Opinion handed down August 30, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
St. Charles County (county) recorded on five subdivision plats that some of its public roads are “utility easements” specifically allowing for the installation and upkeep of gas lines. When the county later planned to widen one such road, Pitman Hill Road, Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) refused to pay for the relocation of its gas lines. The county filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking that the Circuit Court of St. Charles County order Laclede to pay for the cost. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the county. Laclede appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case. The court held that: 1) the county’s failure to compensate Laclede would constitute an unconstitutional taking; 2) compelling the county to repay Laclede would not curtail the county’s police power over public roads; 3) the doctrine of merger is inapplicable; 4) Laclede’s easement is a compensable property interest regardless of whether it was formed before or simultaneously with the establishment of the public right-of-way; 5) and even though the subdivision plat language creating the public road preceded that which created the utility easements, there was no priority of interest.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
Buemi v. Kerckhoff[1]
Opinion handed down August 2, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Kerckhoffs[2] appealed a trial court order imposing sanctions of $122,425 in attorney fees for acting in bad faith in a mediated settlement meeting.[3] Since the order imposing sanctions was interlocutory in nature and not a “claim for relief,” the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal for lack of final judgment.[4]
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Kerckhoffs[2] appealed a trial court order imposing sanctions of $122,425 in attorney fees for acting in bad faith in a mediated settlement meeting.[3] Since the order imposing sanctions was interlocutory in nature and not a “claim for relief,” the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal for lack of final judgment.[4]
Manzara v. State[1]
Opinion handed down August 2, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that two taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Distressed Areas Land Assemblage Tax Credit Act because the issuance of tax credits was not a direct expenditure of funds generated through taxation. This holding makes it extremely difficult for taxpayers in Missouri to challenge the constitutionality of tax credits.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that two taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Distressed Areas Land Assemblage Tax Credit Act because the issuance of tax credits was not a direct expenditure of funds generated through taxation. This holding makes it extremely difficult for taxpayers in Missouri to challenge the constitutionality of tax credits.
State ex rel. Griffin v. Denney[1]
Opinion handed down August 2, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Reginald Griffin was convicted of first-degree murder. The conviction stemmed from the murder of an inmate at a correctional facility in which Griffin was also an inmate. In the course of his appeal and proceedings on his motion for post-conviction relief, he discovered that another inmate, who had been in the prison yard where the murder occurred, had been found with a weapon immediately after the murder. Because the prosecution did not disclose this information to him, and he could not assert the claim in his direct appeal or post-conviction relief proceeding due to procedural issues, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Missouri. The Court granted the petition, finding that the failure to disclose the evidence prejudiced Griffin. The dissent disagreed after concluding that evidence of a weapon found on the other inmate was not favorable to Griffin.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Reginald Griffin was convicted of first-degree murder. The conviction stemmed from the murder of an inmate at a correctional facility in which Griffin was also an inmate. In the course of his appeal and proceedings on his motion for post-conviction relief, he discovered that another inmate, who had been in the prison yard where the murder occurred, had been found with a weapon immediately after the murder. Because the prosecution did not disclose this information to him, and he could not assert the claim in his direct appeal or post-conviction relief proceeding due to procedural issues, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Missouri. The Court granted the petition, finding that the failure to disclose the evidence prejudiced Griffin. The dissent disagreed after concluding that evidence of a weapon found on the other inmate was not favorable to Griffin.
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
State ex rel. Holzum v. Schneider[1]
Opinion handed down July 19, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The case stemmed from a medical malpractice claim filed on the final day of the statutory limitation period for such suits. Following discovery the plaintiff dismissed several of the original defendants, initially unknown and identified as John and Jane Doe, and named multiple new defendants in an amended complaint. The new defendants argued that the claim against them should be dismissed, as it was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of Missouri, examining the applicable rules regarding the “relation back” of amendments, held the amendment did not fall within the statutory period and dismissed the claims against the new defendants,. In doing so, the Court clarified and strengthened the pleading standards necessary for “Doe” defendants to toll the statute of limitations.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The case stemmed from a medical malpractice claim filed on the final day of the statutory limitation period for such suits. Following discovery the plaintiff dismissed several of the original defendants, initially unknown and identified as John and Jane Doe, and named multiple new defendants in an amended complaint. The new defendants argued that the claim against them should be dismissed, as it was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of Missouri, examining the applicable rules regarding the “relation back” of amendments, held the amendment did not fall within the statutory period and dismissed the claims against the new defendants,. In doing so, the Court clarified and strengthened the pleading standards necessary for “Doe” defendants to toll the statute of limitations.
Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc. v. Mo. Real Estate Comm’n[1]
Opinion handed down July 19, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc., a corporation offering advertising and other services through its website, challenged Revised Statutes of Missouri §§ 339.010.1 and 339.010.7, which require a real estate license to perform certain activities. It contended that not only was it exempt from the statutes but also that the statutes violated numerous provisions of the United States and Missouri Constitutions. The free speech challenge is the issue of primary interest. The majority determined the relevant subsections under § 339.010 were permissible regulations of commercial speech. Meanwhile, the dissent unleashed an attack on the entire occupational licensing statutory scheme, and ultimately concluded that under a very recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling, the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment.
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc., a corporation offering advertising and other services through its website, challenged Revised Statutes of Missouri §§ 339.010.1 and 339.010.7, which require a real estate license to perform certain activities. It contended that not only was it exempt from the statutes but also that the statutes violated numerous provisions of the United States and Missouri Constitutions. The free speech challenge is the issue of primary interest. The majority determined the relevant subsections under § 339.010 were permissible regulations of commercial speech. Meanwhile, the dissent unleashed an attack on the entire occupational licensing statutory scheme, and ultimately concluded that under a very recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling, the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment.
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