declaring a provision of an appropriation bill purporting to deny Medicaid reimbursement to Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region (“Planned Parenthood”) for medical services rendered unconstitutional and severing it from the remainder of the bill.  The Court reversed the portion of the circuit court’s judgment taxing costs against the state as statutorily unauthorized.  Judge Paul C. Wilson wrote the majority opinion with Judge Zel M. Fischer dissenting.

II.         Background

            Missouri’s Medicaid program is administered by the MO HealthNet Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services.[1]  RSMo section 208.152.1 provides that the MO HealthNet Division “shall make payments to authorized providers on behalf of Medicaid-eligible individuals for physicians’ services and family planning.”[2]  The General Assembly appropriated funds for the fiscal year of 2019 to pay for these services, and Planned Parenthood was an authorized provider of these services due to a statutorily-authorized agreement with MO HealthNet.[3]  However, MO HealthNet refused to reimburse Planned Parenthood for services rendered in 2019 due to section 11.800 of a new Missouri appropriation bill.[4]  The section provided: “No funds shall be expended to any abortion facility as defined in Section 188.015, RSMo, or any affiliate thereof.”[5]

III.       Legal Background

            Planned Parenthood filed a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission, which ruled in the state’s favor without addressing Planned Parenthood’s constitutional claim due to its lack of authority to make such a determination.[6]  Planned Parenthood then sought consolidated review in the circuit court, arguing it is impermissible to use an appropriation bill to amend substantive law because such behavior violates article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.[7]  The circuit court agreed with Planned Parenthood and therefore declared Section 11.800 unconstitutional, severed the section from the rest of the bill, and taxed costs against the state.[8]  MO HealthNet appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.[9]

IV.       Instant Decision

A.   Majority

            Writing for the majority, Judge Wilson first discussed the constitutionality of Section 11.800 of the appropriation bill.[10]  Article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution provides, “No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except bills enacted under the third exception in section 37 of this article and general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts for which moneys are appropriated.”[11]  Thus, while section 23 prohibits bills with more than one subject, it does contain a “narrow exception” for appropriation bills “because such bills necessarily include multiple subjects, i.e., appropriations of differing amounts from differing accounts for differing subjects.”[12] 

However, the majority explained that the Court has long recognized that the exception is limited, and “section 23 [still] limits appropriation bills to appropriations only.”[13]  To clarify, “any bill that purports to combine appropriations with the enactment or amendment of general or substantive law necessarily contains more than one subject in violation of article III, section 23, and such a bill does not fall within the exception for general appropriation bills.”[14]  The majority clarified, however, that an appropriation bill must be in direct conflict with a general law in order for it to be considered more than solely an appropriation in this context.[15]

Accordingly, the majority examined whether Section 11.800 directly conflicts with general law, specifically RSMo Sections 208.153.1 and 208.152.1.[16]  Section 208.152.1 “provides that MO HealthNet payments shall be made on behalf of Medicaid-eligible individuals for physicians’ services and family planning,” while section 208.153.1 provides that “these individuals can obtain those services from any authorized health care provider, i.e., any provider that has an agreement with MO HealthNet Division to provide those services.”[17]  Because these statutes “specify clearly and unambiguously what MO HealthNet payments will cover and two whom those payments must be made, . . . the language in section 11.800 seeking to disqualify certain authorized providers based on services they provide, separately and apart from the MO HealthNet program, – and for which no MO HealthNet payments can be made ­– is a naked attempt to use HB2011 both to appropriate funds for various purposes and to amend sections 208.153.1 and 208.152.1.”[18]  Therefore, the majority found this to be “a clear and unmistakable violation of the proscription in article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution against bills with multiple subjects.”[19]

Judge Wilson then analyzed whether the circuit court was correct in severing section 11.800 from the remainder of the appropriation bill.[20]  While he agreed with the circuit court that the bill should be severed, he took issue with how the lower court reached its conclusion on the issue, specifically its reliance on RSMo Section 1.140 during its severance analysis.[21]  He explained that the Court uses a different severance analysis for procedurally unconstitutional provisions versus substantively unconstitutional provisions.[22]  For substantive violations, the Court applies section 1.140 to analyze the propriety of severance.[23]  “On the other hand, when evaluating a procedural constitutional violation, the doctrine of judicial severance is applied and severance is only appropriate when this Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature would have passed the bill without the additional provisions and that the provisions in question are not essential to the efficacy of the bill.”[24]  While the circuit court was incorrect in applying section 1.140 in its severance analysis because this case involves a procedural violation, the majority nonetheless agreed that severance is appropriate under the analysis for procedural violations.[25]  Judge Wilson noted that the General Assembly intentionally segregated section 11.800 from the appropriations in the rest of the bill and it expressly noted that the other sections shall not be severed from each other but provided no similar prohibition against severing section 11.800.[26]  Thus, the majority affirmed the circuit court’s determination regarding severance because it was satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt that the appropriation bill would have passed without section 11.800, and that nothing in 11.800 is essential to the efficacy of the appropriations made elsewhere in [the appropriation bill].”[27]

Lastly, the majority reversed the lower court’s determination to tax costs to MO HealthNet because it found no statutory authorization for such a decision.[28]

B.   Dissent

            In his dissent, Judge Fischer argues that section 11.800 is constitutional.[29]  He posits that the language of article III, section 23 plainly and unambiguously exempts appropriation bills from its purview, and therefore it does not control the resolution of this case.[30]  He further argues that, “even if [section] 23 does apply to appropriation bills, the challenged language in HB2011 is constitutional because it embraces one of the various subjects for which money is appropriated.”[31]

V.        Comment

            The situation leading up to this opinion illustrates the continuation of Missouri’s aggressive legislative tactics to make abortion more difficult in the state.  Most notably, the state tried to deny the license of Missouri’s sole remaining abortion clinic last year.[32]  Indeed, Planned Parenthood officials in that case accused Missouri of using the legislative process as a “weaponizing mechanism designed to deny abortion access.”[33]  Had the Court allowed the appropriation bill to pass constitutional muster, it would have deprived Planned Parenthood of millions of dollars’ worth of medical services rendered.[34]  Additionally, the organization provides other essential health services such as cancer screenings, pap smears, and birth control pills – all of which would be at risk without funding.[35]  While this decision allows Missouri women continued access to safe sexual and reproductive healthcare for now, it is likely only a matter of time before Missouri’s legislative actions face another legal challenge.


[1] See Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, Division of Medical Services, 602 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. banc 2020).

[2] Id. at 204.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] House Bill No. 2011, § 11.800 (2018).

[6] See Planned Parenthood, 602 S.W.3d at 206.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.  The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s decision to tax costs against the state, holding such a tax to be without statutory authorization. 

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Mo. Const. art. III, § 23.

[12] Planned Parenthood, 602 S.W.3d at 206.

[13] Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[14] Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[15] Id. at 208.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 208–09.

[19] Id. at 209.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 210.

[23] Id. at 211.

[24] Id. at 211–12. (internal quotations omitted).

[25] Id. at 212.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 213.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Joe Harris, Missouri Court Shuts Down Effort to Defund Planned Parenthood, Courthouse News Service (June 30, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/missouri-court-shuts-down-effort-to-defund-planned-parenthood/.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.