Opinion
handed down December 6, 2016
After fatally shooting his wife, David
Holman (“Defendant”) was read his Miranda
rights and proceeded to talk with law enforcement officials, giving
incriminating statements.[1]
Only when asked to sign a search consent
form to his home, did Defendant state, “I ain’t signing shit without my
attorney.”[2]
On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that the Defendant did not clearly and unequivocally
invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel after being read his Miranda rights and reversed the decision
of the lower court.[3]
I. Facts and Holding
On the morning of December 10, 2013, it
was asserted that the Defendant’s wife, RaDonna Roland (“Wife”), shot the Defendant
in the back of the arm.[4] As a result, Defendant fatally shot his Wife and
then called 911.[5]
Upon
calling 911, deputies Ryan Devost and Michael Thorn were dispatched to
Defendant’s home.[6] The deputies knocked on the door and were
allowed inside by Defendant.[7] Deputy Devost performed a security sweep of
the home, while Deputy Thorn checked on Wife.[8] Deputy Devost then handcuffed Defendant and
escorted him to the patrol car.[9] Shorty thereafter, paramedics arrived and
attempted to treat Wife.[10]
Deputy Thorn then moved Defendant into
the ambulance and read Defendant his Miranda
rights.[11] Defendant was emotional about his wife and
kept repeating that he could not believe he shot her.[12] Defendant stated that he could not believe
there was not more being done for Wife and that he should have run away rather
than shooting Wife.[13] At this point, Deputy Devost requested that
Defendant sign a consent form to search his home, to which Defendant responded,
“I ain’t signing shit without my attorney.”[14]
Once other
detectives arrived at the scene, Deputy Devost informed them that Defendant was
in custody, had been read his Miranda
rights, and refused to sign a search warrant without his attorney.[15] The following morning, Detective Linda
McElroy again read Defendant his Miranda
rights and asked if he understood them.[16]
Defendant indicated he did, and he
proceeded to speak with the detective.[17]
Following this interview, Defendant was
charged with first-degree murder and armed criminal action.[18]
Before
trial, Defendant brought this motion to suppress statements he made after
originally being read his Miranda
rights.[19] The trial court sustained the motion, holding
that in stating “I ain’t signing shit without my attorney,” Defendant had
invoked his right to counsel.[20]
II. Legal Background
In
Missouri, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will only be reversed by
an appellate court if it is “clearly erroneous.”[21] To be “clearly erroneous,” the appellate court
must be “left with a definite and firm belief a mistake has been made.”[22]
As for Miranda rights, these are designed to
“inform a criminal defendant of his constitutional rights during the
interrogation process.”[23] A request for consent to search is “not an
‘interrogation’ because giving consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement
under the Fifth Amendment.”[24]
Once a
criminal suspect is subjected to a custodial interrogation (formally arrested
or is subjected to arrest-like restraints),[25]
the suspect is entitled to Miranda
warnings.[26] In the Supreme Court of Missouri case of State v. Stover, the court noted: “Statements
obtained during a custodial interrogation not preceded by Miranda warnings are subject to suppression at trial.”[27]
Further, once these rights are read, if
the suspect “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”[28] Likewise, when a suspect invokes his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel, the police must stop all interrogation and may not
again question the suspect unless counsel is present.[29]
However,
for this right to counsel to be triggered during a custodial investigation, the
suspect must be sufficiently clear so that a reasonable officer would
understand that the suspect is invoking his or her right to have an attorney
present during the interrogation.[30]
III. Instant Decision
In the present case, the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed the judgment of the trial court and found that the trial
court had erroneously sustained Defendant’s motion to suppress the statements
made to Detective McElroy.[31]
To support its decision, the court found
that at no time did Defendant seek to terminate questioning by the police or
clearly state that he wanted an attorney.[32] More so, the court found that Deputy Devost
had advised Defendant of his Miranda
rights, Defendant indicated that he understood them, and Defendant continued
talking to him after he did so.[33]
As to the statement made by Defendant, “I
ain’t signing shit without my attorney,” the court determined that “a
reasonable police officer would not have understood Defendant’s statement
refusing to sign the consent to search form to be an invocation of his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel.”[34]
More so, as to the interrogation the
following day by Detective McElroy after again reading Defendant his Miranda rights, the court found that
“[b]ecause Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel clearly and
unequivocally after being read his Miranda
rights by [both officers], Detective McElroy’s interrogation of Defendant was
proper.”[35]
IV. Comment
There have
been numerous cases across the modern legal landscape in which statements are
suppressed due to law enforcement’s violation of a defendant’s invocation of his
or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel. While these cases may come on a spectrum, with
interrogation continuing after a clear invocation for counsel on one extreme, and
interrogation continuing after a potentially weak invocation for counsel on the
other, the trial court’s decision to sustain Defendant’s motion appears to be
outside of such spectrum.
Here, the
supposed invocation of Defendant’s right to counsel came only after the suspect
had continued speaking with Deputy Devost after his Miranda rights were read. Further,
this “request” came only in reference to signing a search consent form. At no time did Defendant state he did not wish
to speak to law enforcement officials or ask that his attorney be present for
any of the questioning. While Defendant
mentioned that he would not sign anything without his attorney present, that is
not what this case is about. This case
is about Defendant’s statements to law enforcement officials following a
custodial interrogation. As such,
Defendant did not invoke his Miranda
rights clearly and unequivocally, as the law requires he so do.[36]
Currently, law enforcement officials are
tasked with countless decisions and a maze of law and procedure they must
follow in both responding to and investigating a crime. On top of this already-steep burden, should we
also require law enforcement officials to try to decipher every statement made
by suspects during an investigation that could potentially trigger a right to
counsel? Or should we take the
statements made by suspects at face value and interpret them how a reasonable
officer in such situation would?
I argue the
answer is simple and should be the latter. As such, I believe the Supreme Court of Missouri
was correct in determining that the trial court erroneously sustained
Defendant’s motion to suppress.
-
EC
Duckworth
[1] State v. Holman, 502
S.W.3d 621, 623–24 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
[2] Id. at 623.
[3] Id. at 627.
[4] Id. at 623.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 624.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] State v. Bell, 488 S.W.3d 228, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting
State v. Haldiman, 106 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)).
[23] State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 753 (Mo. 2014) (en banc)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 582 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)).
[24] State v. Metz, 43 S.W.3d 374, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
[25] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
[27] State v. Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 155 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
[28] Miranda, 384
U.S. at 473–74.
[29] Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
[30] Id.
[32] Id. at 625.
[33] Id. at 625–26.
[34] Id.
[35] Id. at 626.
[36] Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
