Tuesday, January 7, 2014

Southern Wine and Spirits of America, Inc. v. Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control [1]

Opinion handed down September 25, 2013
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/13/09/122502P.pdf

A subsidiary of Southern Wine and Spirits of America (“SWSA”) applied for a license for wholesale distribution of liquor with the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control of the Missouri Department of Public Safety (“the Division”). The application was denied because Missouri law requires a liquor wholesaler to meet certain residency requirements and SWSA, a Florida corporation, could not satisfy these requirements. SWSA sued, arguing that the residency requirement violated the Commerce Clause because its purpose is simply to discriminate against out-of-state commerce while insulating in-state enterprises against competition. The Division responded by arguing that Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment grants states greater power to regulate alcohol distribution than normally allowed under the Commerce Clause. After considering the interaction between the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment and reviewing the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions on the subject, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals held that the residency requirement was constitutional.


I.          Facts & District Court Holding

In order to obtain a license to sell liquor at wholesale under Missouri law, a wholesaler must be a “resident corporation.”[i] In order to qualify as a resident corporation, an entity must be incorporated under the laws of Missouri, all of its officers and directors must be “qualified legal voters and taxpaying citizens of the county…in which they reside” and have been bona fide residents of the state for at least three years.[ii] Furthermore, at least 60 per cent of the legal and beneficial interest in the corporation must be owned by resident stockholders.[iii]
A wholly owned subsidiary of Southern Wine and Spirits of America (“SWSA”) applied for a wholesale license with the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control of the Missouri Department of Public Safety (“the Division”).[iv] Because SWSA was a Florida corporation, all of its officers and directors were Florida residents, and over 51 percent of all shares of the corporation were held by Florida residents, the Division denied the application because SWSA failed to satisfy the residency requirement.[v]
SWSA sued the Division, arguing that the residency requirement is unconstitutional. Specifically, it argued that the requirement discriminates against out-of-state enterprises in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.[vi] While the Division agreed that the requirement discriminates against interstate commerce, it argued that Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment supersedes the Commerce Clause and authorizes such discrimination with regard to alcohol regulation.[vii] The District Court agreed with the Division and granted summary judgment in its favor.[viii]

III.       Legal Background

In deciding this case, the Eight Circuit began by analyzing the Supreme Court of the United States’         treatment of alcohol regulation cases under the Twenty-first Amendment in order to delineate the scope of that provision.[ix] While noting that the earliest cases held that the Twenty-first Amendment completely removed state liquor regulations from Commerce Clause scrutiny, the Court has steadily reined back this broad interpretation.[x] Most recently, the Court in Granholm v. Heald[xi] found that state systems that exempted in-state alcohol producers from certain distribution requirements constituted “explicit discrimination against interstate commerce.”[xii] Because the Twenty-first Amendment “does not displace the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers,” systems like the one at issue were unconstitutional.[xiii]
The Eighth Circuit noted that despite its holding, the Court’s reasoning in Granholm endorsed in-state wholesaler requirements like the one in effect in Missouri.[xiv] The court pointed out that Granholm described the tiered distribution system, and the in-state wholesaler component of such systems, as “unquestionably legitimate.”[xv] The Eighth Circuit further distinguished Granholm by reasoning that the regulations were found unconstitutional because they failed to treat “liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent.”[xvi] Tiered systems are unconstitutional if they discriminate against out-of-state products, but in-state wholesaler requirements are part of a state’s “exercise of authority under the Twenty-first Amendment.”[xvii]
SWSA argued that the purpose of the residency requirement was simply “mere economic protectionism.”[xviii] In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. V. Dias,[xix] the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[t]he central purpose of the [Twenty-first Amendment] was not to favor local industries by erecting barriers to competition.”[xx] While the Eighth Circuit recognized that alcohol regulations that seek merely to protect in-state enterprises from competition are unconstitutional, the court held that SWSA had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of protectionist intent.[xxi] Furthermore, the statute containing the residency requirement contained a statement of the law’s purposes, including “to promote responsible consumption, combat illegal underage drinking,” and other plainly legitimate, non-protectionist purposes.[xxii]
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit held the residency requirement constitutional.[xxiii] The Twenty-first Amendment provides states with greater power to regulate alcohol than other commerce.[xxiv] While such regulation cannot be solely for protectionist purposes under Bacchus,[xxv] in-state wholesaler regulations have been expressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in Granholm.[xxvi] Thus, because Missouri’s wholesaler residency requirement is not solely for protectionist purposes and is within the state’s power under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Eight Circuit held the law constitutional.[xxvii]

II.        Instant Decision

The decision in Southern Wine and Spirits depended on the interaction between the so-called “dormant Commerce Clause” and section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. The Dormant Commerce Clause refers to an inference drawn from the Commerce Clause[xxviii] – which gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce – that states do not have the power to unfairly discriminate against out-of state commerce.[xxix] However, section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides that “[t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”[xxx] Thus it would seem that the Twenty-first Amendment gives states greater power than they would otherwise have under the dormant Commerce Clause in the area of alcohol regulation.
As the Southern Wine and Spirits court notes, early United States Supreme Court cases interpreted the Twenty-first Amendment very broadly,[xxxi] while more recent cases have seen the Court scaling back its interpretation of the amendment to harmonize its coverage with the Commerce Clause.[xxxii] The court in Southern Wine and Spirits relied heavily on the Supreme Court of the United States’ most recent pronouncement on the issue – Granholm v. Heald.[xxxiii] In that case, the Court noted that “state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause”[xxxiv] while recognizing that “States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.”[xxxv] Because the laws in question had the effect of favoring in-state producers of wine over their out-of-state competitors, the Court held that “these regulations cannot stand…under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”[xxxvi]
The Southern Wine and Spirits court used Granholm to reach the opposite conclusion – that Missouri’s residency requirement for wholesale liquor distributors was constitutional. The alcohol regulations at issue in Granholm burdened out-of-state producers of alcohol while conferring benefits on domestic producers. As the Granholm court held: “State policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent.”[xxxvii] In Southern Wine and Spirits, out of state producers of alcohol were not burdened by the residency requirement – access to Missouri’s market for liquor could still be obtained by distributing through a resident wholesaler. Because the residency requirement treats in-state and out-of-state products the same, it is within the Twenty-first Amendment’s protection. Perhaps most on point, the Granholm court approvingly cites Justice Scalia’s concurrence in North Dakota v. United States,[xxxviii]where he stated that “[t]he Twenty-first Amendment ... empowers [a state] to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler.”[xxxix]

III.       Comment

This case is a new entry in the long history of the federal courts’ attempts to properly harmonize the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. While it is clear that state alcohol regulations that seek merely to protect domestic producers from out-of-state competition fail under the Commerce Clause – the Twenty-first Amendment notwithstanding – the court in Southern Wine and Spirits applies earlier precedents and finds that wholesalers of alcohol can be subject to regulation that producers cannot. Relying largely on dicta from the Supreme Court of the United States,[xl] the Eighth Circuit seems to have simply decided that regulations relating to state liquor production systems are “protected against constitutional challenges based on the Commerce Clause,”[xli] despite the fact that the regulation at issue was clearly discriminatory against out-of-state commerce. This seems to be a step back towards prior law, where the Twenty-first Amendment was interpreted to remove state liquor regulations from Commerce Clause scrutiny – an interpretation that the Supreme Court has rejected.


- Keith Holland



[i] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 311.060.2(3).
[ii] Id. at § 311.060.3
[iii] Id.
[iv] Southern Wine and Spirits, No. 12-2502 at 2.
[v] Id. at 3.
[vi] Id. at 4.
[vii] Id.
[viii] Id.
[ix] Id. at 5.
[x] Id. at 5-6.
[xi] 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
[xii] Id. at 467.
[xiii] Id. at 486.
[xiv] Southern Wine and Spirits at 9.
[xv] Id. (citing Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488 (2005)).
[xvi] Id. (emphasis added).
[xvii] Id. (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,  466 (2005)). 
[xviii] Id. at 10.
[xix] 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
[xx] Id. at 276.
[xxi] Southern Wine and Spirits at 10-12.
[xxii] Id. at 12-13.
[xxiii] Id. at 19.
[xxiv] Id. at 16.
[xxv] Id. at 12.
[xxvi] Id. at 16-17.
[xxvii] Id. at 19.
[xxviii] U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
[xxix] See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
[xxx] U.S. Const., amend. 21, § 2.
[xxxi] See, e.g., State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936) ( holding that the Twenty-first Amendment removed state liquor regulations from Commerce Clause scrutiny).
[xxxii] See, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
[xxxiii] 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
[xxxiv] Id. at 487.
[xxxv] Id. at 493.
[xxxvi] Id.
[xxxvii] Id. at 489.
[xxxviii] 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
[xxxix] Id. at 447 (Scalia, J., concurring).
[xl] Southern Wine and Spirits at 14-15.
[xli] Id. at 14.