Opinion
handed down August 23, 2016
In an effort to maximize judicial
efficiency at the trial court level, race-neutral explanations for defending a Batson challenge exercised by defense
counsel are seemingly becoming mere formalities – issues which are left for
appellate courts to flesh out. While
juries are typically notorious (and justifiably so) for wanting trials to be
more expeditious, prosecutors and defense counsel should expend all of their
efforts in voir dire in order to
obtain justice at the trial level for the criminal defendant.
I. Facts
and Holding
On July 4, 2012, Roscoe M. Meeks accosted
a Mexican American whom he claimed “took his girlfriend.”[1] When the man denied the allegation and turned
to walk away, Meeks unloaded a gun from his person and placed the gun against
the back of the man’s head.[2] The man attempted to try and take the gun
away from Meeks, and during this struggle, Meeks shot the man in the lower
abdomen.[3] When the man attempted to retreat, Meeks shot
him a second time.[4] Meeks was tried for first-degree assault and
armed criminal action in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.[5]
During voir dire, Meeks’s defense counsel asked the venire whether anyone
would have difficulty presuming that Meeks was innocent.[6] The response of Venireperson A struck a chord
with the rest of the venire. Venireperson
A responded:
Statistically speaking, we live in the
seventh most dangerous city in the United States. And I hate to go into race here. But statistically, we’re in St. Louis; he’s
black. There’s more into it, but I don’t
know those facts. But it’s more than
likely he did something.[7]
After this comment was made, there
was an outcry in the venire.[8] The defense counsel responded:
“I don’t want to open a can of worms the Judge doesn’t want to open at ten to
five with a few things said there.”[9] One
of the female venirepersons, whom the prosecutor assumed was Venireperson C,
responded with “let’s open that can.”[10] Neither the prosecution nor defense, however,
knew which venireperson made that statement.[11]
After voir dire, the prosecutor moved to
strike Venireperson C.[12] Meeks responded by exercising a Batson[13]
challenge against the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of Venireperson C.[14] Venireperson C was an African American woman
who presumably made the let’s-open-that-can remark in response to racist
statements made by Venireperson A.[15] The prosecutor reasoned that since the row
where the outcry came from had already mostly been struck for cause, and since
Venireperson D would likely be struck by the defense (Venireperson D is of
Mexican descent), then she would choose to strike Venireperson C.[16] The circuit court ruled that the prosecutor
had offered a racially neutral explanation for using her last peremptory strike
against Venireperson C.[17] After the circuit court overruled this
challenge, the final jury was selected and consisted of one African-America
juror, ten white jurors, and one juror who declined to state his race.[18] Meeks’s case went to trial, and he was
convicted on both counts.[19]
II. Legal Background
A Batson
challenge has long been recognized as a procedural safeguard used during voir dire to ensure equal protection
under the law by prohibiting prosecutors from using their peremptory strikes on
a juror because of his or her race.[20] In 1986, the Supreme Court in Batson articulated a three-step,
burden-shifting process to be used to challenge a peremptory strike on the
basis of race.[21] For the first step, the defendant must raise
a Batson challenge with regard to one
or more specific venirepersons struck by the State and be able to identify the
racial group to which the person or persons belong.[22] The second step is for the court to require
the State to present “reasonably specific and clear race-neutral explanations”
for why he or she is exercising the strike.[23] If the prosecutor is able to present a
reasonable explanation for the strike, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to prove that the strikes were merely pretextual and were, in fact, racially
motivated.[24]
A variety of factors are analyzed by
courts in order to determine whether the defendant has met the burden of
proof. Ultimately, the main
consideration should be the “plausibility of the prosecutor’s explanations in
light of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.”[25] In addition, several other factors can evince
pretext, including: (1) the existence of similarly situated white jurors who
were not struck, (2) the degree of logical relevance between the proffered
explanation and the case to be tried in terms of the kind of crime charged, (3)
the potential punishment if the defendant is convicted, and (4) the prosecutor’s
demeanor or statements during voir dire.[26]
III. Instant
Decision
On appeal from the Court of Appeals from the Eastern
District of Missouri, the Supreme Court of Missouri analyzed the case under the
clear error standard of review.[27] In analyzing the Batson challenge under the three-step, burden-shifting process, the
court solely turned its attention to the second step – whether the prosecutor
offered a racially neutral explanation for the strike of Venireperson C.[28]
The court noted that context is especially important when determining
whether the prosecutor’s explanation was genuine or pretextual.[29] The prosecutor had hoped to strike all of the
members of the row who had unpleasant reactions to the statements made by Venireperson
A but had expended all but one of her strikes.[30] Thus, to ensure that neither Venireperson C
nor D would serve on the jury, she had to choose one to strike (and she assumed
that the defendant would strike Venireperson D, given that Venireperson D was
of the same race as the victim in the case).[31]
The prosecutor’s reasoning for striking
Venireperson C was so she would not “start out the case where there is a person
of Mexican descent and African-American descent upset about racial issues.”[32] The court reasoned that the prosecutor’s
explanation might have been sufficient in explaining a strike of all the
venirepersons in that row but that her reasoning was insufficient as to explain
why she struck Venireperson C instead of D.[33] Further, the court emphasized that the
prosecutor’s second explanation was also unable to satisfy the burden of
offering a race-neutral explanation under the second step, because the
prosecutor in her second explanation explicitly referred to Venireperson C’s
race.[34] For these reasons, the Supreme Court of Missouri
vacated Meeks’s convictions and remanded his case for a new trial.[35]
IV. Comment
It almost seems incredulous that the circuit
court would accept the prosecutor’s explanation as “race-neutral” when, in
doing so, she explicitly referred to the races of both Venirepersons C and D. It is
not difficult to imagine why the prosecutor wanted to strike someone who apparently
made an impassioned remark following highly racially charged statements. And it is not difficult to see why the judge might
be sympathetic to the prosecutor, who was aware that someone made the remark,
but because of either lack of time or ability – or an expectation that the
court would accept whatever purportedly race-neutral explanation was offered – the
prosecutor failed to determine which venireperson made the statement. However, the absence of even an attempt to
pinpoint the specific juror was a significant contributing factor in the
Supreme Court of Missouri’s overruling the circuit court’s finding.
Earlier in voir dire, after Venireperson A made the racist statements, the
prosecutor heard someone yell “let’s open that can” yet failed to “spin around”
in time to see who made the statement.[36] While it would have been difficult to
initially pinpoint who made the remark, if the prosecutor had the means and the
tact in which she could decipher who specifically made that remark, it is
possible that she would have succeeded in striking Venireperson C. This is because earlier the prosecutor argued
making that specific statement was different than someone simply being offended
by the comment.[37] So, it is likely that if the prosecutor had ascertained
that Venireperson C made the remark and then used that explanation to defend a Batson challenge, then she may have
succeeded on her strike.
In conclusion, in order to prevent
criminal defendants from lengthy appellate processes, which may or may not
result in a vacated conviction, extra time and effort should be expended in the
voir dire process in order for
prosecutors and defense counsel alike to make their peremptory strikes as
accurate and race-neutral as possible.
-
Sheaffer Fennessey
[1] State v. Meeks, No. SC 95221, 2016 WL 4443993, at *1 (Mo.
Aug. 23, 2016).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at *3.
[9] Id. at *2.
[10] Id. at *3.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at *2.
[13] See discussion infra Part
II.
[14] Meeks, 2016 WL 4443993, at *2.
[15] Id. at *3.
[16] Id. at *2.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at *3.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at *4; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–97
(1986).
[21] Meeks, 2016 WL 4443993, at *4 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 89).
[22] Id. (quoting State v.
Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc)).
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939.
[26] Id. at 939–40.
[27] In reviewing a trial
court’s holding on a Batson challenge, the standard of review is clear
error. Meeks, 2016 WL 4443993,
at *3 (quoting State v. Marlowe,
89 S.W.3d 464, 470 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)).
[28] Id. at *4.
[29] Id. at *5.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id. at 3.
