Tuesday, May 31, 2011

State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele[1]

Opinion handed down May 31, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Michael Anthony Taylor pled guilty in 1991 to kidnapping, rape, and first-degree-murder of a young girl. On two occasions he was sentenced to death by a judge. After multiple attempts in both state and federal court to have his sentence overturned, Taylor sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Missouri. On appeal, Taylor argued that because of subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions, his death sentence was imposed unlawfully by a judge, rather than by a jury, and that his sentence violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of Missouri disagreed, finding that Taylor was not entitled to jury sentencing because he had made a conscious and strategic decision to be sentenced by a judge believing it gave him the best chance of avoiding the death penalty.


Tuesday, May 17, 2011

State v. Brown[1]

Opinion handed down May 17, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion


The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded the second-degree murder conviction of Anthony Brown. At trial Brown had asserted self-defense, and during closing arguments the trial court had permitted the State to use a .38 revolver as demonstrative evidence to rebut Brown’s claim of self-defense. The conviction was reversed because there was no testimony that the .38 was similar to the gun allegedly carried by the victim.


Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Schmitz v. Great Am. Assurance, Co.[1]

Opinion issued April 26, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Christine Ewing died from injuries she sustained falling from a portable rock climbing wall at a minor league baseball game.[2] Her parents sued the baseball team’s owner, who had primary and excess insurance policies. After settling with the owner, and in the course of the proceedings against the insurers, four issues arose: (1) whether the excess liability policy required exhaustion of the primary policy before it would apply; (2) whether the rock climbing wall was an “amusement device” within the meaning of the policy’s amusement device exclusion; (3) whether the court was permitted to examine the reasonableness of the underlying judgment; and (4) whether the excess insurer’s refusal to defend was justifiable. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the excess policy did not require exhaustion, the rock climbing wall was not an “amusement device,” the court was not permitted to examine the reasonableness of the underlying judgment, and the excess insurer’s refusal to defend was unjustifiable.


Thursday, April 21, 2011

Fast v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc.[1]

Opinion handed down April 21, 2011
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Applebee’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Department of Labor’s (DOL) interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as contained in the Wage and Hour Division’s Field Operations Handbook (Handbook), establishing conditions for when employers could use the alternative minimum wage for tipped employees, was reasonable, persuasive, and entitled to deference.[2]


Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Debaliviere Place Ass’n v. Veal[1]

Opinion handed down April 12, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a dissolved neighborhood association could transfer its rights to collect assessments from property owners to a new neighborhood association with the same name because the transfer was an appropriate part of the winding up process of the dissolved association.


State v. Bowman[1]

Opinion handed down April 12, 2011
Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion

Gregory Bowman was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder.[2] At the sentencing phase, the jury found six aggravating factors, and the trial court imposed the death penalty accordingly.[3] Bowman appealed the conviction and death sentence to the Supreme Court of Missouri.[4] The Court upheld the conviction but reversed the death sentence.[5] The majority reversed on grounds that during sentencing, the jury considered invalid factors; namely, two previous Illinois murder convictions which were later reversed. Judge Wolff, concurring in part and dissenting in part, engaged in a proportionality review based on Section 565.035 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri; this review led to the same result and brought to light a number of issues that demonstrate the room for error existing in death penalty cases. Given the finality of the death penalty, efforts should be made to decrease room for error as much as humanly possible.