Predatory sexual offenders,
as defined in Missouri Revised Statutes section 558.018.5(3), are subject to a minimum
sentence of life imprisonment with a chance of parole.[1] Angelo
Johnson (“Defendant”) was convicted of twelve counts of sexually-related crimes
against juveniles but tried to argue that he could not be a predatory sexual
offender because that distinction only applied to prior acts.[2] The
Supreme Court of Missouri disagreed, holding that section 558.018.5(3)
applied to charged acts, was not facially unconstitutional, and the circuit
court’s error from violating section 558.021.2 did not result in manifest
injustice in State v. Johnson.[3]
I.
Facts and Holding
The
State charged Defendant with six counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, three
counts of first-degree statutory rape, three counts of incest, and one count of
second-degree rape.[4] Prior
to trial, Defendant waived his statutory right to jury sentencing.[5]
The State also charged Defendant as a predatory sexual offender pursuant to section
558.018 for the first-degree statutory sodomy and first-degree statutory rape counts.[6]
Section 558.018 subjects a defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence of life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole if the circuit court finds the
defendant to be a predatory sexual offender and guilty of the predicate offense.[7]
The
St. Louis County Circuit Court, outside the presence of the jury, heard
arguments about the State’s request to find Defendant to be a predatory sexual
offender after the close of evidence and prior to the submission of the case to
the jury.[8]
Because the charges against Defendant involved multiple victims, the State
argued he was a predatory sexual offender pursuant to section 558.018.5(3),
which provides that a person “is a predatory sexual offender if the person
‘[h]as committed an act or acts against more than one victim.’”[9]
Defendant argued that section 558.018.5(3) did not apply because “that section
applies only to prior acts, not acts that are the bases for the current
charges.”[10]
Initially, the court was persuaded by Defendant’s argument and denied the
State’s request to find him to be a predatory sexual offender.[11]
The
jury found Defendant guilty on twelve of thirteen counts, acquitting him on one
count of first-degree sodomy.[12]
At sentencing, the State repeated its request that the court find Defendant to
be a predatory sexual offender pursuant to section 558.018.5(3).[13]
Defendant reiterated his argument from before – that the section did not apply
to him because it only applies to prior acts, but failed to argue section 558.021.2
precluded the court from finding him to be a predatory sexual offender because
the case had been submitted to a jury.[14]
The court reconsidered its earlier interpretation of the statute and found
Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender.[15]
Based on that
finding, the court sentenced Defendant to eight concurrent terms of life
imprisonment with eligibility for parole after twenty-five years for his
first-degree statutory sodomy and first-degree statutory rape convictions.[16]
Defendant appealed.[17]
After opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, the case was
transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to article V, section 10,
of the Missouri Constitution.[18]
II.
Legal Background
Section
558.018.5(3) defines “predatory sexual offender” as a person who: . . . (3) Has
committed an act or acts against more than one victim which would constitute an
offense or offenses listed in subsection 4 of this section, whether or not the
defendant was charged with an additional offense or offenses as a result of
such act or acts.”[19]
In jury trials, facts are “pleaded, established and found prior to submission
to the jury outside its hearing.”[20]
If the court finds the defendant to be a predatory sexual offender and the
defendant is found guilty of committing (or attempting to commit) one of the
predicate offenses,[21]
child molestation in the first or second degree, or sexual abuse when
classified as a class B felony, then the defendant is subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of life imprisonment with the chance of parole.[22]
The
Supreme Court of Missouri announced its primary rule of statutory
interpretation as “to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the
plain language of the statute.”[23]
Written simply, “[w]hen the words are clear, there is nothing to construe
beyond applying the plain meaning of the law.”[24]
In
Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, when a
factual finding increases the legally prescribed punishment, the fact “forms a
constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury.”[25]
To successfully argue that a statute is facially unconstitutional, the party
challenging the statute must establish that “no set of circumstances exists
under which the statute may be constitutionally applied.”[26]
III.
Instant Decision
In
Johnson, the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that section 558.018.5(3) applied to charged acts, was not
facially unconstitutional, and the circuit court’s violation of section 558.021.2
did not result in manifest injustice.[27]
In holding that section
558.018.5(3) applied to charged acts, the court found the statute unambiguous
because it never refers to prior or previous acts.[28]
To support Defendant’s argument that section 558.018.5(3) applied only to prior
acts, the court would have needed to add language to the statute and find that section
558.018.5(3) was superfluous.[29]
The court was unwilling to do so because section 558.018.5(2) specifically
refers to acts “previously committed,” meaning the legislature clearly intended
section 558.018.5(3) to also apply to charged acts.[30]
Defendant was
unable to persuade the court that section 558.018.5(3) was facially
unconstitutional.[31]
He argued that according to Alleyne, section
558.018.5(3) was unconstitutional because it permitted the circuit court to
find that he was a predatory sexual offender (thus extending the mandatory
minimum sentence) prior to the submission of the case to the jury.[32]
The court rejected this notion, holding that Alleyne only requires the jury find the necessary facts and does
not preclude a statute from requiring that the circuit court also find the
fact(s).[33]
In rejecting Defendant’s argument, the Supreme Court of Missouri noted if
either the circuit court or the jury failed to find the predicate facts, Defendant
could not be sentenced as a predatory sexual offender.[34]
Because circumstances exist where the circuit court’s pre-submission finding of
facts could align with the jury’s finding, the court held that section 558.018.5(3)
was not facially unconstitutional, concluding that “[t]his is not a case where
‘no set of circumstances exists under which the statute may be constitutionally
applied.’”[35]
Lastly, the court
held Defendant had not established manifest injustice resulting from the
circuit court’s violation of section 558.021.2 because he received the same
sentence he would have received if the statute had been properly applied.[36]
The court reasoned that the circuit court’s error was “untimely,” but “did not allow the State an
unfair advantage, and did not lack foundational support in the State's charging
or evidence.”[37]
IV.
Comment
The
Supreme Court of Missouri sent a clear message to predatory sexual offenders by
refusing to interpret section 558.018.5(3) beyond its plain meaning. In doing so,
the Court maintained that offenders convicted as predatory sexual offenders
would be sentenced to mandatory minimums of life imprisonment, with a chance
for parole.
Equally
important, the court settled an interesting procedural question. The statute at
issue required the circuit court to find the defendant’s status as a predatory
sexual offender prior to the case’s submission to the jury.[38]
The status comes with a mandatory minimum sentence, meaning that it has the
potential to extend the length of the defendant’s sentence. While the statute
was not found to be facially unconstitutional, the court acknowledged that the
statute could be found unconstitutional as applied to a defendant’s particular
case.[39]
Should there be more “as applied” constitutional challenges to the statute, the
legislature may be persuaded to alter the procedural portion of the statute —
requiring the jury to find the status.
- Gavin Thomas
[1] Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 556.125.5(3) (2016). Mo. Rev. Stat. §558.018
(2016), the statute cited by the Supreme Court of Missouri and referred to
throughout this note, was transferred to Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 556.125. This note cites to the current statute number.
[4] Id. at 508.
The three victims were the defendant’s two step-daughters and biological
daughter. Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[c]ases pending in the court of
appeals shall be transferred to the supreme court when any participating judge
dissents from the majority opinion and certifies that he deems said opinion to
be contrary to any previous decision of the supreme court or of the court of
appeals, or any district of the court of appeals. Cases pending in the court of
appeals may be transferred to the supreme court by order of the majority of the
judges of the participating district of the court of appeals, after opinion, or
by order of the supreme court before or after opinion because of the general
interest or importance of a question involved in the case, or for the purpose
of reexamining the existing law, or pursuant to supreme court rule. The supreme
court may finally determine all causes coming to it from the court of appeals,
whether by certification, transfer or certiorari, the same as on original
appeal.
Mo.
Const. art. V, § 10.
[19] Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 556.125.5(3) (2016).
[20] Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 558.021.2 (2016).
[21] “(1) Statutory
rape in the first degree or statutory sodomy in the first degree; (2) Rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first
degree; (3) Forcible rape; (4) Forcible
sodomy; (5) Rape; or (6) Sodomy.”
§ 566.125.1.
[22] Id.
[24] State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Mo. 2017) (en
banc) (quoting Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W. 3d 441, 446 (Mo. 2013) (en banc)).
[25] Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162
(2013).
[26] State v. Jeffrey, 400 S.W.3d 303, 308 (Mo. 2013) (en
banc).
[27] Johnson,
524 S.W.3d at 510, 513.
[28] Id. at 511.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 512–13.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
(quoting State v. Jeffrey, 400 S.W.3d 303, 308 (Mo. 2013) (en banc)).
[37] Id. at 513.
[38] Id. at 512.
[39] Id. at 513.
