Opinion handed
down February 4, 2014
Travis
M. Stanley was charged with two counts of failure to register as a sex
offender, and eventually negotiated a plea agreement in which the prosecuting
attorney agreed to recommend a lesser sentence in return for guilty pleas on
both counts.[2] The circuit court,
however, was not bound by this agreement and gave Stanley the maximum sentence
for each count.[3] Stanley filed a pro
se post-conviction motion, which was amended by court-appointed post-conviction
counsel from the public defender’s office.[4]
Stanley’s first post-conviction counsel eventually withdrew, though, and
a new attorney from the public defender’s office entered an appearance.[5] Stanley’s new counsel filed a second
amendment to the motion, which the circuit court overruled.[6] The case was eventually transferred to the
Supreme Court of Missouri, which held that: (1) the time limit for filing the
second amended post-conviction motion was governed by the date Stanley’s first post-conviction counsel was
appointed; (2) Stanley was not entitled to a hearing on the claim of
ineffective counsel; (3) the circuit court was not obligated to make
disclosures or allow Stanley to withdraw his guilty pleas; and (4) Stanley’s
plea counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the sentence
imposed.[7]
I. Facts and Holding
Travis
M. Stanley was charged with two counts of failure to register as a sex
offender.[8] Stanley subsequently
reached an agreement with the state in which the prosecuting attorney agreed to
recommend a lesser sentence in return for guilty pleas on both counts.[9] Pursuant to the agreement, the prosecuting
attorney requested two three-year sentences, to be served concurrently.[10] The
circuit court, however, imposed two four-year sentences served consecutively,
which was the maximum sentence allowed for the crimes at issue.[11]
Prior
to the circuit court’s sentence, Stanley fulfilled his end of the bargain by
filing with the court a written petition to plead guilty, and also entered oral
guilty pleas.[12] Stanley signed the
written petition, which included an acknowledgement that “the sentence [Stanley
would] receive [was] solely a matter
within the control of the Judge,” and stated that Stanley’s plea counsel had
informed him that he could be imprisoned for up to four years on each count.[13] At the plea hearing, the circuit court
discussed with Stanley the terms of the
plea agreement and conducted an oral plea colloquy, which conformed to Rule
24.02(b) and (c).[14] During the
colloquy, Stanley confirmed that he intended to plead guilty, and that he
understood that he did not have to plead guilty.[15] The circuit court also made clear to Stanley
that the plea agreement was not binding on the court, and that the judge would
be free to give Stanley the maximum sentence for his crimes, despite the plea
agreement.[16] The court failed to
inform Stanley that he could not withdraw his guilty plea if he was given a
higher sentence than recommended in the plea agreement, though.[17]
The
court ultimately accepted Stanley’s guilty pleas, and after ordering a
sentencing assessment report imposed the maximum sentence for each charge.[18] Stanley and his counsel raised no arguments
at the sentencing, and the court entered judgment.[19]
Afterwards,
on April 12, 2010, Stanley filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct the judgment or sentence, alleging: (1) “that the circuit
court erred by failing to reject his plea agreement in ‘open court,’ and (2)
that his plea counsel was ineffective because she promised Mr. Stanley he would
receive a maximum of a three-year sentence if he pleaded guilty, yet she
allowed the court to treat the plea agreement as a nonbinding ‘open plea.’”[20] On April 30, 2010, the motion court appointed
the public defender’s office as Stanley’s post-conviction counsel.[21]
Once
Stanley’s new counsel entered his appearance, he filed an amended motion on
September 30, 2010, which was considered timely because it was filed within 60
days of August 9, 2010, the date the plea court’s transcript was filed with the
motion court.[22] The amended motion
made five claims: (1) that the court “violated Rule 24.02(d)(4) when it failed
to inform the Parties that it rejected their plea agreement”; (2) that the
court “violated Rule 24.02(d)(4) and [the Supreme Court’s] holding in Schellert
v. State, 569 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. banc 1978), when it failed to afford
[Stanley] an opportunity to withdraw his plea after the Court rejected the plea
agreement”; (3) that Stanley’s plea counsel erred “by failing to specifically
mention in the written plea petition that Mr. Stanley was to serve his
sentences concurrently”; (4) that Stanley’s plea counsel erred by “failing to
adequately explain to Mr. Stanley that the court was free to reject the plea
agreement and impose a higher sentence”; and (5) that Stanley’s plea counsel
erred by “failing to object to the eight-year sentence imposed or inquire
whether the court understood the plea agreement.”[23] The last three claims went towards the
assertion that Stanley’s guilty pleas were involuntary.[24]
Stanley’s
new counsel eventually withdrew from the case with permission of the motion
court, and a new lawyer from the same office entered an appearance on April 13,
2011.[25] This appearance was more than
60 days after both the filing of the transcript with the motion court and the
appointment of the public defender’s office as counsel, so Stanley’s new
post-conviction counsel had to request permission from the court in order to
file a second amendment to the motion. [26]
The request was granted, and the second amended motion was filed on July
21, 2011.[27] The second amendment
differed from the first in that it alleged that the plea court violated Rule
24.02(d)(2) by not informing Stanley that he would not be able to withdraw his
guilty pleas.[28] It also alleged
specific facts as evidence of prejudice for the claims; something the first
amendment failed to do.[29] The circuit
court overruled the second amended motion, finding that the transcript of the
plea colloquy was contrary to Stanley’s claims.[30]
The case was eventually transferred to the Supreme Court, which first
held that the time limit for filing the second amended post-conviction
motion was governed by the date Stanley’s first
post-conviction counsel was appointed.[31] Stanley’s first amended motion was timely, but
the second was not because it was filed more than 60 days after counsel was
appointed, which violated Rule 24.035(g).[32] Stanley argued that the 60 day time limit
should have applied from the date on which his second post-conviction counsel
was appointed, but the Court disagreed.[33]
The Court also held that Stanley was not entitled to a hearing
on the claim of ineffective counsel.[34]
The Court explained that Stanley’s first amended motion failed to allege
that he would not have pleaded guilty had his plea counsel not erred, which
means he failed to “alleged facts that would prove prejudice.”[35] Although the second amended motion did allege
such facts, that motion was not timely. [36]
Furthermore, even if Stanley had pleaded prejudice in his first amended
motion, the record refutes Stanley’s claim.[37]
Finally, the Court held that the circuit court was not obligated
to make disclosures or allow Stanley to withdraw his guilty pleas, and also that
Stanley’s plea counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the sentence imposed.[38] Such an objection would have been futile, as
the circuit court was not bound by the plea agreement.[39]
II. Legal Background
Time
limits for filing a post-conviction motion are mandatory.[40] Furthermore, claims raised for the first time
in an amended motion filed after the time limit set out in Rule 24.035(g) are
barred from consideration.[41] Rule
24.035(g) requires counsel to file the amended motion within 60 days of “the earlier of: (1) the date both a
complete transcript consisting of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing has
been filed in the trial court and counsel is appointed,
or (2) the date both a complete transcript has
been filed in the trial court and an entry of appearance is filed by any
counsel that is not appointed but enters an appearance on behalf of movant.”[42]
To
establish a claim for ineffective counsel, a defendant must show (1) “that
counsel's performance was deficient”; and (2) that “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.”[43] To show
prejudice in a guilty plea case, the defendant must prove that he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have demanded a trial were it not for the errs of
counsel.[44]
Rule
24.02(d)(4) requires a court to make certain disclosures after rejecting a plea
agreement, and must also allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when the
defendant was under the impression that the plea agreement would be binding on
the court.[45] That rule, however, does
not apply to Rule 24.02(d)(1)(B) plea agreements, where the prosecutor makes a
recommendation for a particular disposition with the understanding that it is
not binding on the court.[46] The court
does not actually “reject” that type of plea agreement, so the typical rules do
not apply and the court is not required to make disclosures or allow the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.[47]
III. Comment
This
case appears to be a straightforward application of already-existing law. This set of facts is somewhat novel in that
Stanley’s post-conviction counsel changed, but the new counsel was not
appointed – he was just another attorney from the public defender’s office. Thus, the Supreme Court was required to
clarify the application of the time limit rules for post-conviction motions in
this very specific situation. Outside of
that, though, this case seems to be routine in nature.
[1]
No. SC93121 (Mo. Sep. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=69833. The West Reporter citation is
Stanley v. State, 2014 WL 439505 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
[2] Id.
at 1.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at 3.
[5]
Id. at 4.
[6]
Id. at 4
[7]
Id. at 5-14.
[8]
Id. at 1.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id. at 1-2.
[13]
Id. at 1.
[14]
Id. at 2.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]Id.
at 3.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id. at 4.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Id.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Id. at 5.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id.
[34]
Id. at 12.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Id.
[38]
Id. at 9-14.
[39]
Id. at 14.
[40]
Wilkins v. State, 802 S.W.2d 491, 504
(Mo. 1991) (en banc).
[41]
Id.
[42]
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (2014).
[43]
Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
[44]
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985).
[45]
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.02(d)(4) (2014).
[46]
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.02(d)(1)(B) (2014).
[47]
Stanley v. State, 2014 WL 439505, *10 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
