Opinion handed down October 25, 2016
While Missouri’s unemployment security
laws are aimed at protecting employees who have become unemployed through no
fault of their own, significant questions remain as to whether these laws are
actually interpreted as broadly as they can be by the courts.
I. Facts
and Holding
David Piloski was hired as a welder by
his employer’s predecessor in October 2007 after responding to an advertisement
that read: “Will work in clean, A/C environment.”[1] Piloski’s job consisted of welding flow
control systems, which required working in a temperature controlled “clean
room.”[2] Two other welders were required to work
outside of the “clean room,” and in the event of their absence, Piloski was
required to fill in, meaning he would work outside of the clean room about once
or twice a month, usually for a half hour to an hour at a time.[3] When his current employer acquired the
business in August 2013, the employer required that Piloski periodically work
outside of the clean room.[4] Piloski refused, claiming that working
outside of the clean room was not part of his job duties.[5] After consulting with human resources, his
employer told Piloski’s supervisors that Piloski was required to work where he
was told to work.[6] The supervisors, however, did not enforce the
rules prescribed by the employer and human resources.[7]
However, starting in early August 2015, Piloski’s
employer informed him and the other clean room welder that they would be
required to start working outside of the clean room for approximately two hours
per day.[8] Shortly thereafter, on August 15, 2015,
Piloski and the other clean room welder were told by the employer that they
would need to begin working alternating weeks outside of the clean room,
because a welder in that area had recently quit.[9] This increasing frequency with which Pilosky
was required to work outside of the clean room caused Piloski to fear that he
would be required to work outside of the clean room on a permanent basis.[10]
Two days later, on August 17, 2015,
Piloski informed his employer that the chemicals present outside of the clean
room were giving him a headache and that he refused to continue working outside
of the clean room.[11] The next day, August 18, 2015, the employer
and Piloski met and discussed Piloski’s job requirements.[12] Piloski reiterated his refusal to work
outside of the clean room, claiming he was hired specifically to be a clean
room welder.[13] The employer responded that Piloski was
simply hired to be a welder.[14] During the meeting, Piloski raised concerns
about the chemical fumes outside of the clean room affecting his health.[15] His employer attempted to allay those fears
by informing Piloski that whenever he was assigned to work outside of the clean
room, he would be the only welder in the area, and he would have sole use of
the fume extractor.[16] At the end of the meeting, the employer
reminded Piloski that his refusal to follow these orders would result in
termination due to insubordination.[17] Piloski asked if he was free to resign, and his
employer responded that the choice of resignation was ultimately Piloski’s
choice.[18]
The next day, Piloski reported for work
outside of the clean room as directed but filled out his resignation, effective
September 11, 2015.[19] After September 11, 2015, Piloski filed for
unemployment benefits, where he was denied by a deputy of the Division of Employment
Security because he had voluntarily quit his job without showing good cause
attributable to his employer.[20] According to the deputy, Piloski “did not
take reasonable steps to maintain his employment.”[21]
Following the necessary administrative
procedures, Piloski appealed the deputy’s decision to the Appeals Tribunal
(“Tribunal”), which held a hearing consisting of testimony from Piloski and two
of his employer’s representatives.[22] The Tribunal reversed the deputy’s
determination, holding that Piloski’s welding outside of the clean room
constituted a substantial change in employment that would compel a reasonable
employee to cease working.[23]
The employer then appealed
to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”), which
concluded that Piloski did not meet his burden of showing good cause for
voluntarily quitting his employment.[24]
The Commission concluded that: (1) “Piloski’s
decision to quit was not compelled by a medical need,” (2) Piloski quit due to
a change in working conditions that he found unacceptable, (3) “the change in
Piloski’s work conditions was not substantial,” (4) “Piloski did not act as a
reasonable employee would act in electing to voluntarily quit,” and (5) “Employer’s
response to mitigate Piloski’s expressed concern about chemical fumes was
reasonable.”[25]
The Commission therefore reversed the
Tribunal’s decision, denying Piloski unemployment benefits.[26] Piloski timely filed his appeal to the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District.[27]
II. Legal
Background
In Missouri, a worker’s eligibility for
unemployment benefits is governed under chapter 288 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes, as well as the rules and regulations created by the Commission’s
Division of Employment Security.[28] The policy rationale behind unemployment
benefits is to protect those unemployed “through no fault of their own.”[29] These specific employment security laws are
“liberally construed to accomplish [this] purpose.”[30] Chapter 288 lays out certain exceptions that
will disqualify an individual from receiving unemployment benefits, one of
those being a situation where “the claimant has
left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work or to the
claimant’s employer.”[31]
Under
chapter 288, good cause is defined as “only that cause which would compel a
reasonable employee to cease working or which would require separation from
work due to illness or disability.”[32] The statute should be construed “strictly and
narrowly in favor of finding that an employee is entitled to compensation.”[33] Whether an employee had good cause to voluntarily quit his employment is
a question of law that the appellate courts review without deference to the
Commission’s findings.[34]
Further, “[t]he burden to prove good
cause rests on the party seeking benefits.”[35] The claimant seeking benefits holds the
burden of proving that he or she did, in fact, have good cause to voluntarily
quit his or her employment.[36]
III. Instant
Decision
Article V, section 18 of the
Missouri Constitution permits Missouri appellate courts to provide judicial
review of an administrative decision affecting private rights to determine if
it is (1) “authorized by law” and (2) “supported by competent and substantial
evidence upon the whole record.”[37] While appellate courts must give deference to
a commission’s finding of fact, they are nevertheless free to alter the commission’s
conclusions of law or its application of law to the facts.[38]
The single issue raised by
Piloski on appeal was whether he voluntarily quit his employment for good cause
and “thus under circumstances that would compel a reasonable employee to cease
working or which would require separation from work due to illness or
disability.”[39]
Piloski contended on appeal
that the Commission erroneously applied the law to the facts in finding that he
did not have good cause to voluntarily quit his employment for four reasons.[40]
First, Piloski argued that a reasonable
employee would quit if he knew work conditions were causing adverse health effects.[41]
Second, Piloski argued that up until
August 2015, his employer had acquiesced for several years about where his work
would be performed.[42]
Third, Piloski contended that there was
a substantial change in his work conditions.[43]
Lastly, Piloski argued that the fume
extractor was not a solution to the changing work conditions because his employer
“knew the work load would require two welders to be working outside the clean
room at the same time” and thus the proposed solution would not be feasible.[44]
As to Piloski’s first
argument, the court held that Piloski could not establish that his work
conditions were causing adverse health affects.[45] In support of his argument, Piloski cited to
a headache that he characterized as “swelling of the brain.”[46] Because Piloski could not produce more than
simply layperson testimony in support of this argument, the court found that he
had not experienced adverse health effects due to work conditions, and
therefore it was immaterial whether other employees in the same circumstance
would quit due to knowledge of adverse health effects.[47]
Piloski’s second argument
provided that his employer acquiesced for eight years regarding the location
where Piloski’s work would be performed.[48] The court quickly rejected this argument,
relying on established case law providing that “a mere change in work duties is
not sufficient in and of itself to support a finding of good cause.”[49] Thus, the court concluded because changing
work conditions in and of themselves does not support a finding of good cause,
the fact that Piloski had worked primarily in the clean room for eight years
was immaterial.[50]
Piloski’s
third argument, that the change in his work conditions constituted a
substantial change, was also rejected by the court.[51] The court noted that while dissatisfaction
with a change in work conditions may support a finding of good cause, the
dissatisfaction must be based on a substantial change in working conditions.[52] In Piloski’s case, the court found that the
changes were not substantial to warrant a finding of good cause.[53] The court noted that from October 2007 to
August 2015, Piloski had never been afforded the luxury of refusing to work
outside of the clean room.[54] It was only until after his current employer
acquired the business that Piloski agreed to work outside the clean room on
request and without complaint.[55] Therefore, the only changes cited by Piloski
were that he began verbalizing his complaints to these requests to work outside
the clean room and that the requests to work outside the clean room were being
made on a more frequent basis and for longer durations than when he had
originally started his employment.[56] Therefore, because Piloski’s work conditions
did not constitute a substantial change, he could establish good cause for
voluntarily leaving his employment.[57]
Lastly,
Piloski’s fourth argument, that his employer had no intention of carrying out
his promise to provide Piloski with a fume extractor, was rejected by the court
because Piloski could not offer any evidence to support his claim, stating that
this suggestion was only speculative at best.[58]
IV. Comment
While the facts and circumstances
surrounding this particular case seem to support the holding, the questions
regarding policy rationale for unemployment benefits still remain.
The specific laws in Missouri regarding
unemployment security are aimed at protecting and safeguarding those employees
who are facing unemployment through no fault of their own. These laws are supposed to be “liberally
construed” to achieve this purpose.[59] However, upon further glance, the standard
for establishing “good cause” for voluntarily leaving work seems a
substantially high burden for a claimant to meet, given the fact that the laws
are to be “liberally construed” in his or her favor. Requiring such a high bar for claimants to
meet in order to acquire unemployment benefits seems to result in a waste of
administrative resources as claimants toil through numerous hearings just to be
ultimately denied at the appellate court level.
Additionally, this hurdle of establishing “good cause” could result in
employees remaining at jobs where they are unhappy and unfulfilled, leaving
employers to question whether these employees will dutifully perform their jobs
as required or whether they will shirk their responsibilities.
Arguably, the opposite viewpoint to this
high bar of establishing “good cause” is that public policy warrants employees
to have valid reasons for leaving their jobs so that the moral hazard of
leaving a job just to claim unemployment benefits will be reduced. So, in order to avoid this moral hazard, it
makes sense that good cause should not be an easily attainable burden.
In order to reconcile the two countering
viewpoints, however, the courts should possibly alter the definition for
“substantial change” regarding workplace conditions. If this standard is slightly lowered, but all
of the other conditions to meeting the “good cause” standard are maintained, it
is likely that claimants may fare better at the appellate court level,
therefore not rendering the previous efforts in administrative hearings as
wasteful, and it is likely that society will still be able to maintain a cap on
the dangers of moral hazard in the realm of unemployment benefits.
- Sheaffer Fennessey
[1] Piloski v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., No. WD 79597, 2016 WL 6210823, at *1 (Mo.
Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2016).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at *2.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.040 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
[29] Piloski,
2016 WL 6210823, at *3 (alteration in
original); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.020.
[30] Piloski,
2016 WL 6210823, at *3; Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 288.020.
[31] Piloski,
2016 WL 6210823, at *3; Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 288.020.
[32] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.050.1(1).
[33] Piloski,
2016 WL 6210823, at *3.
[34] Id.; Mo. Const. art. V, § 18.
[35] Piloski,
2016 WL 6210823, at *3.
[36] Id.
[37] Id. at *2.
[38] Id. (noting that appellate courts have
jurisdiction to “modify, reverse, remand, or set aside a decision of the
Commission where ‘the facts found by the commission do not support the award; .
. . there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the
making [or denial] of the award.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 288.210(3)–(4) (2000))
[39] Id. at *3.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id.
[45] Id. at *4.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48]
Id.
[49] Id. (relying on Kimble v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 388
S.W.3d 634, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) and Darr
v. Roberts Mktg. Grp., LLC, 428 S.W.3d 717, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)).
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Id. (relying on Reno v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 204
S.W.3d 347, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)).
[53] Id.
[54] Id.
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] Id. at *5.
[59] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.020.2
(2000).
