State ex rel. Richardson v. Green

Opinion handed down July 21, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

Welch, a man who pled guilty to two counts of involuntary manslaughter for killing two people while driving in an intoxicated condition applied for a sentence reduction pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 558.046.^[1]  That statute permits judges to reduce the length of sentence for persons convicted of alcohol- or drug-related crimes, provided that those crimes do not involve violence.^[2]  The trial court granted Welch a reduced sentence, and the prosecution filed a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Missouri.^[3]

The Supreme Court of Missouri made the writ of prohibition absolute, holding that the crime of involuntary manslaughter by driving while intoxicated and killing another person with criminal negligence is one that certainly “involves violence.”^[4]  The court specifically found that there need not be a mens rea element in order for a crime to qualify as “involving violence” pursuant to Section 558.046.^[5]

State v. Merritt

Opinion handed down August 18, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

        Marcus Merritt was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 571.070.1.^[1]  Merritt claimed the law violated the protection in the Missouri Constitution of the right to bear arms.^[2]  The trial court sustained Merritt’s motion to dismiss, and the State appealed.^[3]  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed this decision.

Hood v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp.

Opinion handed down May 1, 2015

Link to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion

Employees of Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation (“Gilster”) filed a class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jasper County against their employer alleging that workplace exposure to butter flavoring products caused lung impairment.^[1]  Gilster removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).^[2]  However, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri ordered a remand to the state trial court, noting CAFA’s local controversy exception applied.^[3]  The exception requires the district court to decline jurisdiction when more than two-thirds of the members of the plaintiff class are citizens of the state where the action was originally filed.^[4]  Gilster appealed the district court’s decision, contending that the plaintiff’s class did not sufficiently establish two-third Missouri citizenship because the district court’s calculation included potentially unreliable last known addresses of unresponsive members.^[5]  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and remanded the case to reevaluate the number of Missouri citizens in the class, noting that the last-known address evidence was insufficient in establishing the local controversy exception.^[6] 

McNeal v. McNeal-Syndor

Opinion handed down September 8, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

While incarcerated at the Jefferson City correctional facility, John McNeal filed a notice of appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri following the circuit court’s dismissal of his petition for dissolution of marriage.^[1]  McNeal’s petition for dissolution of marriage was dismissed because he failed to appear in court because of his imprisonment.^[2]   McNeal sought direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, asserting that two Missouri statutes prohibiting prisoners from attending civil proceedings were unconstitutional because they did not grant prisoners an unconditional right to litigate civil actions of which a prisoner was a party.^[3]  McNeal argued that the statutes were simply implemented to deny prisoners access to the courts and violated the Missouri Constitution.^[4]  The Supreme Court of Missouri denied direct transfer, noting the circuit court’s potential misinterpretation and misapplication of the statute did not raise a “real and substantial constitutional challenge” to the validity of the statute required for exclusive appellate jurisdiction.^[5]  McNeal’s appeal was transferred to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District for further proceedings.^[6]

State v. Meacham

Opinion handed down October 13, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

        Dennis Meacham was charged with criminal nonsupport under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 568.040 for failing to make child support payments.^[1]  He filed a motion to dismiss the information and sought a declaration that Section 568.040 was unconstitutional as violative of due process.^[2]  Specifically, Meacham argued that the 2011 amendment to the statute, which expressed “without good cause” as an affirmative defense rather than an element of the offense, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof as to an element of the crime onto the defendant.^[3]  The trial court agreed, dismissed the information, and held that portions of Section 568.040 were unconstitutional.^[4]  Subsequently, the state appealed.^[5]  In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that Section 568.040 was fully compliant with due process under the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.^[6] 

Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.

Opinion issued September 22, 2015

Link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

        In October 2010, Steven Cox, a sixty-two-year-old maintenance manager with the Kansas City Chiefs, was terminated from employment.^[1]  Mr. Cox believed the termination was related to his age and filed a claim of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”), which subsequently issued Mr. Cox a right to sue letter.^[2]  Mr. Cox brought suit, and at trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Chiefs.^[3]  On appeal, Mr. Cox argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying discovery requests and excluding evidence related to similarly-situated former Kansas City Chiefs’ employees (“me too” evidence).^[4]  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that “me too” evidence was relevant and the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the admission of “me too” evidence.^[5]