A highway department employee who
responded to the scene of approximately 1000 catastrophic automobile accidents needed
to compare her work-related stress to that of similarly situated employees to
receive workers’ chompensation benefits for her mental injury, according to the Supreme
Court of Missouri. The Court overruled
the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which found that the 2005
amendments to Missouri Revised Statutes section
287.120.8 required strict construction. This abrogated case law required
claimants with mental injury claims to present evidence proving that the amount
of stress they experienced was “extraordinary and unusual” compared to other
similarly situated employees. The Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed and held that the term “objective” in the statute
meant “whether the same or similar actual work events would cause a
reasonable highway worker extraordinary and unusual stress.”[1]
I.
Facts
and Holding
Linda Mantia worked for the
Missouri Department of Transportation (“MoDOT”) for over twenty years.[2] One of her duties was to respond to motor
vehicle accident scenes to provide traffic control and assistance.[3] MoDOT promoted her to crew leader and
supervisor during her tenure.[4] Ms. Mantia and her crew responded to many
serious accident scenes, often including those with catastrophic injuries,
dismemberments, and fatalities.[5] During her career, Ms. Mantia responded to
approximately 1000 accidents.[6]
In 2008, Ms. Mantia began to suffer
from psychological symptoms that were attributed to her work as a MoDOT
employee.[7] She was treated by Dr. Timothy Jovick, a
psychologist.[8] Dr. Jovick diagnosed Ms. Mantia with major
depressive disorder as well as post-traumatic stress disorder caused by her
work with MoDOT.[9] In October 2008, Ms. Mantia filed a claim
seeking workers’ compensation benefits for mental injuries and disability.[10]
MoDOT’s expert, Dr. Wayne Stillings,
also evaluated Ms. Mantia.[11] Dr. Stillings agreed that she suffered from
depressive disorder caused by her work at MoDOT.[12] The only point on which Dr. Stillings and Dr.
Jovick diverged was the disability rating – Dr. Stillings assigned Ms. Mantia a
2.5% permanent partial disability, whereas Dr. Jovick assigned a ninety to ninety-five
percent disability rating.[13]
Despite both experts’ findings, the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Ms. Mantia’s claim for workers’
compensation benefits.[14] The ALJ held that she failed to prove she
suffered “extraordinary and unusual work related stress” compared to other
similarly situated employees as required by section 287.120.8.[15] Ms. Mantia sought review by the Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”), which reversed the ALJ’s
decision and awarded her a fifty percent permanent partial disability.[16] The Commission ordered MoDOT to pay for
future medical care to treat her psychological injury.[17] The court of appeals upheld the Commission’s
award.[18]
II.
Legal
Background
A. Case
Law
Prior to the amendment to the workers’
compensation statute in 2005, claims for mental injury were governed primarily by
case law that liberally interpreted several provisions of the workers’ compensation
statute.[19] The Supreme Court of Missouri emphasized that
plaintiffs needed to show the level of job-related stress they experienced was
“extraordinary and unusual compared to similarly situated employees.”[20] For example, in Carnal v. Pride Cleaners, a 2004 case, Carol Carnal presented a workers’
compensation claim for a panic attack that she suffered due to job-related
stress.[21] Pride Cleaners employed Ms. Carnal as a plant
manager in 2000.[22] Sometime during the preceding two years,
Pride Cleaners underwent a large reorganization that led to a significant
increase in workload.[23] In addition, Ms. Carnal’s supervisor (and
ex-husband), Dennis Dye, treated Ms. Carnal in an “indifferent, demanding, and
uncaring manner.”[24] Ms. Carnal alleged that the increase in
workload, coupled with the treatment from Mr. Dye, led to her panic attack.[25] The ALJ entered an award in favor of Ms.
Carnal, stating that she had “suffered extraordinary and unusual stress during
the course and scope of employment as a plant manager.”[26] While many of the same stressors were shared
by those in similar managerial positions, the ALJ noted that Ms. Carnal was
subject to higher levels of stress due to the substandard working conditions
and being supervised by her ex-husband.[27] The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western
District, affirmed the ruling, stating there was substantial evidence that Ms.
Carnal did experience “extraordinary and unusual stress” compared to other
managerial employees.[28]
B. 2005
Amendment to Section 287.120.8
In 2005, the Missouri legislature amended
the workers’ compensation statute to include a strict construction mandate.[29] Subsection 8 states that a “[m]ental injury resulting from work-related stress does
not arise out of and in the course of the employment, unless it is demonstrated
that the stress is work related and was extraordinary and unusual. The amount
of work stress shall be measured by objective standards and actual events.”[30] While the statute requires that an employee’s
stress must be measured using some objective standard, it is not clear exactly
what objective standards should be used to determine whether the work-related
psychological injury is extraordinary and unusual in nature.[31]
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,
in Mantia stated that under the
strict construction mandate passed in 2005, section 287.120.8 must no longer be
interpreted to require evidence of stress by similarly situated employees
because the requirement is not stated in the statute in plain and unambiguous
terms.[32] This effectively lowered the burden for
claimants with mental health injuries and abrogated case law that required
claimants suffering from work-related mental health injuries to present
evidence proving that the stress they suffered was “extraordinary and unusual”
compared to other similarly situated employees.[33]
III.
Instant
Decision
The Supreme Court of Missouri
reversed the court of appeals’ ruling and held that the 2005 amendments to the workers’
compensation statute did not alter claimants’ burdens of proving the stress
they suffered was extraordinary and unusual compared to other employees.[34] The Court noted that the Commission did not
apply the legal meaning of “objective” when interpreting the statute.[35] Most importantly, the Court noted that while the
statute may not have clearly defined what objective standards to use, the
standard can be found in case law.[36] The Court stated that in tort cases, “’[t]he
standard of conduct exacted by the law is an external and objective standard’ .
. . and not the personal, individual, subjective standard of the actor
involved.”[37] The Court stated that the “reasonable person”
standard is often used in negligence cases, and the defendant’s conduct is
evaluated based upon what an ordinary and careful person would do under similar
circumstances.[38] Therefore, the Court held, “the objective
standard for determining whether Employee’s stress was compensable is whether
the same or similar actual work events would cause a reasonable highway worker
extraordinary and unusual stress.”[39] In order to meet this burden, the claimant
must show not only that she experienced stress, but that it was to such a
degree that it was beyond the level of stress experienced by similarly situated
coworkers.[40] In this case, Ms. Mantia presented sufficient
evidence to show that she experienced stress, but she did not present evidence
to show that it was objectively “extraordinary and unusual” as required by the
statute.[41] The case was remanded for a review of Ms.
Mantia’s claim using the proper objective standard.[42]
IV.
Comment
This decision by the Supreme Court
of Missouri reversed the relaxed standard adopted by the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Eastern District, regarding pure mental injury (also known as
“mental-mental claims”) made by employees.
A minority of jurisdictions do allow for mental-mental workers’
compensation claims without evidence of extraordinary or unusual stress as
compared to the stress experienced by similarly situated employees; however,
Missouri is not one of them.[43] The holding by the Supreme Court of Missouri
realigns the state with the majority of jurisdictions that agree that
compensation for mental-mental claims should only be allowed in circumstances
where there are extraordinary and unusual circumstances present in relation to
other employees’ experiences.[44]
There are a number of reasons why
the Court may have been reluctant to adopt the relaxed standard proposed by the
court of appeals. Mental-mental claims
are more subjective than physical claims, which means causation can be
difficult to prove.[45] Many employees struggle to prove that the
mental stress is related to employment stress and not personal stress.[46] Due to the subjective nature of these claims,
it is also easier to feign a mental injury as opposed to a physical injury.[47] Regardless of the rationale, the Supreme
Court of Missouri followed past precedent by interpreting the “objective
standard” portion of section 287.120.8 to
mean that the extraordinary and unusual mental stress experienced by the
claimant must be compared to the stress that similarly situated employees
experience.
- Jessica
Peterman
[1] Mantia v.
Missouri Dep’t of Transp., No. SC 95885, 2017 WL 4001703, at *4 (Mo. Sept. 12,
2017) (en banc).
[2] Id. at *1.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Mantia v. Missouri
Dep't of Transp., No. ED 103016, 2016
WL 3269890, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. Aug. 1,
2016), transfer granted, No.
SC 95885, 2017 WL 4001703 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017).
[6] Id.
[7] Mantia, 2017 WL 4001703, at *1.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at *2.
[12] Id.
[13] Mantia v. Missouri
Dep't of Transp., No. ED 103016, 2016
WL 3269890, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. Aug. 1,
2016), transfer granted, No.
SC 95885, 2017 WL 4001703 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017).
[14] Mantia, 2017 WL 4001703, at *1.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Mantia v. Missouri
Dep't of Transp., No. ED 103016, 2016
WL 3269890, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. Aug. 1,
2016), transfer granted, No.
SC 95885, 2017 WL 4001703 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017).
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 159.
[29] S.B. 1, 93rd Gen
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005).
[31] Mantia v. Missouri
Dep’t of Transp., No. SC 95885, 2017 WL 4001703, at *3 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017) (en
banc).
[32] Mantia v. Missouri
Dep't of Transp., No. ED 103016, 2016
WL 3269890, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. Aug. 1,
2016), transfer granted, No.
SC 95885, 2017 WL 4001703 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017).
[33] Id.
[35] Id. at *3.
[36] Id.
[37] Id. (quoting Hodges v. Am. Bakeries,
Co., 412 S.W.2d 157, 162 (Mo. 1967) (en banc)).
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at *4.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] Id. at *5.
[43] See Catherine
M. Smith, Workers' Compensation for Mental-Mental Claims, 19 Am.
J. Trial Advoc. 229, 230–31
(1995).
[45] Id. at 229.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
