State v. Stover[1]

Opinion handed down September 25, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Melvin Stover, Jr. appealed his conviction and sentence of twelve years without probation or parole for the class A felony of trafficking drugs in the first degree.  On appeal, Mr. Stover claimed that the trial court erred in: (1) overruling his motion for acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact that he knowingly possessed the contraband; (2) overruling his motion to suppress the contraband seized during the search of his vehicle because the detention was conducted without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and lasted beyond the time reasonably required to complete a traffic ticket; (3) overruling his motion to suppress evidence of incriminating statements made during the detention and prior to the arresting officers issuing a Miranda warning; (4) allowing into evidence his refusal to consent to a search of the vehicle; (5) allowing Corporal Hagerty’s testimony that he received a commendation from the DEA for making the largest PCP seizure in the history of the United States until 2003; and (6) overruling his objection to the verdict-directing instruction because it did not require the jury to find that he knew of the content and character of the PCP or that he was aware of its presence and nature.  The Supreme Court denied five of Stover’s six points on appeal, but reversed and remanded because it held that the verdict-directing instruction the trial court gave the jury resulted in manifest injustice since it failed to require the state to prove one element of the crime—that Stover knew the content or character of the substance found in the briefcase in the trunk of his rented vehicle. 

Bob DeGeorge Associates, Inc., et al., v. Hawthorn Bank[1]

Opinion handed down September 11, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

In June 2008, Blue Springs Xtreme Powersports purchased property using loan funds obtained from Hawthorn Bank; as security for the loan, Hawthorn Bank took a purchase-money deed of trust on the property, but failed to record it until November 2008.[2]  Prior to recording the deed, Xtreme Powersports hired two contractors, DeGeorge and KSD Christian, to make improvements on the property.  After Xtreme failed to pay the contractors several months later, the contractors filed a mechanic’s lien against Xtreme’s property.[3]  Although Hawthorn Bank’s deed of trust was not recorded at the time the contractor’s began making improvements on the property, Hawthorn Bank claimed its deed had priority over the contractors’ mechanic’s liens.  The Supreme Court of Missouri looked to well-established statutory and case law regarding priority interests between mechanic’s liens and deeds of trust on the same property.[4]  Ultimately, the Court held that the contractors’ mechanic’s liens had superior priority because Hawthorn’s deed of trust was unrecorded at the time the contractors’ liens “attached” to the property, which was consistent with traditional Missouri law on the subject.[5] 

Whelan Security Co. v. Charles Kennebrew, Sr., and W. Landon Morgan[1]

Opinion handed down August 14, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Whelan Security Company (Whelan) appealed a trial court’s conclusion that its non-compete agreements with two employees was overbroad and unreasonable in time and space. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the non-compete agreements were unreasonable, but modified the agreement to fit the intent of the parties.

Hervey v. Missouri Department of Corrections[1]

Opinion handed down August 14, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Plaintiff Deborah Hervey sued her employer, the Missouri Department of Corrections, under the Missouri Human Rights Act for discriminating against her because of her disability.[2]  The department contested whether Ms. Hervey had a disability at all and defended its decision to terminate her for poor performance.[3]  Despite the department’s objection, the trial court submitted Ms. Hervey’s verdict-directing instruction to the jury instead of the department’s alternate verdict director, which included a separate paragraph requiring the jury to specifically find that Ms. Hervey was indeed disabled in order to find for her.[4]  The jury returned a verdict in Ms. Hervey’s favor for both the discrimination and the retaliation claims.[5]  Ms. Hervey was awarded actual and punitive damages for the disability discrimination claim.[6]  The department appealed and claimed the trial court erred in (1) overruling its objection to Ms. Hervey’s verdict director that did not require the jury to specifically find Ms. Hervey was disabled, as required by the MHRA, and (2) awarding excessive punitive damages as a result of failing to calculate the total in accordance with Section 510.265, RSMO 2011.[7]  On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with the department, and reversed and remanded the judgment of the trial court since Ms. Hervey’s proffered instruction did not require the jury to find an element that was essential to her MHRA claim.[8]

State ex rel. Missouri Public Defenders Commisison v. Waters[1]

Opinion handed down July 31, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The state’s public defender office opposed its assignment to represent a criminal defendant when it had exceeded its caseload capacity for three consecutive months, eventually seeking a writ of prohibition to have the Supreme Court of Missouri order the trial judge to set aside the appointment. The Court held that the trial judge exceeded its authority by appointing the representation in contravention of administrative regulations governing the public defender office.

Mendenhall v. Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford[1]

Opinion handed down July 31, 2012

Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Len Mendenhall worked for Jay Walker on his cattle farm.[2]  While at work one day, Mr. Mendenhall was killed in an accident when the truck he was unloading overturned.[3]  The truck was owned by the Family Center[4] and covered by business liability insurance.[5]  Ruth Mendenhall, his wife, filed a wrongful death suit against the Walkers and the Family Center, seeking indemnification of her judgment against Jay Walker from the liability insurance.[6]  The insurance company contended that Mr. Mendenhall was excluded by the insurance coverage because he was considered an “employee” under the insurance policy.[7]  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that because of an ambiguity in the exclusionary language and various definitions for an “employee,” the policy must be interpreted in favor of Mrs. Mendenhall.[8]