Ecclesiastical
Denzel Washington was an inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center
(“Crossroads”) in Missouri.[1] He suffered from asthma and other respiratory
ailments that were aggravated by secondhand smoke.[2] While Crossroads was nominally a smoke-free
facility, in reality a large portion of the population smoked and were
permitted to do so in their cells.[3] This smoke-intensive environment aggravated
Washington’s condition, which led him to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to
protect his Constitutional rights.[4]
Washington brought suit against a group
of prison officials alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.[5] Washington prevailed, collecting compensatory
and punitive damages in a federal district court.[6] A three-judge panel for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury’s findings of fact but vacated
the award of punitive damages and remanded the case for further proceedings on
damages.[7]
I. Facts and Holding
Washington
was diagnosed with asthma and bronchitis, which produced attacks that included
“wheezing, chest pains, and coughing.”[8] In 2010 he was transferred to Crossroads, a
facility where over 85% of the population smoked.[9] While the only officially-designated smoking
areas were outside, the policy was “routinely violated,” as inmates spent up to
twenty-one hours a day in their cells where they were permitted to keep
cigarettes and lighters.[10] Washington was enrolled in a chronic care
clinic where he was treated with nebulizers and inhalers.[11] He was also given “lay-ins,” or medical
orders, to help his condition, such as wearing a painter’s mask or only housing
with nonsmoking cellmates.[12] Despite these attempts to allay his attacks,
Washington was unable to escape the secondhand smoke at Crossroads.[13]
Washington
communicated with Larry Denney, the warden of Crossroads, Ronda Pash, the deputy
warden, and Cheryl Richey, his case manager, about the impact of the smoke on
his condition.[14] With no improvement, Washington utilized the
grievance process and submitted informal resolution requests (“IRR”).[15] These IRRs notified the administration to the
fact that his roommate smoked and the ventilation system recycled the smoke.[16] The first IRR was denied because Washington’s
“allegation of tobacco limitation restrictions not being enforced ha[d] been
refuted and found to be without merit.”[17] He appealed this denial to Cyndi Prudden,
deputy division director, who also denied the IRR.[18]
Subsequently, Washington’s
painter’s mask, prescribed by a doctor, was taken away by corrections officers.[19] He submitted other IRRs for relief from
secondhand smoke, all of which were denied.[20] Washington was informed that the facility was
nonsmoking and that if the nonsmoking policy was being violated, he must report
the offender to resolve the issue.[21]
Washington sued Denney, Pash,
Prudden, and Richey (“Defendants”) for violating his Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment, alleging they were “deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical need by failing to take reasonable steps to abate
the risk of harm that secondhand smoke poses to him.”[22] At the conclusion of the Washington’s
case-in-chief, the Defendants moved for judgement as a matter of law, asserting
Washington failed to present sufficient evidence that they acted with deliberate
indifference or that he suffered harm as a result of their alleged failure.[23] The trial court took the motions under
advisement.[24] The jury returned a verdict for Washington,
awarding $40,000 in compensatory and $71,000 in punitive damages.[25] The Defendants again made a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, this time adding the argument that Washington
failed to present “sufficient evidence of outrageous, intentional, or malicious
conduct” to warrant punitive damages.[26] The district court denied their motion for a
judgement as a matter of law.[27]
II. Legal Background
Washington
filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that provides a cause of
action for any person deprived “of any rights . . . secured by the
Constitution.”[28] His claim was for a violation of his Eighth Amendment
right that protects against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”[29] The standard for proving this violation
required Washington to demonstrate “that (1) he suffered from an objectively
serious medical need, and (2) that Defendants knew of the need but deliberately
disregarded it.”[30] The deliberate indifference can be shown if
the Defendants “knew of and disregarded ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety’ and knew that his ‘conduct was inappropriate in light of that risk.’”[31] If a jury finds a defendant liable under this
standard, then compensatory damages are mandatory.[32] These damages may include remuneration for out-of-pocket
loss and mental anguish and suffering.[33]
To determine if punitive damages
are warranted, the Eighth Circuit used the standard set forth in Coleman v. Rahija.[34] Coleman
involved an inmate named Coleman who had a complicated pregnancy.[35] Following several visits to a local medical
center, a physician instructed that Coleman not return to the medical center until
her contractions became regular and in ten-minute intervals.[36] Misinterpreting the patient’s symptoms, the
nurses at her correctional facility did not transport her to the hospital immediately
when she went into labor, and Coleman underwent a painful premature delivery.[37] Coleman brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for
violation of her Eighth Amendment right, alleging that the nurse’s indifference
to her premature labor was cruel and unusual punishment.[38]
The court emphasized the intent of the
defendants in reaching its conclusion. The
court stated that punitive damages were only proper to punish for “malicious
conduct” and to serve as a deterrent against “similar behavior.”[39] The court found the nurse, while liable for
compensatory damages, did not demonstrate “sufficiently egregious” conduct that
would warrant punitive damages.[40]
III. Instant Decision
The
Eighth Circuit began by evaluating the Defendants’ claim that Washington failed
to present sufficient evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference.[41] The Defendants neither disputed Washington’s
medical condition nor the fact that they were aware of it.[42] They argued instead that Washington “failed
to prove that they drew an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm
existed.”[43] The Eighth Circuit found there was sufficient
evidence on the record, particularly in the form of the IRRs and the Defendant’s
responses to them, supporting the jury’s finding that each official knew of the
risk to Washington and that they failed to reasonably respond.[44]
The
court, however, did not find sufficient evidence to support an award of
punitive damages.[45] The court used the standard described in Coleman to evaluate the intent of the
prison officials and attempted to find support in the record for conduct
“motivated by evil motive . . . . ”[46] The court noted that in Coleman, the nurse was relieved of punitive damages because she
relied on the instructions of the physician.[47] Similarly, the Defendants at Crossroads
relied on the prison’s smoking policy in denying Washington’s requests.[48]
The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding that the Defendants violated
Washington’s Eighth Amendment rights, however, it vacated the award of punitive
damages and remanded the case to the district court to enter the award of
compensatory damages.[49]
IV. Comment
This
case is but one symptom of a facility in disarray. A google search quickly reveals the
ineptitude within Crossroads Correctional Center management.[50]
The decision to vacate the award of
punitive damages is largely based on analogizing Washington’s situation to that
of Coleman’s, however this comparison is unfair.
There was ample evidence presented
in the record that all levels of the prison staff knew that the smoking policy
was widely disregarded. It was a policy
that existed in name only, unlike the physician’s orders in Coleman.
In Coleman, the physician
giving the nurse direction knew that the patient was pregnant and the patient would
soon be in labor. The physician issued
his order from that perspective. To make
the facts of Coleman analogous to Washington, the nurse would have had to
make up the physician’s order (or know that the physician giving the order was
unaware of the patient’s condition) and then act according to that bogus
command. The smoking policy “existed” in
a technical sense, but without strict enforcement it was useless as a way to
rectify Washington’s condition. The fact
that everyone knew it was ostensible made it plausible that the Defendants
possessed the requisite level of culpability needed for imposing punitive
damages.
Further, the removal of the facemask seems like
an especially egregious step. It was
removed for “security” reasons despite the fact that a doctor prescribed it to
alleviate obviously constant asthma attacks.[51] It seems odd that a breathing apparatus
raised security concerns while a prison full of lighters went unabated. Ultimately, the final monetary award may
matter less than the vindication of a person’s civil right.
-Chris Mathews
[1] Washington v. Denney, 900 F.3d
549, 554 (8th Cir. 2018).
[2] Id. at 555.
[3] See id.
[4] Id. at 555.
[5] Id. at 554; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2016).
[6] Id. at 555.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 555–56.
[12] Id. at 556.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 556–57.
[16] Id. at 556.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. 556–57.
[21] Id. at 556.
[22] Id. at 557.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 558.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2016).
[29] U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
[30] Washington v. Denney,
2:14-CV-06118-NKL, 2017 WL 2773709, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part by
Washington v. Denney, 900 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Johnson v. Hamilton,
452 F.3d 967, 972–73 (8th Cir. 2006)).
[31] Id. (quoting Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2015)).
[32] Washington v. Denney, 900 F.3d
549, 563 (8th Cir. 2018).
[33] Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778,
786 (8th Cir. 1997).
[34] Washington, 900 F.3d at 563.
[35] Coleman, 114 F.3d at 782.
[36] Id.
[37] Id. at 783.
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at 787.
[40] Id. at 788.
[41]
Washington v. Denney, 900
F.3d 549, 559 (8th Cir. 2018).
[42] Id. at 559–60.
[43] Id. at 560.
[44] Id. at 560–63.
[45] Id. at 565.
[46] Id. at 564.
[47] Id. at 565.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] See e.g., Shannon O’Brien, Crossroads
Correctional Facility Still a Dangerous Mess, Inmate’s Parents and Employees
Say, Fox (July 10, 2018, 6:23
PM),
https://fox4kc.com/2018/07/10/crossroads-correctional-facility-still-a-dangerous-mess-inmates-parents-and-employees-say/
(last updated July 11, 2018, 2:32 PM).
[51] Id. at 560.
