Burlison v. Springfield Public Schools[1]

Opinion handed down March 4, 2013

Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

Mellony and Douglas Burlison, on behalf of their son, C.M., filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article I, Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution, alleging that Springfield Public Schools (the “District”) along with school and law enforcement officials violated C.M.'s constitutional rights by searching and seizing his backpack during a drug dog visit to C.M.’s school.[2]  The Burlisons sought a permanent injunction, actual and nominal damages, attorney fees, and other relief.[3]  The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the policies used during the drug dog exercise were reasonable and not a deprivation of any federal rights.[4]  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.[5]

State v. Kevin E. Hicks[1]

Opinion handed down February 26, 2013

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri denied Kevin Hicks’ appeal to overturn his convictions of forcible rape, attempted forcible rape, and forcible sodomy. Hicks argued that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his statements to the police because the statements were made on the belief that he had agreed to a certain plea bargain which the state later failed to uphold.[2]

Garozzo v. Missouri Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions & Professional Registration, Division of Finance[1]

Opinion handed down January 29, 2013

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

In 2010, the Missouri SAFE Act was passed in response to the federal SAFE Act that was enacted in the wake of the 2008 financial crises.[2]  A provision of the Missouri SAFE Act, section 443.713(2)(a), prohibited the director of the division of finance from issuing a mortgage loan originator license to anyone who had pleaded guilty to a felony seven years prior to the date of the application.[3]  Ray Garozzo, who had been a mortgage loan originator for several decades, applied for a license in 2010, but had pleaded guilty to a felony in 2006. [4] As a result, Garozzo’s license application was rejected.[5]  Garozzo subsequently filed a suit claiming that section 443.713(2)(a) violated portions of the Missouri Constitution, namely: article I, section 30’s ban on bills of attainder; article I, section 13’s ban on retrospective laws; and article I, section 10’s guarantee of due process.[6]  Although the lower court held section 443.713(2)(a) unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the ruling.[7]

Roberts v. BJC Healthcare[1]

Opinion handed down January 29, 2013

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Plaintiffs brought suit against health service providers claiming that they were victims in a fraudulent billing scheme.  The circuit court ruled that because Plaintiffs were not billed for the alleged overcharges, they were unable to prove damages, and entered judgment in favor of the health service providers.  The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s holding.

State ex rel. Mark Woodworth v. Larry Denney[1]

Opinion handed down January 8, 2013

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated Mark Woodworth’s convictions for murder, assault, burglary and armed criminal action because the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to turn over material exculpatory evidence.[2]

Doughty v. Director of Revenue[1]

Opinion handed down January 8, 2013

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Norman and David Doughty, father and son, were arrested simultaneously for driving while intoxicated and both subsequently refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.[2] As a result of their refusals, Norman and David were served with notices from the Director of Revenue which stated that their licenses would be revoked for one year. At trial, the Director’s sole evidence was an exhibit of her certified records, which were admitted pursuant to a state statute that provides certified copies of the records of the Director of Revenue are admissible in proceedings without identification testimony.[3]  The Doughtys’ claimed that statute was unconstitutional because it prevented them from confronting adverse witnesses, such as their arresting officers.[4] The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected this argument and held that the Doughtys’ were free to subpoena any adverse witnesses to appear at their separate trials because the statute did not expressly prevent them from doing so. [5]

In Re The Matter Of T.Q.L[1]

Opinion handed down Dec. 18, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Petitioner, M.M.A., and Respondent, L.L., had a relationship which was thought to have resulted in the birth of a child, T.Q.L.  Over the years, M.M.A. fulfilled the role of T.Q.L.’s father.  Eventually M.M.A. and L.L.’s relationship ended and a paternity test revealed that M.M.A. was not the biological father.  M.M.A. filed a petition alleging unfitness of both L.L. and the child’s biological father, ultimately seeking third-party custody and visitation.  The circuit court dismissed M.M.A’s petition for failure to state a claim.  M.M.A. brought this action for reinstatement of his petition seeking third-party custody and visitation of T.Q.L.  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and reinstated M.M.A.’s petition. The Court held that M.M.A. could petition the court for third-party custody and visitation.

American Federation of Teachers v. Ledbetter[1]

Opinion handed down November 20, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

At trial, the American Federation of Teachers and its St. Louis affiliate, Local 420, (together “the union”), claimed that the Construction Career Center Charter School District and the individual members of its Board of Education (“the board”) failed to satisfy its duty to bargain collectively under article I, section 29, of the Missouri Constitution.[2]  The trial court granted summary judgment declaring that the board had no duty to “meet and confer” or to bargain collectively in good faith with the union.[3]  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court, holding that that article I, section 29 guarantees employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively, which includes a duty for the board to meet and confer in good faith.[4]

S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District[1]

Opinion handed down October 17, 2012

Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

On January 11, 2012, the Lee's Summit R-7 School District ("the School District") suspended twin brothers Steven and Sean Wilson ("the Wilsons”) for 180 days because of inappropriate content posted on a website the Wilsons created.[2]  The Wilsons sued the School District alleging the School District violated their rights to free speech.  The Wilsons also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to lift their suspensions.[3]  The District Court granted the injunction, effectively allowing the Wilsons to return to school, but the School District appealed.[4]  A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit overturned the District Court’s preliminary injunction.[5]  The brothers had not met two of the four elements of their claim, and the panel held that they likely would not be successful on the merits.[6]  The speech was punishable under the famous Tinker analysis and the harm was purely speculative.[7]