Opinion handed down
August 30, 2013
Link to Eighth Circuit Opinion
Laborers
brought a suit against their employer, ConAgra Foods, Inc., alleging that
ConAgra violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to compensate them and
others similarly situated for time spent walking between changing stations
where they put on and remove their uniforms and the time clock where they punch
in and out for the day. When the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of ConAgra on the issue of whether the time spent changing clothes was
lawfully excluded under 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(o) but denied ConAgra’s motion for
summary judgment on the issue of whether time spent walking between changing
stations and the time clock was lawfully excluded, the parties filed a joint
motion to certify the second issue for interlocutory appeal. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded for further
proceedings.
I.
Facts
& District Court Holding
ConAgra
Foods, Inc., operates a facility which produces frozen foods.[2] ConAgra
employs hourly production and maintenance laborers and requires them to wear
certain protective gear, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.[4] ConAgra
furnishes and launders the gear, which remains at the facility overnight.[5] Thus
the uniforms are kept on site, and the laborers must change into and out of
these uniforms at the facility.[6] After
donning their uniforms, the laborers walk to a time clock and punch in for the
day; at the end of the day, the laborers punch out at the time clock and walk
back to the changing area to doff their uniforms.[7] The laborers have never been compensated for
time spent changing into and out of uniforms or for time spent walking in
either direction between changing stations and the time clock.[8]
Two
laborers brought suit against ConAgra, alleging that ConAgra violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act [9] by failing to compensate them for time spent changing
into and out of uniforms, and time spent walking between changing stations and
the time clock. [10]
The
district court first considered, under ConAgra’s summary judgment motion,
whether the time spent changing clothes was lawfully excluded and concluded it
was lawfully excluded under an exception created by Congress.[11] Thus the
district court granted ConAgra’s summary judgment motion on this issue.[12] This
decision was not appealed.[13]
The
district court next considered the issue of whether the time spent walking
between the clothes-changing station and the time clock was lawfully excluded.
[14] The laborers argued that putting on and removing their uniforms were
principal activities of their employment, and because the laborers day
commences and concludes in the changing stations rather than at the time clock,
the time spent walking between the changing stations and the time clock must be
included in their hours. [15]
The
district court found “substantial disagreement in the case law” on the issue,
but concluded that putting on and removing uniforms begin and end the workday,
because wearing those uniforms is “integral and indispensable to [the
laborers’] principal work activity.”[16] Thus the district court denied
ConAgra’s motion for summary judgment on this second issue. [17] The parties
filed a joint motion to certify this second issue for appeal. [18]
II.
Legal
Background
The Fair
Labor Standards Act states an employer must compensate a covered employee “for
a workweek longer than forty hours…at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed.”[19] A workweek is a collection
of “workdays”, which is a “period between the commencement and completion on
the same workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities.”[20] The
statute defines a “principal activity” as one “which such employee is employed
to perform.”[21] Thus the Eighth Circuit found that if an employee is not
“employed to perform” a particular activity, even if that activity may be basic
to the employee’s work, then it is not a principal activity that begins or ends
the workday.[22]
Under §
203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, “any time spent changing clothes or
washing at the beginning or end of each workday” is excluded from “the hours
for which an employee is employed.”[23] “The clear implication of § 203(o) is
that clothes changing and washing, which are otherwise a part of the principal
activity, may be expressly excluded from coverage by agreement.”[24]
III.
Instant
Decision
The
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of ConAgra’s summary
judgment on the second, walking-time issue.[25]
The Eighth Circuit found that since the clothes-changing time of the
laborers was excluded “by custom or practice” under the collective bargaining
agreement, the hours present changing clothes are not “hours for which an
employee is employed.”[26] The Eighth Circuit read § 254(a) and § 203(o)
together to conclude that the changing of clothes is not a principal activity
that begins and ends the workday, because it is not an activity the employee is
employed to perform.[27] Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit held that the time spent walking between the clothes-changing
station and the time clock was not a part of the workday for which the employer
is liable to pay overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.[28]
IV.
Comment
The
Eighth Circuit adhered strictly to Congress’s exclusion under § 203(o) to
reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment. However, the Eighth
Circuit quickly dismissed the laborers Alvarez
argument. While the two cases do include factual differences, the holding in Alvarez [29] seems particularly applicable
in this instance. The Eighth Circuit could have elaborated on how the holding
in Alvarez does not change the
outcome of Adair. This elaboration
could have helped flesh out the Court’s interpretation of § 203(o) and the Fair
Labor Standard Act in general.
- Kaci Peterson
[1] 728
F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2013).
[2] Id. at 850.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] 29
U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq.
[10] Adair, 728 F.3d at 850.
[11] Id. at 851. Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act
to specifically exclude “time spent in changing clothes” from “the hours for
which an employee in employed” provided that time has been excluded by “the
express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide
collective-bargaining agreement.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(o).
[12] Adair, 728 F.3d at 851. The district court concluded the protective
gear on by laborers constituted “clothes” and the clothes-changing time is
uncompensated by custom or practice under a bona
fide collective bargaining agreement. Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 851-52.
[19] 29
U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1).
[20] 29
C.F.R. § 790.6(b).
[21] 29
U.S.C.A. § 254(a)(1).
[22] Adair, 728 F.3d at 852. Congress also
had passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, which excludes from the workday time spent
“walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of
the principal activity or activities which [an] employee is employed to
perform,” and time spent performing “activities which are preliminary to or
postliminary to said principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 254(a).
[23] 29
U.S.C.A. § 203(o).
[24] Adair, 728 F.2d at 852 (citing Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255
(1956)) (internal citations omitted).
The Eighth Circuit did note that under IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, an activity that is “integral and
indispensable to a principal activity is itself a principal activity.” Adair, 728 F.2d at 852-52, (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37
(2005)). However, the Eighth Circuit found that since Alvarez did not include a collective bargaining agreement and §
203(o) was not considered by the Alvarez
court, the Alvarez decision was not
controlling. Adair, 728 F.2d at 853.
[25] Id. at 852.
[26] Id. (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(o)).
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 853.
[29] See supra
ft. 24.
