Doe v. Keathley

Opinion handed down June 16, 2009. [1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

I. Introduction

The Missouri Supreme Court held that the federal Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) imposes an independent obligation on sex offenders living in Missouri to register, even if they would not been required to register under state law.

State of Missouri v. Jacob R. Pribble

Opinion handed down May 26, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 566.151, a newly enacted emergency measure that criminalizes enticement of a child, is not unconstitutional. Specifically, the court held that the prescribed punishment was not cruel and unusual, and the statute itself was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Finally, the court held that the statute was enacted pursuant to a valid and supported legislative determination that an emergency existed so as to justify the waiver of the standard ninety-day waiting period before a newly enacted law takes effect.

State v. Gaw

Opinion handed down May 26, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a criminal suspect's waiver of Miranda rights is valid even if he was previously questioned on the same subject while in custody and prior to receiving a Miranda warning. The court held that statements made both before and after a Miranda warning were admissible if the questioning officer did not intentionally undermine Miranda by withholding the warning.

Jay Wolfe Imports Missouri, Inc. v. Director of Revenue

Opinion handed down May 5, 2009
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that an auto dealership was not entitled to corporate income tax apportionment on income from vehicles purchased by out-of-state buyers. Before apportionment of a corporation’s income is allowed, the corporation must first have income produced outside of Missouri. When a buyer purchases and takes delivery of an auto in Missouri, the sale is deemed to have occurred wholly within Missouri, even if the buyer lists an out-of-state address in the dealership’s records. The court affirmed the tax assessment of the Director of Revenue and the Administrative Hearing Commission.

Susan M. Cannon (Randall) v. James R. Cannon

Opinion handed down April 14, 2009[1]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 452.375 of the Missouri Revised Statutes was constitutional and not applied retroactively to a convicted felon prohibited from having unsupervised visitation with his children due to a post-conviction amendment to section 452.375. The court stated that no one has a vested right in the “anticipated continuance of the existing law.”[2] The court also held that the statute did not deprive him of his fundamental right to associate with his children because he was allowed supervised visitation; nor did the statute violate his equal protection rights.

State v. The Hon. Paul Parkinson

Opinion handed down April 14, 2009[1]
Link to Missouri Supreme Court Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri, in regards to the procedures for committing sexually violent predators, addressed the effect of the Department of Corrections (DOC) providing a psychological analysis to the Attorney General and the sexual predator multidisciplinary review team that was performed by a psychologist without a license in Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri came to several conclusions. First, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the failure of the state to follow the procedural requirements of Section 632.483 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, the procedures for notifying the Attorney General of a potential sexually violent predator, constitutes a legal error and is not a jurisdictional defect that deprives a court of its subject matter authority to hear a case. Second, a properly prepared end-of-confinement report by a Missouri-licensed psychologist is not a condition precedent to the Attorney General’s right to file a petition seeking to have an individual declared a sexually violent predator (SVP) or for a court’s authority to hear a case on the issue. Third, the error was waived by not raising the issue for three years during which time the trial court entertained various other motions. Fourth, even if the error was not waived, failure of the DOC’s psychological assessment to be performed by a psychologist licensed by Missouri was not prejudicial for a series of reasons: the psychologist was licensed in the state of Texas and was licensed in the state of Missouri several months after issuance of the assessment; despite the error in the formation of the report, the multi-disciplinary committee’s recommendation was that the individual was not a SVP; the Attorney General has discretionary authority to seek someone declared a SVP whatever the contents of the DOC’s psychological assessment or multidisciplinary committee report; and the initial psychological assessment by the DOC is not the psychological assessment used when a trial court determines whether an individual is a sexually violent predator.