In
Miller v. State, the Supreme Court of
Missouri reviewed a grant of postconviction relief to a defendant who
challenged his conviction based on the revocation of his probation.[1] The question before the court was whether the
trial court made “every reasonable effort” to hold the hearing before the end of
his probation term.[2] The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the
trial court did make “every reasonable effort” to hold the hearing prior to the
expiration of the probation term, despite allowing for continuances, because
the continuances were agreed to by both parties.[3]
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Richard
Miller was driving south on Highway 63 when he passed a car by crossing into
the oncoming traffic lane.[4] Despite having passed the driver, Miller
stayed in the oncoming lane and entered into a no-passing zone.[5] This section of the road had a curve that
obstructed his vision of oncoming cars.[6] As a result of his carelessness, Miller struck
an oncoming car, killing two people.[7] Miller was convicted of two counts of
involuntary manslaughter.[8] On August 29, 2007, the trial court suspended
the imposition of Miller’s sentence and gave him five years of probation.[9]
The
trial court found that Miller was found to have violated the terms of his
probation, so the state of Missouri filed a motion to revoke Miller’s probation
on June 26, 2012.[10] Miller admitted to violating the terms of
his probation at least three times.[11] The probation revocation hearing was
originally set for August 8, 2012, twenty days before his probation was set to
expire.[12] At that hearing the appointed public defender
withdrew because of a conflict of interest, so the hearing was continued until
August 23, 2012.[13] On August 23, the hearing was continued again
to October 3.[14] On October 3, the hearing was continued again
and set for December 5, after the expiration of the probation term.[15]
Once
the probation hearing finally began, Miller argued that the court lost the
authority to revoke his probation because his probation term had expired.[16] The trial court determined that it had the
authority to hear the revocation hearing because the prosecution’s motion to
revoke manifested a clear intent to revoke probation, and reasonable efforts
were made to revoke the probation within the probation term.[17] In addition, the trial court found that every
continuance was agreed to by both parties.[18] Because Miller violated the terms of his
probation, the trial court revoked his probation.[19] Mr. Miller’s conviction was affirmed on
appeal.[20]
Miller
filed a timely Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, which claimed that
the trial court lacked the authority to revoke his probation.[21] At this hearing, Miller claimed that his counsel
did not consult him before agreeing to continue the revocation hearing, and
that the continuances deprived the court of authority to revoke his probation.[22] The motion court found that the trial court
lacked the authority to revoke Miller’s probation because the trial court did
not make “every reasonable effort” to hold the hearing before the revocation
period expired.[23] Consequently, the motion court sustained
Miller’s Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief.[24] The state appealed, the court of appeals
issued an opinion, and the Supreme Court of Missouri ordered transfer.[25]
II.
Legal Background
When
a court finds a defendant guilty, it has the discretion to place him on
probation if (1) the institutional confinement of the defendant is not
necessary to protect the public, and (2) the defendant will benefit in some way
from being on probation.[26] The term of probation is set by the
classification of the offense; the probation term for a felony can be set
between one and five years, the term for a misdemeanor can be set between six
months and two years, and the term for an infraction can be set between six
months and one year.[27]
The
court can set conditions of probation at anything it deems reasonably necessary
to ensure that the defendant will not violate the law again.[28] In addition, the court may require the
probationer to pay restitution to victims, or enroll in a drug treatment
program.[29] If the defendant does not like the conditions
of his probation, he has the option of refusing probation and accepting his
criminal punishment.[30]
A
sentencing court can grant probation by suspending the execution or the
imposition of the sentence.[31] When a court suspends the execution of the
sentence, the defendant has legally been convicted of the criminal offense, but
does not have to serve his sentence if he accepts probation.[32] In contrast, with a suspended imposition of
sentence, no conviction occurs unless the probationer violates the terms of his
probation, and probation is revoked.[33]
Probation
terms begin on the day probation is imposed and end when the probation term
expires.[34] A court has the power to revoke probation, so
long as the revocation occurs during the probation term or after the probation
term if there is “some affirmative manifestation of an intent” to revoke
probation and “every reasonable effort is made . . . to conduct the hearing
prior to the expiration of the period.”[35] The Miller
case sheds some light on the definition of “every reasonable effort.”[36]
III.
Instant Decision
The
Supreme Court of Missouri noted that an appellate court will only overturn a
grant of postconviction relief if the motion court clearly erred in granting the
motion.[37] The court noted that a trial court can revoke
probation at any time during the probation term or after the probation term if
certain conditions are met.[38] The court stated that a trial court only has
the authority to revoke probation after the expiration of the probation term
when an “‘affirmative manifestation of an intent to
conduct a revocation hearing’ before the end of the period. [and the trial
court has made] ‘every reasonable effort ... to notify the probationer and to
conduct the hearing prior to the expiration of the period.’”[39]
The court considered several arguments and circumstances of the
case in reaching its conclusion. The court
first examined the record and noted that the hearing was originally set before
the probation period expired, which the court concluded showed that the
prosecution manifested its intent to revoke probation.[40] Next, the court examined Miller’s claim that
the trial court did not make every reasonable effort to conduct the hearing
prior to the end of the probationary period and that his counsel continued
these cases without consultation.[41] The court noted that the continuances complained
of were agreed to by both parties.[42] The court soundly dismissed Miller’s contention,
citing authority that holds a party will be bound by his lawyer’s actions.[43] Finally, the court addressed Miller’s
argument that, by continuing his case, the court lost the power to revoke his
probation.[44] The court stated that an appellant cannot
claim error on appeal that the appellant himself caused and ultimately reversed
the motion court’s grant of postconviction relief.[45]
IV.
Comment
Relying
on well-established legal principles, the Supreme Court of Missouri reached the
only reasonable result in this case. The
main issue with Miller’s appeal was that he (or his counsel) invited any error,
if there was error. Since a party cannot
claim error that he invited,[46] the appeal was bound to
lose even if meritorious.
Putting
that procedural issue aside, Miller could not succeed on the merits. Miller contended that continuing a case past
a probation term is unreasonable as a matter of law. If Miller’s position were adopted, then a
defendant could evade the consequences of violating the terms of his probation
by continuing the hearing past the probation term. A Miller
rule would only incentivize defendants to game the court system by manufacturing
reasons for why they cannot attend the current probation hearing. Furthermore, it would discourage courts from
accommodating lawyers and defendants by continuing cases so that courts could
timely reach the merits of legal disputes.
Finally, such a rule would lead to unjust results, since at least some
probationers would escape the consequences of their actions by continuing cases
beyond a probation term.
The Miller case makes it clear that
continuing a case beyond a probationary period will not save a defendant from
probation revocation. In addition, the
case demonstrates that a public defender’s conflict of interest will not
deprive a trial court of jurisdiction.[47] In sum, this case makes clear that which
should be readily apparent, continuances are an essential and reasonable part
of our judicial system.
- David O’Connell
[1] Miller
v. State, No. SC 96754, 2018 WL 3626508, *1 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
[2] Id.at *5.
[3] Id. at *6.
[4] Id. at *1.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at *1.
[11] Id. at *2.
[12] Id. at *1.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at *2.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. See also Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 559.036 (2016).
[18] Miller
v. State, No. SC 96754, 2018 WL 3626508, *2 (Mo. July 31, 2018) (en banc).
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at *3.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 4.
[26] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.012 (2016).
[27] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.016 (2016); A court can only extend
probation past this limitation if the defendant admits they violated the terms
of the probation and then the court can only extend this term by one year. Id.
[28] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.021.1 (2016).
[29] Id. § 559.021.2. In addition, there are a variety of other
corrective tools at the court’s disposal in reforming probationers. See id.
[30] State ex
rel. Delf v. Missey, 518 S.W.3d 206, 212 (Mo. 2017) (en banc).
[31] Hoskins v. State, 329 S.W.3d 695, 698 n.3 (Mo.
2010) (en banc).
[32] Id.
[33] Id. The comment section of §
559.036 suggests that a court has the power to extend a sentence beyond jury
sentencing when the court suspends the imposition of sentences and revokes that
suspension. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.036.1 (2016).
[34] Id. § 559.036.1.
[35] Id. § 559.036.8.
[36] Miller
v. State, No. SC 96754, 2018 WL 3626508, *5–6 (Mo. July 31, 2018) (en banc).
[37] Id. at *4.
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at *5 (quoting Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 559.036.8 (2016)).
[40] Id.
[41] Id. at *6.
[42] Id.
[43]
Id.
[44] Id.
[45] Id.
[46] See id.
[47] Id. at *5.
