Newsome v. Kansas City Missouri School District

Opinion handed down May 16, 2017

            It is important for the courts to recognize the public policy exception to at-will employment because it prevents employers from firing employees for following statutes and other rules.  The Supreme Court of Missouri first recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in 2010.[1]  In Newsome, the Supreme Court of Missouri expanded the public policy exception to at-will employment.[2]  The court upheld an employee’s claim against a school district for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when the employee refused to alter the school district’s contract in violation of the policy behind a statute.

Wilson v. P.B. Patel, M.D., P.C.

Opinion handed down May 16, 2017

            The Supreme Court of Missouri overturned a jury verdict in favor of the defendant in a medical malpractice case, stating that evidence regarding the patient's informed consent to the procedure was not relevant and likely confused the jury.[1]  The court stated that the trial judge should have granted Plaintiff Josephine Wilson's request for a withdrawal instruction relating to the fact that she signed a consent form allowing Defendant Dr. Rohtashav Dhir to perform the procedure.[2]  The case was brought on improper care grounds and not on lack of informed consent grounds, which are separate and distinct theories of medical malpractice.[3]  This case note will examine the procedural issues raised when evidence is introduced by both parties on a different theory of negligence than what was presented in the pleadings and affirmative defenses.

State v. Naylor

 Opinion handed down March 14, 2017

The link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

            Orlando Naylor was convicted in the Circuit Court of Ste. Genevieve County of first-degree burglary for entering a restaurant’s office area while another person was present inside the building.[1]  The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, held that there was insufficient evidence to convict Naylor of this crime because no person was in the office area during the commission of the crime.[2]  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the court expanded the definition of the term “structure,” thus reversing the appellate court’s decision.[3]

Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis,

 Opinion handed down February 28, 2017

The link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

            In Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, the Supreme Court of Missouri examined whether the Missouri state minimum wage law preempts cities and municipalities from adopting a higher local minimum wage.[1]  The court held that the Missouri state minimum wage was a floor, rather than a ceiling, which allows cities to adopt ordinances that require employers to pay a higher hourly wage than that required by state law.[2]  However, recent legislation may effectively overturn this decision, adversely affecting low-wage workers in areas with higher average costs of living, particularly those in urban areas.

State v. Twitty

 Opinion handed down January 17, 2017

The link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

While it may be a seemingly straightforward crime, “possession of a chemical with the intent to create a controlled substance”[1] leaves significant lingering discord among Missouri courts regarding whether the requisite element of possession strictly refers to possession at the time of the arrest or whether it allows for more flexible temporal ranges.

State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner

Opinion handed down January 31, 2017

The link to the Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion

            In State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that article I, section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution applies to all trials that occur after its enactment date, December 4, 2014, regardless of the date when the charged conduct occurred.[1]  The constitutional provision at issue, passed into law by Missouri voters in the 2014 general election, allows evidence of prior criminal acts, charged or uncharged, to be introduced at trial for crimes of a sexual nature involving a child.[2]  Tipler had argued that this provision operated as an ex post facto law because the alleged crime occurred before this constitutional amendment was passed into law by Missouri voters.[3]  The court’s holding is an affirmation of the long-held principle that laws that affect evidentiary rules only are not ex post facto because the “event” that they modify is the trial itself, not the conduct which gave rise to the trial.