United States v. Naylor

Opinion handed down April 5, 2018

            On November 25, 2015, Charles Naylor II pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.[1]  The district court found that Naylor’s four prior convictions for Missouri second-degree burglary qualified as violent felonies, so it subjected him to enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and imposed a sentence of 180-months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.[2]  The enhanced sentence was affirmed by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in March 2017.[3]  On subsequent appeal, the Eighth Circuit, en banc, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that second-degree burglary, as defined in Missouri’s statute, does not constitute a violent felony under the ACCA, overturning the precedent of United States v. Sykes.[4] 

G.W.G. ex rel J.D.G. v. A.D.N.

Opinion handed down December 19, 2017

            The Missouri Court of Appeals’, Eastern District, decision in G.W.G. ex rel J.D.G. v. A.D.N. assessed, among other issues, a claim that the trial court was impartial and failed to recuse itself despite being aware of certain evidence that improperly swayed the decision in a custody case.  The decision illustrates the high threshold required to make an effective showing of impartiality and the emphasis of viewing a trial record as a whole rather than at specific pieces that suggest impropriety.

Doe Run Resources Corporation v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance

Opinion handed down October 31, 2017

            The Supreme Court of Missouri considered whether a pollution exclusion in a commercial general liability policy issued to Doe Run barred coverage for bodily injury caused by exposure to toxic emissions stemming from Doe Run's lead production facilities in Peru.  The pollution exclusion defined pollutant to mean "any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant."  At issue was whether lead, emitted in its particulate form, was an "irritant or contaminant."  The court applied the dictionary definition of those terms and concluded that the pollution exclusion applied to bar coverage.

K.M.M. v. K.E.W.

Opinion handed down October 3, 2017

            The Missouri Court of Appeals', Eastern District, decision in K.M.M. v. K.E.W. highlights potential struggles in custody when the parties involved are a same-sex, unmarried couple with a child conceived by artificial insemination.  The decision dodged the constitutional equal protection violation question and instead reached a resolution grounded in third party custody statutory factors. While the holding of the Eastern District is equitable given the circumstances, it does not solidify any rights for the non-biological parent in a same-sex custody situation.

State v. Clay

Opinion handed down October 17, 2017

            In State v. Clay, defendant Clay appealed his conviction for second degree murder and armed criminal action citing improper jury instructions even though his counsel actively participated in the drafting of the instructions.[1]  Defense counsel failed to request, or object to the absence of, “withdrawal” language in the self-defense instruction proffered to the jury at the trial court.[2]  Consequently, the jury never considered whether Clay had regained the privilege of self-defense after he was found to be the initial aggressor.[3]  The Supreme Court of Missouri properly affirmed Clay’s conviction[4] and reestablished the historical maxim that “nullus commondum capere protest de injuria sua propria,” or “no one shall be allowed to profit from his own wrong.”[5]

In re SuperValu, Inc.

Opinion handed down August 30, 2017

15.4 million Americans were victims of identity theft in 2016.[1]  Data breaches are becoming more common, and some consumers want to sue the company that suffered the data breach.  There is a circuit split regarding whether the consumers whose information was stolen satisfy the injury element of standing.[2]  The Eighth Circuit contributed to that split in In re SuperValu by holding that the consumers did not satisfy the injury requirement because they had not yet and may never suffer identity theft.[3]