The Appealability of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Transfer in Missouri
D.E.G. v. Juv. Officer of Jackson Cnty., 601 S.W.3d 212 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Rachael Moore[1]
I. Introduction
Since its adoption in 1957, the Missouri Juvenile Code has separated and shielded juveniles from the harshness of the “adult” criminal system.[2] While the juvenile and adult criminal systems have many differences, both give the accused the right to appeal final judgments.[3] For serious offenses, a juvenile court may, on its own motion or a motion by a juvenile officer, dismiss juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile’s case to a court of general jurisdiction.[4] This exposes the juvenile to being tried as an adult and strips the juvenile of all the protections of juvenile court.[5] While Section 211.261 of the Juvenile Code gives juveniles the right to appeal any final judgment,[6] in 1972, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled in In Re T.J.H. that transfers of jurisdiction were not included in Section 211.261, barring juveniles from appealing transfers to adult court.[7]
For the next fifty years, the ruling of In re T.J.H. sat undisturbed. However, in 2020 the Supreme Court of Missouri revisited the appealability of a juvenile transfer of jurisdiction in D.E.G. v. Juvenile Officer of Jackson County, finding the reasoning in T.J.H. unpersuasive and citing a revision of the statute.” You could even break it into two sentences, but I think the transitional info could be helpful to the reader.[8] In D.E.G., the court overruled T.J.H., holding that a juvenile court dismissing jurisdiction and transferring a juvenile to a court of general jurisdiction is a final, appealable judgment.[9]
In overruling T.J.H., Missouri has afforded juveniles more protections than ever. However, this new era of juvenile appeals of transfer orders leads to several new policy questions that could have a substantial effect on juveniles’ ability to have access to the benefits of the juvenile system.
In 2018, D.E.G., a teenager, allegedly shot and seriously injured another juvenile in the hallway of an apartment building.[10] In October of 2018, the Jackson County juvenile officer filed a petition alleging that D.E.G., if charged as an adult for the shooting incident, would be charged with first-degree assault, a class A felony, and armed criminal action.[11] The juvenile officer filed a motion for a certification hearing and prepared a report recommending that D.E.G. be transferred to a court of general jurisdiction to stand trial as an adult.[12]
At the certification hearing, the deputy juvenile officer gave a summary of the information contained in the certification report and recommendation for transfer.[13] The summary included details of D.E.G.’s conduct while in detention for a previous criminal incident, statements by D.E.G.’s mother, and details of D.E.G.’s mental and medical health and treatment for conditions.[14] The juvenile court judge overruled D.E.G.’s objections and allowed the report in.[15]
In considering the seriousness and viciousness of the offense, D.E.G.’s history of past violent action both within and outside of the juvenile system, the options available to treat D.E.G. at the juvenile level, and the sophistication of D.E.G., the judge dismissed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over D.E.G. and transferred jurisdiction to “adult court.”[16] D.E.G. raised six points on appeal but first had to argue that the court should overrule T.J.H. and hold that he had the right to appeal the transfer order.[17] While the case was pending in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer.[18]
In a four-three decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a judgment by a juvenile court dismissing jurisdiction and transferring jurisdiction to a court of general jurisdiction is a final, appealable judgment under Section 211.261, overruling In re T.J.H.[19] Because the Supreme Court of Missouri only transferred the case to decide the issue of appealability, D.E.G.’s case was retransferred to the court of appeals to rule on the merits.[20]
III. Legal Background
In examining the appealability of juvenile transfers, there are three important components to consider: 1) the history of the Missouri juvenile court system and how it differs from adult criminal court; 2) the statutory framework of the Missouri juvenile court system, including the history of how the Missouri Legislature has amended the Juvenile Code; and 3) the cases that have shaped the appealability of transfers of jurisdiction, namely In re T.J.H.
The Missouri Juvenile Code in its current form was first adopted in 1957.[21] Section 211.011 states that the Missouri Juvenile Code is intended to “facilitate the care, protection, and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”[22]
The Missouri Division of Youth Services (“DYS”) was created in 1974 as a division of the Department of Social Services.[23] The agency cares for and treats juveniles that are committed by one of the forty-five juvenile courts of Missouri.[24] DYS focuses on rehabilitation and restorative justice through its core areas of accountability, rehabilitation, and community safety.[25]
Today, DYS operates a variety of treatment programs, from maximum security facilities to day treatment programs and group homes.[26] Because the focus of DYS is on rehabilitation rather than punitive correction, the Missouri juvenile justice system offers a better alternative than adult incarceration. Juveniles in residential facilities are given more freedoms and comforts than incarcerated adults.[27] Juveniles might also be less likely to reoffend due to the rehabilitative model. The Missouri juvenile system has found incredible success: In 2016, the Missouri Department of Corrections reported the adult recidivism rate at 43.9%.[28] By contrast, the long-term recidivism rate for juveniles into the adult system was 6.6% in 2014.[29]
Section 211.071 was included in the Juvenile Code adopted in 1957.[30] Section 211.071 allows for a juvenile court to dismiss its own jurisdiction over a juvenile and transfer jurisdiction to “adult” court so that the juvenile can be charged as an adult if the prosecutor so chooses.[31] Only juveniles between the ages of twelve and seventeen who have committed an offense that would be considered a felony if committed by an adult are eligible.[32] A juvenile court may schedule a hearing to determine jurisdiction on its own motion or upon motion by a juvenile officer, the child, or the child’s custodian.[33] For the most serious offenses, the juvenile court must order a hearing.[34]
Before the hearing, the juvenile officer must prepare a written report outlining the factors that the juvenile court judge should consider when ruling on jurisdiction.[35] During the hearing, a juvenile officer gives a recommendation for dismissing or granting juvenile court jurisdiction.[36] After hearing both sides and reviewing the compiled report, the juvenile judge either grants or dismisses transfer to a court of general jurisdiction.[37] If the judge grants the transfer, the judge must file a dismissal order with all of the findings of the hearing.[38]
When the Missouri Legislature adopted the Juvenile Code in 1957, Section 211.261 allowed for a child to appeal “any final judgment, order, or decree.”[39] In 1994, the Legislature amended Section 211.261, adding in sections that now allow juvenile officers to appeal any final judgment, order, or decree, except for a final determination pursuant to Section 211.031.1(3).[40] Section 211.031.1(3) establishes that juvenile courts have jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age of seventeen years.[41]
In 1972, the Supreme Court of Missouri was tasked with deciding whether Section 211.261 applied to juvenile transfers of jurisdiction in In re T.J.H.[42] The court ruled that juvenile transfers of jurisdiction were not covered under Section 211.261, although Section 211.261 allowed for any final judgment within the Juvenile Code.[43] In the majority opinion, there was little discussion of the language in Section 211.261.[44] The court instead chose to focus on public policy, reasoning that allowing juveniles to appeal jurisdiction transfers would delay the administration of justice in general court.[45] The court was concerned that allowing such an appeal would allow juveniles to “game” the system and prolong their wait for a felony charge.[46] The majority also held that there was no need for appeals of jurisdiction transfers: If juveniles really opposed such a transfer, they could simply file a motion to dismiss the indictment in the trial court.[47]
Judge Seiler dissented in In re T.J.H., criticizing the majority’s refusal to interpret the statute and instead turn to other jurisdictions for public policy arguments.[48] Judge Seiler argued that the remedy suggested by the majority – forcing juveniles to file motions to dismiss at the trial court level – would take away all of the protections of juvenile court that a juvenile would get to keep during an appeal.[49] These include the right to be shielded from publicity, not to be fingerprinted or photographed, and not to be jailed or housed with adults.[50]
IV. Instant Decision
The Supreme Court of Missouri overruled In re T.J.H. in a four-to-three decision, remanding the case to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, to decide on the substantive issues in D.E.G.’s appeal.[51] Chief Justice George W. Draper III wrote the majority opinion, joined by three other judges.[52] Judge W. Brent Powell and Judge Zel Fischer filed separate dissents with Judge Paul C. Wilson joining both dissents.[53]
In overruling T.J.H., the majority cited three reasons for holding that a juvenile court transfer of jurisdiction is a final, appealable decision: (1) the majority in In re T.J.H. incorrectly interpreted and applied Sections 211.071 and 211.261; (2) the legislature amended Section 211.261, requiring a reanalysis; and (3) the plain language of Section 211.261 allowed an appeal from any final judgment, and a transfer of jurisdiction had all of the hallmarks of a final judgment.[54]
First, the court held that the majority in T.J.H. incorrectly quoted Section 211.261 and failed to discuss the statutory language, instead raising public policy concerns from outside jurisdictions.[55] In T.J.H., the court misquoted Section 211.261 as only allowing an appeal from specific sections of Chapter 211.[56] Section 211.261 does not limit, nor has it ever limited, what types of statutory issues can be appealed.[57] The T.J.H. opinion contains no interpretation or analysis of Section 211.261.[58] Because the court in T.J.H. failed to engage in any statutory interpretation and also misquoted Section 211.261, undermining the legislative intent, the majority in D.E.G. found it necessary to overrule T.J.H.’s holding.[59]
Second, the Missouri legislature amended Section 211.261.[60] When the legislature amends a statute, the court presumes that the legislature intended to change the existing law.[61] The legislature added language that now allows a juvenile officer to appeal from any final judgment or order, except for a final determination under Section 211.031.1(3).[62] The legislature also added language allowing juvenile officers to seek an interlocutory appeal for orders suppressing evidence, a confession, or an admission during a 211.031.1(3) proceeding.[63] By adding in language about what juvenile officers can and cannot appeal while leaving the language about juveniles so broad as to include “any final judgment,” the legislature’s amendment would logically seem to indicate that their intent is not in line with the ruling of In re T.J.H.
Third, the plain language of the statute allows for an appeal of any final judgment or order, and the issuance by the juvenile court had all the hallmarks of a final judgment.[64] The judgment dismissing and transferring D.E.G.’s case was titled “Judgment of Dismissal,” the judge signed it, the court gave a detailed analysis and reasoning of why it was dismissing and transferring, and the judgment concluded with “It is hereby ordered and adjudged.”[65] The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that these characteristics make the judgment transferring jurisdiction a final judgment.[66] Because the language of 211.261 is “clear and unambiguous” as to allowing for an appeal of any final judgment, the court concluded that there was no need to go into public policy concerns or look to other jurisdictions for guidance.[67]
The Supreme Court of Missouri has now opened the door for juveniles to appeal many different issues arising from a juvenile transfer hearing. Like D.E.G., juveniles may wish to appeal perceived procedural defects in the case.[68] Others may want a review of the entire decision itself, believing that their case was improperly decided based on the weighing of the factors. Because the Missouri Court of Appeals has not had to review any transfers of jurisdiction on direct appeal in the last fifty years, allowing appeals may now open the door for a variety of questions for Missouri appellate courts.
Another issue that may come before the court is whether juvenile officers in Missouri can or should appeal transfer of jurisdiction denials. While this may seem like an inconsequential determination – indeed, the majority only devoted one sentence to it when discussing the amendments to 211.261 – allowing juvenile officers to appeal a transfer of jurisdiction could have huge consequences for juveniles. A juvenile officer appealing could lead to confusion in the juvenile courts of whether to pursue treatment of the juvenile or wait for the results of the appeal, delaying much-needed treatment options for at-risk youth. Because the juvenile court system must work quickly to prevent juveniles from aging out of the system before receiving treatment, juvenile officers should not have the right to create confusion by appealing denial of a transfer order. Therefore, it would be in the best interest of juveniles for the courts to clarify that Section 211.261 does not allow juvenile officers to appeal denials of transfer.
Another issue for juveniles sent to “adult” court is that they are still left without any of the protections of juvenile court while they are appealing. The supersedeas provision of 211.261 leaves juveniles without any of the protections that Judge Seiler discussed in his dissent in In re T.J.H.[69] Judge Seiler worried that not allowing a juvenile to appeal a transfer order would strip juveniles of the privileges of juvenile court, including the right to be shielded from publicity, not to be fingerprinted or photographed, and not to be jailed or housed with adults.[70] Section 211.261 and D.E.G. still leave Judge Seiler’s worries intact, since, even though a juvenile can now appeal, the juvenile would still be subject to the full force of adult criminal court while their appeal is pending. If a court of appeals finds that the transfer was in error, some of the protections of juvenile court may already be gone. If their criminal proceedings have begun while the appeal of the transfer was pending, the juvenile will have already been jailed, fingerprinted, and had their information potentially released to the media.
In order to combat the injustice of juveniles losing the protections of the juvenile court while they are appealing, the Missouri legislature must reexamine Section 211.261 and amend it so that proceedings are stalled while the juvenile is appealing the transfer. This would be a similar system to Alabama, where the Alabama Supreme Court has held that in general, jurisdiction of a case can only be in one court at time and trial courts cannot rule on matters that are being adjudged by an appellate court.[71] If Missouri wants to avoid a juvenile losing all of the protections of juvenile court after winning an appeal of transfer, Missouri must reexamine Section 211.261 and should follow a system similar to that used by Alabama.
The final issue that Missouri must address is the issue of age, which has become a problem in states with similar juvenile systems. In the Texas case In Matter of J.G., juvenile J.G. spent three years appealing his case that began when he was sixteen.[72] When J.G. finally appeared before the juvenile court for the second time, he was nineteen, which made the court worry about how amenable he was to treatment in the juvenile system and whether he could receive treatment alongside much younger juveniles.[73] In D.E.G., D.E.G. was most likely fifteen when the alleged offense occurred in 2018[74] and was barely sixteen years old when the juvenile court granted the transfer of jurisdiction in January 2019.[75] The Supreme Court of Missouri opinion was decided in June 2020 when D.E.G. was most likely on the cusp of his eighteenth birthday.[76] The Missouri Court of Appeals must still decide the merits of D.E.G.’s claims, and if it reverses and remands the issue back to the juvenile court, D.E.G. will most likely be eighteen when he stands in front of the juvenile court for the second time.[77]
The major factors that a juvenile court considers when granting or denying a transfer is the age of the child, the programs and facilities available to the juvenile court, and whether or not the child can benefit from the treatment or rehabilitation.[78] In the future, many cases like D.E.G.’s may be remanded based on purely procedural defects. When the juvenile reappears in front of the juvenile court, the court may conclude that the child’s age makes them past the point of help or that the juvenile system has no adequate resources to rehabilitate or treat a person who is now over eighteen and a legal adult. A juvenile court may be even less likely to grant a transfer the second time around if a child is now two to three years older, reasoning that they are closer to the age of adulthood and therefore less amenable to treatment in the juvenile system.
In order to combat this, the Missouri legislature or the judiciary must reexamine the appellate procedures for juveniles and create an expedited system for reviewing an appeal of transfer of jurisdiction. This expedited proceeding would work against the passage of time and allow juveniles a fair proceeding if they win their appeal and appear again in front of a juvenile court.
While D.E.G. is a step in the right direction, Missouri still has significant issues relating to juveniles appealing transfer orders that it must resolve to achieve true justice for juveniles. D.E.G. leaves many questions unresolved, such as whether criminal circuit courts should proceed in prosecuting a juvenile while the juvenile is appealing their transfer, how to deal with the closing window of time for juvenile proceedings, and the confusion over whether juvenile officers can appeal denials of transfer
In treating a transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile court to a court of general jurisdiction as a final, appealable judgment, the Supreme Court of Missouri has changed a piece of the juvenile court system that sat undisturbed for fifty years.[79] The ruling of D.E.G. was long overdue, as evidenced by the court citing a 1994 amendment to the juvenile appeals statute.[80] This amendment to Section 211.261 shows that the Missouri legislature intended to give juveniles the right to appeal a transfer of jurisdiction.[81] While the Supreme Court of Missouri would be correct in its interpretation of Section 211.261 based on the amendment to the statute alone, its ruling is strengthened by the public policy concerns of transferring juveniles to adult court. Judge Seiler’s dissent in the 1972 case In re T.J.H. highlighted the serious decision a juvenile court has in subjecting a child to the adult criminal court system and stripping that child of all of the protections and treatment options that juvenile court can provide.[82]
The Missouri juvenile justice system has achieved amazing results in recent years with extremely low rates of recidivism.[83] Because of these results, Missouri juvenile courts should strive to keep juveniles in the juvenile justice system in as many cases as they can. By allowing juveniles to appeal transfer orders after fifty years of prohibiting it, Missouri has created a safeguard that can protect more juveniles from the harshness of the adult criminal system. Now that juveniles can appeal transfer orders, it is up to the Missouri legislature and the Missouri appellate courts to amend and interpret Section 211.261 to ensure that juveniles are given as much justice as possible. This would include limiting the ability of juvenile officers to appeal denials of transfer, halting adult criminal proceedings while juveniles appeal the transfer so they keep some juvenile system protections, and expediting the system so that juveniles do not age out while their appeal is pending.
[1] B.A. Psychology, University of Missouri, 2021 dual-degree program; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021; I would like to thank Associate Dean Paul Litton for his insight and edits, and thank you to the editorial staff of the Missouri Law Review for their help during the editing process.
[2] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.011 (2016).
[3] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.261 (2016); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 30.01.
[4] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.071 (2020 Cum. Supp.).
[5] In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (Seiler, J. dissenting), overruled by D.E.G. v. Juv. Officer of Jackson Cnty., 601 S.W.3d 212 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
[6] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.261.
[7] In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d at 435 (Seiler, J. dissenting).
[8] D.E.G. v. Juv. Officer of Jackson Cnty., 601 S.W.3d 212, 219-20 (Mo. 2020).
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 234 (Ex. A) (The victim was hospitalized for more than a month in intensive care and remains permanently paralyzed from the waist down.).
[11] Id. at 233-34 (Ex. A).
[12] Id. at 214.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 233-238 (Ex. A).
[17] Brief for Appellant at 13-18, D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d 212 (No. SC97869) (D.E.G.’s six points on appeal claimed that various parts of the juvenile court system violate the Missouri Constitution.).
[18] D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d at 215. Cases pending in the court of appeals can be transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri before the court of appeals issues an opinion because of the general interest of a question involved in the case or for the purpose of reexamining existing law. Mo. Const. Art. 5, § 10.
[19] D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d at 219-20.
[20] Id. at 220.
[21] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.011.
[22] Id.
[23] The Approach, The Missouri Approach, http://missouriapproach.org/approach/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
[24] Id.
[25] James D. Reed, Celebrating 100 years of Juvenile Justice In Missouri 5 (2003).
[26] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 219.021 (2016).
[27] Brittany L. Briggs, Children Are Our Future: Resurrecting Juvenile Rehabilitation Through “Raise the Age” Legislation in Missouri, 85 Mo. L. Rev. 191, 205 (2020).
[28] Anne F. Precythe, Mo. Dept. of Corr., Missouri Reentry Process report to the governor 1 (2016).
[29] Results, The Missouri Approach, http://missouriapproach.org/results/#:~:text=The%20results%20of%20Missouri's%20innovative,for%203%20years%20or%20more (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
[30] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.071.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. § 211.071(1).
[33] Id.
[34] Id.(Offenses that require a hearing include first and second degree murder, first degree assault, first degree rape and sodomy, first degree robbery, distribution of drugs, or the juvenile has committed two or more prior unrelated offenses which would be felonies if committed by an adult.).
[35] Id. § 211.071(6) (These factors include: seriousness of the offense, characteristics of the offense (violence, committed against persons or property), age of the child, previous record in the juvenile system, and program and facilities available, whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern that indicates the child is beyond rehabilitation, the sophistication and maturity of the child when considering the child’s home and environment, whether the child can benefit from treatment or rehabilitative programs, and the racial disparity in certification.).
[36] Id. § 211.071.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.261.
[40] D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d at 217.
[41] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031.1(3).
[42] In re T.J.H, 479 S.W.2d at 435.
[43] Id. at 434.
[44] Id.
[45] Id.
[46] Id. at 435.
[47] Id.
[48] Id. at 436 (Seiler, J. dissenting).
[49] Id. at 437.
[50] Id.
[51] D.E.G. v. Juv. Officer of Jackson Cnty., 601 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Mo. 2020).
[52] Id. at 220 (Judges Russell, Breckenridge, and Stith concurred in the majority opinion.).
[53] Id.
[54] Id. at 217.
[55] Id. at 216-19.
[56] Id. at 216 n.5.
[57] Id.
[58] In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (Seiler, J. dissenting), overruled by D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d 212.
[59] D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d at 219.
[60] Id. at 217.
[61] Id. at 216.
[62] Id.
[63] Id. at 216.
[64] Id.
[65] Id. at 217.
[66] Id.
[67] Id. at 219.
[68] Id. at 215-16.
[69] In re T.J.H, 479 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (Seiler, J. dissenting), overruled by D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d 212.
[70] Id.
[71] Ex parte Webb, 843 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 2002).
[72] In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d 354, 362 (Tex. App. Houst. 2016).
[73] Id.
[74] D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d at 212. D.E.G.’s age is redacted in the juvenile court decision due to being a minor, but the juvenile court stated in its findings that at the time of the transfer hearing in January 2019 that D.E.G. was “little more than 16”, making his birthday most likely between August and January. Id. at 238 (Ex. A).
[75] Id. at 238 (Ex. A).
[76] Id. at 212.
[77] Id. at 238 (Ex. A).
[78] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.071(6).
[79] Id. at 219.
[80] Id. at 217.
[81] Id.
[82] In re T.J.H, 479 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (Seiler, J. dissenting), overruled by D.E.G., 601 S.W.3d 212.
[83] Results, The Missouri Approach, http://missouriapproach.org/results/#:~:text=The%20results%20of%20Missouri's%20innovative,for%203%20years%20or%20more (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
