Opinion handed down June 28, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
As part of a national trend of similar litigation, St. Louis County and St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC) filed suit against Prestige Travel, Inc. (Prestige) and several other online travel companies that contract for discounted motel rooms and then resell the rooms online at a higher price. St. Louis County and CVC claimed that §§ 502.500-502.550 of the revised ordinances of St. Louis County and Revised Statutes of Missouri §§ 67.601-67.626 required these companies to pay certain hotel and tourism taxes, which they had not paid. House Bill No. 1442 (H.B. 1442) was then enacted, exempting such travel companies from the taxes at issue. The circuit court dismissed the case, and on appeal the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that Prestige was not obligated under the taxing statutes before enactment of H.B. 1442, and that H.B. 1442 did not violate the Original Purpose, Clear Title, or Single Subject provisions of the Missouri Constitution.
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Mo. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists, Inc. v. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts[1]
Opinion handed down June 28, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
In 2007, the State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts (the Board) sent a letter to Dr. Kunkel prohibiting his delegation of certain responsibilities to nurses with whom he worked. Dr. Kunkel and other interested parties subsequently filed a petition in circuit court requesting relief from the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Board, dismissing all claims by Dr. Kunkel and the other parties. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded. The court held that the letter sent to Dr. Kunkel constituted a “rule” and was invalid because the Board failed to follow proper rulemaking procedures as provided by statute. While the Board has the authority to properly promulgate rules on the general subject matter, the court remanded because it is a question of fact to determine if the Board independently possesses this authority. The court’s holding is proper and consistent with statute because the letter to Dr. Kunkel was not limited to the specific facts of his situation. The letter was instead a general statement that all APNs were unqualified to perform certain procedures. To make such general policy statements the Board must instead adhere to the statutorily prescribed rule making procedure.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
In 2007, the State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts (the Board) sent a letter to Dr. Kunkel prohibiting his delegation of certain responsibilities to nurses with whom he worked. Dr. Kunkel and other interested parties subsequently filed a petition in circuit court requesting relief from the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Board, dismissing all claims by Dr. Kunkel and the other parties. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded. The court held that the letter sent to Dr. Kunkel constituted a “rule” and was invalid because the Board failed to follow proper rulemaking procedures as provided by statute. While the Board has the authority to properly promulgate rules on the general subject matter, the court remanded because it is a question of fact to determine if the Board independently possesses this authority. The court’s holding is proper and consistent with statute because the letter to Dr. Kunkel was not limited to the specific facts of his situation. The letter was instead a general statement that all APNs were unqualified to perform certain procedures. To make such general policy statements the Board must instead adhere to the statutorily prescribed rule making procedure.
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele[1]
Opinion handed down May 31, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Michael Anthony Taylor pled guilty in 1991 to kidnapping, rape, and first-degree-murder of a young girl. On two occasions he was sentenced to death by a judge. After multiple attempts in both state and federal court to have his sentence overturned, Taylor sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Missouri. On appeal, Taylor argued that because of subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions, his death sentence was imposed unlawfully by a judge, rather than by a jury, and that his sentence violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of Missouri disagreed, finding that Taylor was not entitled to jury sentencing because he had made a conscious and strategic decision to be sentenced by a judge believing it gave him the best chance of avoiding the death penalty.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Michael Anthony Taylor pled guilty in 1991 to kidnapping, rape, and first-degree-murder of a young girl. On two occasions he was sentenced to death by a judge. After multiple attempts in both state and federal court to have his sentence overturned, Taylor sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Missouri. On appeal, Taylor argued that because of subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions, his death sentence was imposed unlawfully by a judge, rather than by a jury, and that his sentence violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of Missouri disagreed, finding that Taylor was not entitled to jury sentencing because he had made a conscious and strategic decision to be sentenced by a judge believing it gave him the best chance of avoiding the death penalty.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
State v. Brown[1]
Opinion handed down May 17, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded the second-degree murder conviction of Anthony Brown. At trial Brown had asserted self-defense, and during closing arguments the trial court had permitted the State to use a .38 revolver as demonstrative evidence to rebut Brown’s claim of self-defense. The conviction was reversed because there was no testimony that the .38 was similar to the gun allegedly carried by the victim.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded the second-degree murder conviction of Anthony Brown. At trial Brown had asserted self-defense, and during closing arguments the trial court had permitted the State to use a .38 revolver as demonstrative evidence to rebut Brown’s claim of self-defense. The conviction was reversed because there was no testimony that the .38 was similar to the gun allegedly carried by the victim.
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Schmitz v. Great Am. Assurance, Co.[1]
Opinion issued April 26, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Christine Ewing died from injuries she sustained falling from a portable rock climbing wall at a minor league baseball game.[2] Her parents sued the baseball team’s owner, who had primary and excess insurance policies. After settling with the owner, and in the course of the proceedings against the insurers, four issues arose: (1) whether the excess liability policy required exhaustion of the primary policy before it would apply; (2) whether the rock climbing wall was an “amusement device” within the meaning of the policy’s amusement device exclusion; (3) whether the court was permitted to examine the reasonableness of the underlying judgment; and (4) whether the excess insurer’s refusal to defend was justifiable. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the excess policy did not require exhaustion, the rock climbing wall was not an “amusement device,” the court was not permitted to examine the reasonableness of the underlying judgment, and the excess insurer’s refusal to defend was unjustifiable.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Christine Ewing died from injuries she sustained falling from a portable rock climbing wall at a minor league baseball game.[2] Her parents sued the baseball team’s owner, who had primary and excess insurance policies. After settling with the owner, and in the course of the proceedings against the insurers, four issues arose: (1) whether the excess liability policy required exhaustion of the primary policy before it would apply; (2) whether the rock climbing wall was an “amusement device” within the meaning of the policy’s amusement device exclusion; (3) whether the court was permitted to examine the reasonableness of the underlying judgment; and (4) whether the excess insurer’s refusal to defend was justifiable. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the excess policy did not require exhaustion, the rock climbing wall was not an “amusement device,” the court was not permitted to examine the reasonableness of the underlying judgment, and the excess insurer’s refusal to defend was unjustifiable.
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Fast v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc.[1]
Opinion handed down April 21, 2011
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion
On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Applebee’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Department of Labor’s (DOL) interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as contained in the Wage and Hour Division’s Field Operations Handbook (Handbook), establishing conditions for when employers could use the alternative minimum wage for tipped employees, was reasonable, persuasive, and entitled to deference.[2]
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion
On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Applebee’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Department of Labor’s (DOL) interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as contained in the Wage and Hour Division’s Field Operations Handbook (Handbook), establishing conditions for when employers could use the alternative minimum wage for tipped employees, was reasonable, persuasive, and entitled to deference.[2]
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