Opinion handed down March 4, 2013
Mellony and Douglas Burlison, on
behalf of their son, C.M., filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article
I, Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution, alleging that Springfield Public
Schools (the “District”) along with school and law enforcement officials
violated C.M.'s constitutional rights by searching and seizing his backpack
during a drug dog visit to C.M.’s school.[2]
The Burlisons sought a permanent injunction, actual and nominal damages,
attorney fees, and other relief.[3] The
District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the
policies used during the drug dog exercise were reasonable and not a
deprivation of any federal rights.[4] On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.[5]
I. Facts & Holding
In April 2010, when C.M was a
freshman at Springfield’s Central High School, two deputies from the Greene
County Sheriff’s Department conducted a brief survey of randomly-selected areas
with two drug dogs.[6] C.M.’s classroom
was selected.[7] After the students and
teacher left the room, leaving their personal belongings inside, one of the
deputies entered the classroom with a drug dog and remained inside for five
minutes.[8] The dog did not signal any
drugs were present.[9] Both the deputy
who searched the room with the dog and school district personnel maintained
that no personal possessions were searched in the classroom, but C.M. insisted
that his backpack had been unzipped and searched.[10]
The drug dog visit was conducted
in accordance with the sheriff’s department’s policy, which authorizes random
exploratory sniffing of containers in public facilities.[11] It was also executed in accordance with the Board
of Education’s policy and school police services’ standard operating procedure,
both of which were enacted to balance students’ privacy rights with the need to
promote an environment conducive to learning.[12] Using animals trained to locate prohibited
weapons and drugs is expressly permitted by these procedures and policies.[13] In this instance, the District contacted the
Sheriff’s Department and requested searches throughout the 2009 to 2010 school
year in order to address a known drug problem.[14] The District also created procedures for said
visits, and followed them in this instance.[15]
The
District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that
C.M.'s belongings had not been seized, and the “written policies and procedures
. . . appear to be reasonable and not in any way a deprivation of a federal
right.”[16] Even though there may have
been a search, the superintendent, principal, and sherriff were not liable in
their individual capacities because they did not physically conduct the alleged
search.[17] The claims against the
superintendent and principal in their official capacities were dismissed
because they were redundant to the claims against the District, and the sheriff
was not liable in his official capacity because he had no notice.[18]
On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the
Burlisons claimed the District Court erred in concluding there was no seizure,
the superintendent and principal were not liable in their official capacities,
and the sheriff was not liable in his individual or official capacities.[19] However, they did not pursue their claim that
an unconstitutional search of C.M.'s bag occurred because the proper parties
were not named.[20] They also did not
appeal the District Court's determination that the superintendent and principal
were not liable in their individual capacities.[21] The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court, holding that even if a seizure occurred, it was reasonable.[22]
II. Legal Background
A. Summary Judgment for the District and Ridder and
Snodgrass in Their Official Capacities
The
Court of Appeals determined that the Burlisons' claims against the superintendent
and principal in their official capacities were, in reality, claims against the
District pursuant to Johnson v. Outboard Marine
Corporation.[23] Next the
Court applied Van Zee v. Hanson holding that in
order to succeed on their § 1983 claim against the District, the Burlisons must
prove that the District acted under color of state law in a manner that
deprived C.M. of a constitutionally protected federal right.[24]
The
Burlisons also raised a state constitutional claim under Article I, Section 15
of the Missouri Constitution, which is essentially the same as a Fourth
Amendment claim under the federal constitution.[25] The Fourth Amendment requires that seizure of
property be reasonable, but pursuant to New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
reasonableness depends on the context.[26]
Because the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and
safety at public schools, a student's privacy interest is limited according to Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls.[27]
Students retain Fourth Amendment rights at school, but those rights are
different in public schools.[28]
The
Supreme Court balances “the intrusion on the children's Fourth Amendment rights
against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” when determining
whether a school’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.[29] In Earls, the
Supreme Court considered the nature of the privacy interest compromised, the
character of the intrusion, the immediacy of the government's concerns, and the
value of the policy.[30] As such, the
Court of Appeals held that C.M.'s freedoms were not unreasonably impinged by
his brief separation from his book bag because he normally would not have been
able to access or move it during class time without permission. The District showed an immediate need for the
drug dog inspections by offering substantial evidence of the drug problems
within the District.[31]
B. Summary Judgment for Sherriff Arnott in his
Individual and Legal Capacities
As a
government official, the sheriff could be held liable in his individual
capacity if the Burlisons could show he had direct responsibility for the
deprivation of C.M.’s rights.[32]
Pursuant to Parrish v. Ball,
a supervising officer can be liable for an inferior officer's constitutional
violation “only if he directly participated in the constitutional violation, or
if his failure to train or supervise the offending actor caused the
deprivation."[33] To succeed on a
claim against the sheriff in his official capacity, the Burlisons must have
shown that "a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an
official ‘policy or custom’ and that such ‘policy [or] custom’ was the moving
force behind plaintiff's injury.”[34]
Because
the drug dog survey itself was conducted pursuant to established procedures,
there was no constitutional deprivation and there was no evidence that the
sheriff failed to train or supervise the deputies who conducted the drug dog
procedure at C.M.’s school.[35] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found that
the District Court correctly concluded that the sheriff was not liable in his
individual or official capacity.[36] The
sheriff did not participate in the drug dog event at C.M.’s school.[37] The
sheriff knew about the request to conduct the exercises, but he assigned the
matter to a captain.[38]
III.
Comment
The
intrusion, if any, on C.M.’s rights is clearly outweighed by a legitimate and
immediate interest of the government.
Ensuring academic integrity and maintaining an environment suitable for
learning is one of the school’s most important roles. The alleged seizure lasted only five minutes
in duration, did not deprive C.M. of access to his property because he would
otherwise have needed his teacher’s permission anyway, and it was in response
to a known drug problem. As such, it was
reasonable for the Court to hold that the drug dog policies and procedures that
were followed were reasonable.
- Joe Palumbo
[1] No. 12-1382 (8th Cir. Mar. 4, 2013). The West reporter citation is Burlison v.
Springfield Pub. Sch., 708 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2013).
[2] Id. at 1.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 2.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 3.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 4.
[17] Id. at 5.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 7.
[23] Id. at 5 (discussing 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th
Cir. 1999)).
[24] Id. (discussing 630 F.3d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir.
2011)).
[25] Id. at 5-6.
[26] Id. at 6 (discussing 469 U.S. 325, 337
(1985)).
[27] Id. (citing 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002)).
[28] Id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)).
[29] Id. (citing Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.)
[30] Id. at 7 (discussing Earls, 536 U.S. at 830,
832, 834).
[31] Id. at 8.
[32] Id. at 10.
[33] Id. (citing 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir.
2010)).
[34] Id. (citing M.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,
544 F.3d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 2008)).
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Id. at 11.
