Opinion handed down June 7, 2016
While driving a tractor-trailer
during the course of his employment, Kevin Parr was killed after his truck was
involved in a single vehicle accident.[1] After the accident, Mr. Parr’s children and
father brought a wrongful death action against three of Mr. Parr’s supervisors.[2] The plaintiffs alleged that the supervisors
breached personal duties they owed to the decedent that were separate and
distinct from the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace for
all employees.[3]
The circuit court found that the
supervisors did not owe a duty beyond the nondelegable duties they owed Mr.
Parr as his employer.[4] The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the
existence of a duty imposed by a federal statute creates a duty that is
separate and distinct from an employer’s nondelegable duties, and (b) whether
an admission of duty by a defendant is binding on a court where no duty would
otherwise exist.[5]
I. Facts and Holding
Mr.
Parr was employed by Breeden Transportation, Inc. ( “Breeden” or “the company”)
from June 2006 until his death on April 11, 2008.[6] During the course of his employment, Mr. Parr
was involved in three single-vehicle accidents, the third of which was fatal.[7]
After
his death, the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death suit against the president of
Breeden and two of Mr. Parr’s supervisors.[8] The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had
a personal duty to provide a safe working environment to the driver by
monitoring his physical condition to determine whether he was fit to drive a tractor-trailer.[9]
The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants breached this duty by: (1) keeping Mr. Parr on the road without a
medical evaluation following his first accident; (2) failing to inquire into
Mr. Parr’s health conditions that may have contributed to the two prior
single-vehicle accidents; and (3) putting Mr. Parr back on the road when they
knew, or should have known, that it was not safe for him to operate a tractor-trailer.[10]
Further, the plaintiffs alleged
that these actions of the co-employees and employer were contrary to Federal
Motor Carrier Safety regulations, which require motor carriers, and the
supervisors and managers who work for motor carriers, to ensure that drivers
are safe to operate commercial motor vehicles.[11]
Additionally, during a
deposition, the supervisors stated that it was part of their job duties to be
aware of any health conditions of the drivers that may affect their ability to
operate a truck and to determine if drivers were otherwise safe to operate the
vehicle.[12]
The defendants alleged that the
duty to ensure the decedent was fit to drive the truck was not separate from
the nondelegable duties of the employer, therefore they owed no separate duty
to the decedent.[13]
The Supreme Court of Missouri held the defendant supervisors owed no duty
beyond that of their nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, regardless
of whether federal regulations purportedly create such a duty.[14]
II. Legal Background
In
Missouri, workers’ compensation law provides employees that are injured at work
with the exclusive remedy for injuries that arise out of and occur during the
course of employment. [15] However, the liability of a co-employee is
slightly more complicated.
In
2005, the Missouri General Assembly adopted amendments to the workers’ compensation
statutes that effectively returned Missouri to the common law of co-employee
negligence.[16]
Under the amended act, a co-employee
could not be held liable for an employer’s breach of nondelegable duties owed
to employees to provide for a safe work place.[17] These nondelegable duties include: (1) the
duty to provide a safe place to work; (2) the duty to provide safe appliances,
tools, and equipment for the work; (3) the duty to give warning of dangers of
which the employee might reasonably be expected to remain ignorant; (4) the
duty to provide a sufficient number of suitable fellow employees; and (5) the
duty to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct of employees which would
make the work safe.[18]
The
reasoning behind not holding co-employees liable for the employer’s breach of a
nondelegable duty is that employees ultimately have little control over whether
these duties are performed by an employer.[19] However, these duties are not unlimited, and a
co-employee may be personally liable to another employee when his or her negligent
breach of a nondelegable duty causes injury or death.[20]
III. Instant Decision
The
issue in this case was ultimately whether a personal duty existed outside of
the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. The Supreme Court
of Missouri ultimately held that the duties of the employer and the supervisors
to ensure that the drivers were safe to operate a motor vehicle was not
separate or distinct from the employer’s nondelegable duties.[21] The court reasoned, even though federal regulations
place a duty on the co-employees to ensure the drivers are safe to be on the
road, the duty is part of the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe
working environment for its employees.[22] Because of this, the court upheld the circuit
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
Additionally,
the court found that while the defendant co-employees, in their answer,
admitted to owing such a duty to Mr. Parr, they did not in fact owe a personal
duty to the decedent.[23] This holding explicitly overrules Richey v. Philipp, which held that an
admission of duty is binding on a court.[24]
IV. Comment
It is important to note that the
court’s holding does not leave the plaintiffs with no avenue of compensation. The plaintiffs in this case could still
recover under Missouri’s workers’ compensation statute. However, the court’s decision makes the
federal motor carrier regulations somewhat irrelevant in this instance. This is particularly significant if the
regulations were indeed intended to create a personal duty for supervisors and
co-employees to ensure the health and safety of motor carrier drivers, or if
they otherwise created a private cause of action for drivers to utilize as an
avenue for relief against their employers. While some states have reached the same
conclusion as the Supreme Court of Missouri, and held that the Federal Motor
Carriers Act does not create a private cause of action that preempts the
exclusivity provisions of workers’ compensation,[25] at least a few states
allow for such a private action.[26]
For example, in Amerigas Propane, LP, the California court
noted that the Federal Motor Carriers Act was not only intended to provide for
the public safety, but was also concerned with the safety of drivers and
employees of motor carriers.[27] While the court emphasized the purpose of the
act as it relates specifically to protecting independent contractors rather
than employees, it nonetheless held that the Federal Motor Carriers Act does
create a private cause of action for drivers that is not necessarily preempted
by exclusivity provisions of the state’s workers’ compensation statutes.[28]
Whether
a private cause of action exists is significant in this case because it allows
drivers and the families of injured drivers another avenue of relief in the
case of employer negligence. Further, as
some commentators have pointed out,[29] if this were a case in
which a third party were injured by Mr. Parr, and it was not just a single
vehicle accident, it is likely that the injured party could recover punitive
damages from the defendants in this case due to their decision to put Mr. Parr
back on the road, given that he was involved in two accidents in less than two
years and had significant health problems. Forcing the plaintiffs to pursue their claim
through workers’ compensation law extinguishes this separate cause of action,
however.[30]
While
the court’s decision in Parr v. Breeden
is in line with a number of other states in that it denies that the Federal
Motor Carriers Act creates a private cause of action that is separate from
Missouri workers’ compensation law, it has significant implications for
employees of motor carriers. Ultimately,
the decision may undermine one purpose of the Federal Motor Carrier Act by
making it more difficult for drivers or other employees of motor carriers to
recover for injuries caused by an employer’s negligence, which the act arguably
intended.
- Brandon Wood
[1] Parr v. Breeden, 489 S.W.3d 774, 776
(Mo. 2016) (en banc).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
at 777.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] 49 C.F.R. § 392.1 (2016) (noting that it
is the duty of “[e]very motor carrier, its officers, agents, representatives,
and employees responsible for the management, maintenance, operation, or
driving of commercial motor vehicles, or the hiring, supervising, training,
assigning, or dispatching of drivers” to comply with the safety regulations).
[12] Substitute Brief of Appellants at
2, 16, 41, Parr v. Breeden, 489 S.W.3d 774 (Mo. 2016) (No. SC94393), 2014 WL
7642024.
[13] Parr,
489 S.W.3d at 777.
[14] Id.
at 782.
[15] Peters v. Wady Indus., Inc., 489 S.W.3d
784, 789 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
[16] Leeper v. Asmus, 440 S.W.3d 478, 483
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
[17] Id.
at 484.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
at 440.
[20] Id.
at 485.
[21] Parr v. Breeden, 489 S.W.3d 774, 778
(Mo. 2016) (en banc).
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] 259 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008), overruled by Parr, 489 S.W.3d at 780–81.
[25] See
Tierney v. Arrowhead Concrete Works, Inc., 791 N.W.2d 540, 546–47 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2010) (holding the Motor Carrier Act does not create a private cause of
action for personal injury or death that is not barred by the Minnesota
Workers’ Compensation Act); see also
Craft v. Graebel-Okla. Movers, Inc., 178 P.3d 170, 174 (Okla. 2007) (holding
the Motor Carrier Act does not preempt exclusivity provisions in Oklahoma’s
Workers’ Compensation Act).
[26] Amerigas Propane, LP v. Landstar Ranger,
Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
[27] Id.
at 697.
[28] Id.
at 702 (“Whether a driver is an employee of the carrier or an independent
contractor under state law is not dispositive for purposes of summary judgment
since the FMCSR pertains to both equally. It is apparent that the intent of the Act and
FMCSR is to protect drivers . . . and to hold carriers accountable for FMCSR
violations resulting in harm to drivers, when no other recourse is
available.”).
[29] Parr
v. Breeden – Violation of Federal Trucking Rules Does Not Create a Separate
Employer Duty, Chalik & Chalik Inj. Laws. (June 27, 2016), http://www.floridaaccidentattorneyblog.com/2016/06/parr-v-breeden-violation-of-federal-trucking-rules-does-not-create-a-separate-employer-duty/.
[30] See
Gambrell v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163, 165–67
(Mo. App. 1978).
