Monday, April 1, 2019

State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell


In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided whether a motion to compel the production of documents was properly granted after a trial court entered a final judgment in a dissolution action.[1]  The court held that a trial court may grant a motion to compel when it does so to effectuate the terms of its prior judgment.[2]

I.               Background
This case, like all divorce cases, began with a marriage. Jerry Cullen (“Husband”) and Janice Scroggins (“Wife”) were married in 1985, and Wife filed for divorce in 2007.[3]  While the two were married, Husband served in the United States Air Force Reserves.[4]  As an Air Force reservist, Husband accumulated certain retirement benefits.[5]  After Wife filed for divorce, the two signed a marital settlement agreement that provided Wife would be entitled to half of Husband’s retirement benefits that were earned during their marriage.[6]  This settlement agreement was adopted and entered into by the lower court on April 28, 2009.[7] 
The court’s order required both parties to execute and deliver any documents necessary to satisfy their obligation under the divorce agreement.[8]  The order also had a formula for calculating the retirement benefits, but that formula was incorrect.[9]  Upon realizing this mistake, Wife filed a Rule 74.06(a) motion to correct the formula in 2013.[10]  The court granted Wife’s motion and corrected the benefit calculation formula.[11] 
On December 7, 2017, Wife began to suspect that she was not receiving the correct amount of retirement benefits.[12]  She attempted to resolve this issue with Husband, but he was unresponsive.[13]  Consequently, Wife filed a motion to compel Husband to disclose all correspondence from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service relating to his Air Force retirement benefits and to sign an authorization releasing such records to her.[14]  Husband opposed the motion arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the motion was untimely, and the motion would violate his due process and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) privacy rights.[15]  The court sustained Wife’s motion and Husband eventually filed for a writ of prohibition.[16]  The Supreme Court of Missouri granted Husband’s preliminary writ of prohibition and subsequently issued its opinion.[17]
II.             Legal Background
The deciding issue in this case was whether the trial court had the power to compel Husband to produce documents related to the divorce agreement.[18]  However, this case touched on numerous legal issues.  As a preliminary matter, this case was litigated because Husband and Wife had a dispute arising out of a marital separation agreement.[19]  Marital separation agreements require court approval, but a court will approve them as long as their terms are conscionable and do not affect custody, support, and visitation of children.[20]  Once a court adopts a separation agreement, the agreement is treated like a court order.[21]
In this case, Wife wanted to enforce the spirit of the separation agreement by filing a motion to compel the production of documents.[22]  Husband viewed this motion to compel as a 74.06(b) motion for relief from judgment.[23]  Rule 74.06 governs the procedure for obtaining relief from a final judgment.[24]  Rule 74.06(a) grants relief from a final judgment “at any time” when there is a clerical mistake or oversight that led to an incorrect judgment.[25]  In contrast, Rule 74.06(b) affords a litigant a one year time frame to obtain relief from a judgment when the judgment was based on mistake or fraud or when the judgment was irregular.[26]  Rule 74.06(b) also provides for relief from a judgment for a reasonable time period when the judgment is void, satisfied, or inequitable.[27] 
This case was before the Supreme Court of Missouri because Husband sought a writ of prohibition, which is “an extraordinary, discretionary remedy”.[28]  A party may apply for an extraordinary writ when that party alleges harm by an action of a court that is not a final judgment.[29]  Extraordinary writs are usually not available when a party can appeal a decision.[30]  Essentially extraordinary writs give appellate courts the power and discretion to maintain the rule of law and prevent lower courts from acting beyond their authority.[31]  Writs of prohibition originated in English common law, where superior courts exercised their supervisory authority to prohibit the improper actions of lower courts.[32]  The primary purpose of a writ of prohibition is to prevent lower courts from acting in excess of their jurisdiction.[33] 
The writ of prohibition can be issued in three circumstances:
(1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when the trial court lacks jurisdiction; (2) to remedy a excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not made available in response to the trial court’s order.[34]
An appellate court reviewing a lower court has the discretion to grant a writ of prohibition.[35]  Essentially, writs of prohibition are only granted if the lower court lacks the jurisdiction to perform the challenged action and an appellate court, in its discretion, determines that this violation is harmful enough to justify an extraordinary writ.[36] 
            In this case the dissent argued that the writ of prohibition should have been granted and that the proper procedural remedy for Wife, if any, was civil contempt.[37]  Civil contempt is an action arising out of a final judgment to enforce the rights and remedies of a private party as a result of that judgment.[38]  An action for civil contempt will lie if someone knowingly violates a court order.[39]  Civil contempt actions become moot if the non-compliant party complies with the court order.[40]
Trial courts, as a matter of course, have the power to enter orders and grant motion necessary to enforce their own judgments.[41]  However, “[a] trial court’s inherent enforcement power applies to the judgment as originally rendered; the trial court’s power to modify a judgment ceases when the judgment becomes final.”[42]  A motion to compel the production of documents is a discovery tool used to enforce proper discovery requests.[43]  So, this case raised an interesting question about whether the motion to compel the production of documents was merely effectuating the judgment of the trial court or a discovery request beyond the scope of the trial court’s jurisdiction.  
III.           Instant Decision
A.    Majority
Judge Patricia Breckenridge wrote the majority opinion joined by Judges George W. Draper, W. Brent Powell, and Laura Denvir Stith.[44]  The court began its decision by stating the legal standard for writs of prohibition.[45]  Next the court addressed the arguments made by Husband in support of the writ of prohibition.[46]  His primary argument was that the circuit court lacked the authority to give Wife relief from the marital judgment because the one year time frame had passed.[47]  The court stated that the basis of Husband’s argument was erroneous because Wife’s motion to compel was not limited to one year after the judgment was entered, as she was not seeking relief from or a modification to the judgment.[48]  Instead the majority found that the trial court was only effectuating its original judgment.[49]
Next the court noted that Wife only sought the documents necessary to ensure that she was receiving the correct amount of benefits from her dissolved marriage.[50]  In addition, the judgment required both parties “to execute all documents necessary to effectuate the division and transfer of marital property.”[51]  Consequently the court concluded that Wife was not seeking to modify the judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b) but that she was instead seeking to enforce the judgment against Husband.[52]  The majority cited Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., which stated a “court generally has the inherent power to make such proper orders as are necessary to effectuate its decrees.”[53]  In concluding its opinion, the court held that the lower court was only enforcing its original order when it ordered Husband to turn over documents relating to the retirement benefits he accrued during the marriage.[54]
B.    Dissent
Judge Mary R. Russell filed a dissenting opinion joined by Judge Paul C. Wilson and Chief Justice Zel M. Fischer.[55]   The dissent argued that the proper procedure was not followed in the court below.[56]  The dissent maintained that the proper procedural remedy was a civil contempt motion because the judgment was final.[57]  The dissent argued that after the judgment became final the circuit court was deprived of jurisdiction.[58]  Because the judgment was final, there would have to be some rule or statute that would otherwise allow for a modification of this judgment.[59]  Because there was no such rule, the court was not authorized to modify its judgment or compel the parties to act.[60]  However, in the dissent’s view, if Wife had filed a contempt action then the court could have ordered Husband to comply with the judgment.[61]
IV.           Comment
This case concerned a marital settlement that required both parties to “execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate the [settlement agreement].”[62]  Wife sought the production of documents to ensure that she was receiving all benefits she was entitled to under the divorce agreement.[63]  Wife had no concrete evidence that Husband was violating the divorce decree, which is why she sought discovery on the matter.[64]  Both sides agreed that the divorce agreement adopted by the circuit court constituted a final judgment.[65] 
Wife argued that the terms requiring Husband to execute all documents necessary to effectuate the settlement agreement required him to provide her with information relating to his retirement benefits after the judgment was entered.[66]  Even if this reading of the separation agreement were correct, there was no clear grant of authority for the trial court in this case.  In light of this fact, the dissent correctly pointed out that there must be some special rule granting the circuit court jurisdiction when the case is no longer pending.  The majority relied on Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., a case specifying that a court can generally make orders to effectuate its decrees, particularly those referencing declaratory judgments.[67]  However, the purpose of Wife’s actions in this case was to modify a finding of the martial separation agreement, not enforce it.[68]  Because Wife sought to modify the order, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of Missouri should have issued a permanent writ of prohibition.[69]      

-David O'Connell



[1] State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell, No. SC 97008, 2019 WL 925516 (Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc).
[2] Id. at *1.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at *2.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at *3.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at *1.
[19] Id.
[20] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.325 (2016).
[21] Id.
[22] State ex rel. Cullen, 2019 WL 925516, at *1.
[23] Id.
[24] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 74.06.
[25] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 74.06(a).
[26] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 74.06(b)–(c).
[27] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 74.06(b)(4)–(5); Cozart v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc., 861 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
[28] State ex rel. Cullen, 2019 WL 925516, *3.
[29] Transit Cas. Co. ex rel. Pulitzer Publ’g Co. v. Transit Cas. Co. ex rel. Intervening Emps., 43 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Mo. 2001) (en banc), as modified (Apr. 24, 2001).
[30] State ex rel. Hilburn v. Staeden, 62 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Mo. 2001) (en banc); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.22.
[31] See Smith v. State ex rel. Rambo, 30 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
[32] Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232, 246 (1865).
[33] State ex rel. Rambo, 30 S.W.3d at 929.
[34] State ex rel. T.W. v. Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41, 43 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (quoting  State ex rel. Proctor v. Bryson, 100 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Mo. 2003)).
[35] State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 45 (Mo. 2017) (en banc).
[36] State ex rel. K-Mart Corp. v. Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
[37] State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell, No. SC 97008, 2019 WL 925516, at *6 (Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc).
[38] Jafarian-Kerman v. Jafarian-Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
[39] Chem. Fireproofing Corp. v. Bronska, 553 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
[40] Id.
[41] McLean v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 277 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
[42] Id.
[43] Zurheide-Hermann, Inc. v. London Square Dev. Corp., 504 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1973).
[44] State ex rel. Cullen v. Harrell, No. SC 97008, 2019 WL 925516, at *6 (Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc).
[45] Id. at *3.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] Id. at *4.
[49] Id.
[50] Id. at *5.
[51] Id. at *4.
[52] Id.at *4–5.
[53] Id. at *5 (citing Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., 194 S.W.2d 20, 24–25 (Mo. 1946)).
[54] Id. at *7.
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] Id.
[61] Id.
[62] Id. at *8.
[63] Id. at *7.
[64] See id. at *8.
[65] Id. at *4, *7.
[66] Id. at *2.
[67] Id. at *5 (citing Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., 194 S.W.2d 20, 24–25 (Mo. 1946)).
[68] See id.
[69] See id.at *7 (citing Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Tr., 336 S.W.3d 466, 468–69 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)).