Spalding v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.

Opinion handed down May 12, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

Landowner, Randy Spalding, sued titled insurer, Stewart Title Guaranty Company, for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay an insurance claim relating to a defective title sold to Spalding.^[1]  Spalding purchased 419 acres with plans to construct a lake development within the area.^[2]  However, a third party owned the title to one of the 419 acres, preventing the lake development.^[3]  In response to the sale of the defective title, Stewart assessed $10,000 of damages pursuant to their title insurance policy, which Spalding alleged was inadequate.^[4]  After a jury trial, the trial court entered an amended judgment for Spalding for over $1,100,000.^[5] Stewart Title appealed the judgment contending various errors by the trial court.^[6]  The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Spalding’s claim was not barred by a five-year statute of limitations, expert testimony from Spalding’s appraiser regarding damages was admissible, and the jury was not confused or misled by jury instructions on damages.^[7]  This Summary will address the issue of admitting the appraisers of damages as expert testimony.

State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr

Opinion handed down April 28, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

A former employee of the St. Louis Rams, Todd Hewitt, filed suit alleging age discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act.  The Rams then filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, under the Honorable Judge Kristine Kerr, granted the motion.  Hewitt then petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking to prevent the circuit court from requiring arbitration.

Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Center

Opinion handed down April 28, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

In June of 2013, Shonda Ambers-Phillips was experiencing pain in her side and underwent exploratory surgery.^[1]  Doctors discovered pieces of medical equipment that were left in her  abdomen from an operation she underwent in 1999.^[2]  A few months later, Ambers-Phillips filed a medical malpractice claim against the medical center that employed the doctors who allegedly left the pieces of medical equipment in her abdomen.^[3]  The trial court sustained the defendant’s motion to dismiss, citing the ten-year statute of repose contained in a medical malpractice statute, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 516.105.^[4]

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding: (1) the statute of repose is not subject to equitable tolling;^[5]  (2) the statute of repose in Section 516.105 does not violate the Missouri Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause or Open Courts Provision;^[6] and (3) Section 516.105 does not violate due process and is not an invalid special law.^[7]  This Summary will focus on the first holding regarding equitable tolling.

Torres v. Simpatico, Inc.

Opinion handed down March 25, 2015

Link to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion

The issue at the heart of Torres is the enforceability of a compelled arbitration clause contained in a franchise agreement.^[1]  After some franchisees joined together in a putative class action against their franchisers and other individuals associated with their franchise system, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),^[2] the franchisers attempted to assert the individual arbitration clauses in the franchisees’ contracts.^[3]  The district court granted the franchisers’ motion to compel arbitration.  The franchisees then appealed from the district court’s ruling, arguing that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable, but the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.^[4] 

U.S. v. Robinson

Opinion handed down on March 25, 2015^[1]

Link to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion

Fred Robinson opened a non-profit charter school in St. Louis in 2006.^[2]  In addition to opening the charter school, Robinson had been employed by the Parking Division of St. Louis Treasurer’s Office (“Parking Division”) to inspect parking meters since 1990.^[3]  Following suspicious employment records, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation into his employment in late 2009.^[4]  The FBI’s investigation, which consisted of many interviews and GPS tracking, concluded that Robinson did not perform his job for Parking Division.^[5]  In addition, Robinson was found to have misappropriated the charter school’s funding.^[6]  Robinson was charged with eight counts of federal charges, including one for wire fraud (related to the misappropriation of funds for the charter school), two for federal program theft related to the charter school, and five for federal program theft related to his employment by Parking Division.^[7]  Before trial, the district court denied Robinson’s motion to suppress the GPS evidence, Robinsons’ motion to sever counts 1-3 and 4-8, and Robinson’s objection to the jury’s composition under Batson v. Kentucky.^[8]  At trial, the district court also rejected Robinson’s challenges to certain testimony and parking-related jury instructions.^[9]  After the jury found Robinson guilty on all counts, Robinson appealed.^[10]  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all issues and charges.^[11]

Lyons v. Vaught

Opinion handed down March 24, 2015^[1]

Link to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion

 A former University of Missouri - Kansas City (“UMKC”) part-time lecturer filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against UMKC administrators for retaliation, alleging that they discontinued the lecturer’s appointment due to his speech regarding student athlete favoritism.^[2]  The lecturer claimed his protected speech contributed to this adverse employment action taken against him, which would be unlawful due to the First Amendment concerns of public employees.^[3]  The Eighth Circuit held that, because the lecturer failed to allege administrators' awareness of the protected speech, it was not clearly established that the adverse employment action was unlawful, and administrators were therefore to be given qualified immunity.^[4]