April 15, 2014 and modified on Court's own Motion May 27, 2014
Link to Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion
In
Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., Plaintiff
John Templemire filed suit against his former employer, W&M Welding,
alleging he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation
claim.[i] The Pettis County Circuit Court entered
judgment in favor of W&M Welding.
The Supreme Court of Missouri overruled the Circuit Court and held that
to make a submissible retaliatory discharge claim within RSMo § 287.780, “an
employee must demonstrate his or her filing of a workers’ compensation claim
was a ‘contributing factor’ to the employer’s discrimination or the employee’s
discharge.” Templemire is an extremely relevant opinion as the Missouri Supreme
Court accepted the “contributing factor” standard over the previous “exclusive
factor” standard.
I.
Facts
and Holding
John
Templemire (hereinafter “Templemire”) was hired by W & M Welding, Inc.
(hereinafter “Employer”) in October 2005.
He was hired by Employer as a painter and general laborer. On January 9, 2006, Templemire was injured
when a metal beam fell on and crushed his left foot.[ii] He was injured in the course and scope of his
employment. Templemire received workers’
compensation benefits after reporting the injury to employer.
Templemire
returned to work approximately four weeks later with certain restrictions in
place including wearing a protective boot on his foot and bans on climbing
ladders or driving a vehicle with a clutch.
Templemire’s physician added new restrictions in July and September of
2006, including that he only perform seated work and that he could not climb
stairs, push, pull, or stand longer than one hour without a fifteen minute
break. Consequently, Employer placed
Templemire on “light duty.”[iii]
On
November 29, 2006, Templemire was asked by Nick Twenter (hereinafter “Twenter”)
to wash a railing, but that the railing was not yet ready.[iv] Twenter completed other tasks until 1:50 p.m.
when he returned to the site. Templemire
took a break to rest his foot on his walk to the wash bay. At this point, Employer’s owner, Gary
McMullin (hereinafter “McMullin”), confronted Templemire and cursed at him for
not having washed the railing yet.
Templemire attempted to explain that the railing had just arrived, but
McMullin terminated Templemire effective immediately. Templemire threatened that he would go home
and call workers’ compensation, but McMullin responded apathetically and
maintained the termination.[v] Following his termination, Templemire
contacted the insurance adjuster on his workers’ compensation claim, Liz Gragg
(hereinafter “Gragg”). Gragg contacted
McMullin regarding the incident. Gragg’s
notes reflect that when Gragg mentioned Templemire’s work restrictions that
required occasional breaks, McMullin began to rant about Templemire “milking”
his injury.[vi]
Templemire
filed suit against employer under Missouri Revised Statute § 287.780 alleging
that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.[vii] Missouri Revised Statute § 287.780 prohibits
discrimination against any employee for exercising compensation rights as
allowed under the Worker’s Compensation Law.[viii] The statute states that “[a]ny employee who
has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for
damages against his employer.”[ix]
At
trial, Templemire and McMullin argued different stories regarding the incident
that led to termination. McMullin
testified that he personally placed the railing in the wash bay on the morning
of November 29 and that he directed Templemire to wash the railing
immediately. He stated that when he returned
two hours later, he found the railing unwashed and Templemire taking a
break. McMullin referred to Templemire
as a “high maintenance employee.”[x]
Templemire
offered another side of the story at trial.
Templemire presented evidence that McMullin yelled at him for his injury
and offered testimony from former employees who were belittled by
McMullin. One witness in particular
testified that he was discharged by Employer shortly after a workers’
compensation claim. Another witness
heard McMullin yell at Templemire about not doing anything at work besides “draw
[McMullin’s] money.”[xi] Further, Templemire offered Employer’s
progressive discipline policy into evidence and that policy showed that his
discharge was contrary to typical procedure.
Besides an incident when Templemire did not wear a paint mask in a paint
booth, his employee recorded reflected that he was a “good employee who
performed his tasks effectively.”[xii]
Templemire
offered two jury instructions at trial.
The circuit court refused both of the instructions. First, Templemire offered an alternative jury
instruction to Missouri Approved Jury Instruction 23.13, arguing that 23.13
misstated the law.[xiii] Instead, Templemire stated the jury should
find in his favor if they viewed the filing of the workers’ compensation claim
as a “contributing factor” in his discharge.[xiv] Secondly, Templemire offered an alternative
pretext instruction, “which advised the jury that it could find exclusive
causation if it found that Employer’s stated reason for his discharge was a
mere pretext, rather than the true reason stated.”[xv] The circuit court instructed the jury that it
had to find the filing of a workers’ compensation claim was the “exclusive
factor” considered by Employer in the discharge.[xvi] The jury found in favor of Employer. The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the
case de novo.[xvii]
The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded
the case. The Court held that to make a
submissible retaliatory discharge claim within RSMo § 287.780, “an employee
must demonstrate his or her filing of a workers’ compensation claim was a
‘contributing factor’ to the employer’s discrimination or the employee’s
discharge.”[xviii] The Court stated that “[t]o the extent the
decisions in Hansome v. Northwestern
Cooperage Co. and Crabtree v. Bugby”
were inconsistent with the holding, those cases were overruled.[xix]
II.
Legal
Background
In
reaching its holding, the Court analyzed the historical background of RSMo §
287.780.[xx] Section 287.780 is an exception to the
at-will employment doctrine. The statute
provides that “[n]o employer or agent shall discharge or in any way
discrimination against any employee for exercising any of his [or her] rights
under this chapter. Any employee who has
been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages
against his [or her] employer.”[xxi] This statute was enacted as a part of the
original Missouri workers’ compensation law, and at the time it was enacted the
workers’ compensation law was construed “liberally in favor of the worker.”[xxii]
The
first case the Court explored was the decision in Mitchell v. St. Louis County.[xxiii] In Mitchell,
a female employee was terminated following extensive absenteeism at work. The Plaintiff argued the termination occurred
because six months prior to her termination she filed a workers’ compensation
claim relating to a back injury. The
employer argued the termination was a result of the absenteeism unrelated to
her back injury rather than a result of the workers’ compensation claim. The court in Mitchell held that the employer presented sufficient evidence that
it had a valid and non-pretextual motive to terminate the employee.[xxiv]
In
a later case, Hansome v. Northwestern
Cooperage Co., the Missouri Supreme Court stated the required elements for
a claim under RSMo § 287.780 for the firm time.[xxv] The elements included “(1) plaintiff’s status
as employee of defendant before injury, (2) plaintiff’s exercise of a right
granted by Chapter 287, (3) employer’s discharge of or discrimination against
plaintiff, and (4) an exclusive and
casual relationship between plaintiff’s actions and defendant’s actions.”[xxvi] The Court stated that “[c]ausality does not
exist if the basis for discharge is valid and non-pretextual.”[xxvii]
The
Supreme Court of Missouri reaffirmed the holding in Hansome in Crabtree v. Bugby.[xxviii] The Court held that a given jury instruction
was erroneous because it allowed for a plaintiff’s verdict even though the
reasons for termination included causes other than filing a workers’
compensation claim. The Court stated
that the instruction should have required that the jury “find the exclusive cause of the plaintiff’s
discharge was the filing of her claim as articulated in Hansome.”[xxix] The Court explained its reversal of the lower
court’s decision was based on the erroneous jury instruction and stated the
main reason behind the finding of the erroneous jury instruction was stare decisis. The Court explained it should adhere to
previous case law, especially when determining elements of a cause of
action.
Hansome and Crabtree continued to control until the
Missouri Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, P.C.[xxx] In Fleshner,
the Court noted that “[n]owhere in the workers’ compensation laws does
‘exclusive causal’ or ‘exclusive causation’ language appear.”[xxxi] The Court also distinguished workers’
compensation retaliation cases from public policy exception cases. The Court acknowledged that the former arose
under the statute, while the latter arises under common law. Fleshner
clearly stated that the exclusive causation standard was “inconsistent with
the proximate cause standard typically employed in tort cases.”[xxxii] The Court explained that the exclusive
causation standard “would result in an exception that fails to accomplish its
task of protecting employees who refuse to violate the law or public policy.”[xxxiii]
III.
Comment
In
reaching its holding, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered stare decisis. Templemire acknowledged the holdings in Hansome and Davis, but requested the Court consider the issue with some
consideration of the holding in Fleshner. Ultimately, the Court stated the adherence to
stare decisis in regards to the
holdings in Hansome and Crabtree would be “ill-advised.”[xxxiv] The Court explained that neither Mitchell nor Davis “contain[ed] any reference whatsoever to a heightened or
exclusive causation standard for a plaintiff to prevail on a claims for
retaliatory discharge under the workers’ compensation law.”[xxxv] The Court even mentions the dissent in Crabtree which stated the holding in Hansome was based on language “plucked
out of thin air” with no support from case law or statutory interpretation.[xxxvi] This Court ultimately found that the holdings
in Hansome and Crabtree were “clearly erroneous” and “stare decisis should not be applied to prevent their repudiation.”[xxxvii]
The
Court held that when considering the specific statutory language and precedent
in other discrimination cases, the “contributing factor” standard should apply
to RSMo § 287.780 claims.[xxxviii] The Court explained the adoption of the
“contributing factor” standard would serve the following two important
purposes: (1) the legislature’s use of the phrase, “in any way,” is consistent with the Court’s analysis in Daughtery, Hill, and Fleshner, and (2)
the standard “now aligns workers’ compensation discrimination with other
Missouri employment discrimination laws.”[xxxix]
The
dissent argues the majority opinion is flawed in that it did not follow the stare decisis doctrine. The dissent states that the majority failed
to “recognize that adherence to precedent is most important when the precedent
concerns settled questions of statutory interpretation.”[xl] The dissent analyzes both Hansome and Crabtree. The dissent states
the Court in Hansome clearly held
that for a workers’ compensation retaliation claim against the employer
pursuant to RSMo § 287.780, the employee must prove that his or her action in
seeking workers’ compensation benefits was the “exclusive cause of
termination.”[xli] The dissent that states that fourteen years
later, the Court in Crabtree upheld
the exclusive cause standard in Hansome. The dissent explains that both the Hansome and Crabtree holdings were based on interpretations of a Missouri
statute, not based on common law or the United States Constitution. The dissent states that because they were
interpretations based on a Missouri statute, they should be given the greatest stare decisis effect.
The
majority offers a more sensible approach in its analysis of stare decisis. The Court did not reach its conclusion that
the “contributing factor” test should be the standard with no supporting
law. It referenced the language in Fleshner as well as the specific
statutory language. The Court notes that
it rejected the exclusive causation standard in Fishner, and instead adopted the “contributing factor” test applied
in both Daugherty and Hill.
The Court also references that it previously found “both the MHRA
and the public policy exception modified Missouri’s at-will employment doctrine
by instructing that an employer can terminate employees, but its reasoning
cannot be improper.”[xlii] The Court also considers the exact statutory
language and concluded that the “exclusive causation” standard is not in line
with the language. To give credence to a
standard that is inconsistent with the original statutory language would be a
flaw in the judicial process, even if previous cases previously interpreted the
language incorrectly.
- Tara A. Bailes
[i] Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433
S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014).
[ii] Id. at 373.
[iii] Id. at 374.
[iv] Id.
[v] Id.
[vi] Id.
[vii] Id.; Missouri Revised Statute § 287.780 is a civil action for
damages based that prohibits discrimination because of exercising compensation
rights. The statute states that “[n]o
employer or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any
employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee who
has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for
damages against his employer.” RSMo §
287.780 (2012).
[viii] RSMo § 287.780.
[ix] Id.
[x] Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371 at 374.
[xi] Id. at 375.
[xii] Id.
[xiii] Missouri Approved Jury
Instruction 23.13 for Retaliatory Discharge or Discrimination-Worker’s
Compensation was withdrawn in 2012 and replaced with Missouri Approved Jury
Instruction 38.04. Missouri Approved
Jury Instruction 38.04 states that, “[y]Your verdict must be for plaintiff if
you believe: First, plaintiff was employed by defendant, and [s]econd,
plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim, and [t]hird, defendant
discharged plaintiff, and [f]ourth, the exclusive cause of such
discharge was plaintiff's filing of the workers' compensation
claim and
[f]ifth,
as a direct result of such discharge2 plaintiff sustained
damage.”
[xiv] Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371 at 375.
[xv] Id.
[xvi] Id.
[xvii] Id. at 376.
[xviii] Id. at 373.
[xix] Id.
[xx] Missouri Revised Statute § 287.780
states that “[n]o employer or agent shall discharge
or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his
rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been discharged or
discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his
employer.” RSMo § 287.780 (2012).
[xxi] RSMo
§ 287.780.
[xxii] Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371 at 377. See Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz
Cap Co., 82 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. 1934).
[xxiii] See Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. App. E.D.
1978).
[xxiv] See id. at 815-816.
[xxv] Hansome v. Northwestern
Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. banc 1984).
[xxvi] Id.
[xxvii] Id.
[xxviii] Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66,
71 (Mo. banc 1998).
[xxix] Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371 at 378.
[xxx] Fleshner v. Pepose Vision
Institute, P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. banc 2010).
[xxxi] Id. at 92.
[xxxii] Id. at 93.
[xxxiii] Id.
[xxxiv] Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371 at 379.
[xxxv] Id.
[xxxvi] Id.
[xxxvii] Id. at 380.
[xxxviii] Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371 at 384; RSMo § 287.780.
[xxxix] Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371 at 384.
[xl] Id. at 386.
[xli] Id.
[xlii] Id. at 384.
