Jones v. Mid-Century Insurance
Opinion handed down June 30, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed whether a particular car insurance policy reduced the amount an insured motorist could recover from an accident with an underinsured individual. The court looked at whether this amount was reduced by deducting the amount the insured motorist received from the underinsured individual from the coverage limit of the insurance policy or by deducting the amount received from the motorist’s total damages and then applying the policy’s coverage limit. The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the particular insurance contract deducted the amount received from the motorist’s total damages and then applied the policy’s coverage limit. The reasoning behind the court’s holding is not clear because, while the court appears to rely on the proposition that inconsistencies in an insurance contract are resolved in favor of the insured, the court asserts that the contract can be interpreted in a manner that gives meaning to all subsections of the contract.

Miller v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission[1]
Opinion handed down June 30, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a worker's injury, suffered while at work but not caused by the work itself, did not arise out of his employment and therefore did not entitle him to workers' compensation benefits.

State ex rel. Henley v. Bickel[1]
Opinion handed down June 16, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed plaintiffs to sue an automobile passenger under joint venture and master-servant theories for negligence arising from a motor vehicle accident and made absolute the passenger’s writ of prohibition to prevent the lawsuit. The majority found that the plaintiffs’ petition did not plead sufficient facts to show the passenger had a “realistic right of control” under either theory.[2] Judges Fischer and Teitelman dissented, arguing that the “normal rules of procedure” provided a remedy and the issuance of the writ circumvented the trial court and appellate processes.[3]

Doe v. Keathley

Opinion handed down June 16, 2009. [1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

I. Introduction

The Missouri Supreme Court held that the federal Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) imposes an independent obligation on sex offenders living in Missouri to register, even if they would not been required to register under state law.

State of Missouri v. Jacob R. Pribble

Opinion handed down May 26, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 566.151, a newly enacted emergency measure that criminalizes enticement of a child, is not unconstitutional. Specifically, the court held that the prescribed punishment was not cruel and unusual, and the statute itself was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Finally, the court held that the statute was enacted pursuant to a valid and supported legislative determination that an emergency existed so as to justify the waiver of the standard ninety-day waiting period before a newly enacted law takes effect.

State v. Gaw

Opinion handed down May 26, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a criminal suspect's waiver of Miranda rights is valid even if he was previously questioned on the same subject while in custody and prior to receiving a Miranda warning. The court held that statements made both before and after a Miranda warning were admissible if the questioning officer did not intentionally undermine Miranda by withholding the warning.