Opinion handed down
June 11, 2013
Parents of students enrolled in
the unaccredited St. Louis Public School (SLPS) District brought action against
the district, and the transitional school district, for declaratory judgment
claiming the transitional school district was required to pay for students’
tuition and transportation to attend an accredited school in Clayton, Missouri
(Clayton) under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 167.131 and 167.241, also known as the
“Unaccredited District Tuition Statute.[2] Both SLPS and Clayton objected by filing for
summary judgment, which the St. Louis County Circuit Court granted.[3] The
parents appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which reversed and remanded
back to the circuit court for further proceedings.[4] Before the consolidated trial on remand
commenced, the trial court allowed taxpayers from Clayton and a taxpayer from
SLPS to intervene as defendants to raise arguments that § 167.131 violated the
Hancock Amendment of the Missouri Constitution. Clayton also brought a counterclaim against a
plaintiff parent, Gina Breitenfeld, for tuition owed.[5] After the trial court entered judgment in
favor of the school districts, Breitenfeld and the State of Missouri appealed,
and the Supreme Court of Missouri transferred the case from the Court of
Appeals on its own motion.[6] The
Supreme Court of Missouri again reversed the trial court’s decision that §
167.131 violated the Hancock Amendment; thus declaring the statute
constitutional.[7]
I.
Facts
and Holding
In 2007, SLPS lost its
accreditation.[8] As a result, the district was operated by the special
administrative board of the transitional school district (transitional
district).[9] Pursuant to § 167.131, a
group of parents requested that the transitional district pay tuition and allow
the transfer of their children so that they may attend an accredited school in
Clayton.[10] In response to both SLPS
and Clayton’s objections to the transfers and tuition payments, the parents
brought suit, which resulted in Jane
Turner, et al. v. School District of Clayton, et al., 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo.
Banc 2010).[11] In said suit, SLPS and
Clayton filed for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted and the
parents appealed.[12]
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed
the trial court’s judgment in Turner,
stating that the transitional district was bound by § 167.131 and required to
pay the parents their children’s tuition costs to attend Clayton. The case was remanded for further
proceedings.[13]
By the time Turner was heard on remand, only Gina Breitenfeld and her two
children remained as plaintiffs, which transformed Turner into the instant case.[14] By this time, Breitenfeld had transferred her
children to Clayton on her own accord.[15] The trial court also allowed taxpayers from
Clayton and a taxpayer from SLPS to intervene in order to argue § 167.131
violated the Hancock Amendment. Clayton also brought a counterclaim against
Breitenfeld requesting payment for delinquent tuition costs.[16] The issues presented before the circuit court
on remand included: (1) whether or not Breitenfeld’s children were entitled to
have their Clayton tuition paid by the transitional district under § 167.131;
(2) whether § 167.131 violated the Hancock Amendment; (3) Clayton’s
counterclaim against Breitenfeld for payment of tuition costs; and (4)
pleadings asserting that defendant school districts should not be required to
comply with § 167.131 based on an affirmative defense of “impossibility.”[17]
Defendant school districts produced evidence on remand that depicted how
enforcement of § 167.131 would affect their operational costs and argued it
would be impossible for them to maintain or improve their current educational
environments if a surplus of students were allowed to transfer to their
institution.[18] Based on the financial
and organizational hardships the defendants would incur if students were
allowed to transfer, the intervening taxpayers argued § 167.131 required new
and increased activities for the school district without providing appropriate
funding, and therefore constituted an “unfunded mandate” in violation of the
Hancock Amendment.[19]
The trial court agreed with the
interveners.[20] The court relied on the 1978 version of § 167.131, which
provided that each student is free to attend the school of their choice, but
limited student discretion by declaring that no school is required to admit
every student.[21] After the trial court
compared the 1978 version of § 167.131 with the current form of the statute, it
determined the current form created new and increased activities and
responsibilities for the school district by requiring the transfer of thousands
of students without providing funding; thus making it an “unfunded mandate” in
violation of the Hancock Amendment.[22] Due
to the court’s finding that § 167.131 was unconstitutional by violating the
Hancock Amendment, Breitenfeld was ordered to pay Clayton $49,133.33 for
tuition owed and the court granted attorney’s fees to the defendant school
districts and the intervener taxpayers.[23] The state of Missouri (The State) and
Breitenfeld appealed.[24]
II.
Legal
Background
A.
Missouri
Constitution’s Intent to Provide Free Public Education
Missouri has inscribed the goal
of free public education in a number of statutory and legal authorities that
govern the state. Most notably, Article IX, section 1(a) of the Missouri
Constitution provides:
“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential
to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general
assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous
instruction of all persons in this state within ages not in excess of
twenty-one years as prescribed by law.”
In addition, Missouri case law describes public education as an
“entrusted governmental function of imparting knowledge and intelligence”
amongst pupils.[36] Further, it has been
held that children have an undeniable “fundamental right,” not a privilege, to
attend public schools established in their own districts.[37] While there is a fundamental right of children
to receive free public education in their own
district, the Missouri legislature has enacted provisions that allow
students to receive public education outside of their resident district as
well. For example, § 167.020 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes describes the residency requirements of school
districts, but adds exceptions for various cohorts of pupils.[38]
B. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 167.131 and § 167.241
An example of an exception to the conventional residency
requirements is contained in § 167.131 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Pursuant
to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 167.131, “a school district that loses accreditation with
the state board of education must pay tuition for any resident pupil who
attends an accredited school in another district in the same or adjoining
county” and the transferring district is required to pay tuition for the
student to the transferee district.[39] In
addition, § 167.241 addresses the transportation of students that qualify under
§ 167.131 and provides in pertinent part:
“in the case of pupils covered by section 167.131, the district of
residence shall be required to provide transportation only to school districts
accredited by the state board of education pursuant to the authority of the
state board of education pursuant to the authority of the state board of
education to classify schools as established in section 161.092, RSMo, and
those school districts designated by the board of education of the district of
residence.”[40]
C. The Hancock
Amendment
The Hancock Amendment, which aims
to shield taxpayers from the government’s ability to unilaterally increase the
tax burden by imposing unfunded mandates on counties and other political
subdivisions without a vote, is codified into Article X, sec. 16 of the
Missouri Constitution.[41] The portions
relevant to § 167.131 provide as follows:
“The state
is prohibited from requiring any new or expanded activities by counties and
other political subdivisions without full state financing, or from shifting the
tax burden to counties and other political subdivisions.”[42]
“A new
activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service
beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the general
assembly or any state agency of counties or other political subdivisions,
unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the county or other
political subdivision for any increased costs.”[43]
The Hancock Amendment is violated
if: (1) the state requires a new or increased activity or service of political
subdivisions; and (2) the political subdivision experience increased costs in
performing that activity or service.[44] However, a new mandated activity or
service is not established if a
statute imposes a requirement that
encourages the extension of an already existing activity, service, or
responsibility.[45]
III. Instant
Decision
On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Missouri, the State and Breitenfeld disagreed as to why the trial court erred
in holding § 167.131 imposed an “unfunded mandate” in violation of the Hancock
Amendment.[25] Breitenfeld argued that the mandates of §167.131 fit within the already
existing mandate that school districts must provide free public education.[26]
On the other hand, the state asserted that the SLPS already had a duty to
appropriately educate its resident students, and therefore SLPS is not required
attain “new” or “increased” educational services if § 167.131 mandates payment
for students to transfer to an accredited district.[27] The State also argued that the Clayton
interveners failed to show that § 167.131 would
increase the burden of Clayton taxpayers, and while the transportation
mandates under § 167.241 were new,
the defendants failed to prove they were “unfunded,” which is required to show
a Hancock Amendment violation.[28]
Citing the Missouri
Constitution’s historically consistent belief that all children are entitled to
free public education, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs
and held § 167.131 contained no Hancock Amendment violation and was
constitutional.[29] Because districts
are charged with the responsibility of providing free public education to all
children, the instant court felt the mandates contained in § 167.131 did not
add any “new” or “increased” responsibilities
on the districts to carry out its central educational goal.[30] As such,
the court ordered the reversal of attorney’s fees for the interveners and the
recalculation of tuition owed to Clayton on remand.[31] However, the instant court did determine §
167.241, which requires an unaccredited school to pay for transportation of its
students who seek transfer under §
167.131 to the accredited district, did in fact impose “new” and “increased”
burdens on the transitional district.[32] Although § 167.241 imposed increased
responsibility on the defendant district, the court held the SLPS taxpayer
failed to show how the statute violates the Hancock Amendment by imposing
increased costs on SLPS taxpayers.[33] Finally,
the court found that defendant district’s affirmative defense of
“impossibility” lacked merit and basic reasoning.[34] The court noted that mere
fact that Breitenfeld’s children were already matriculating at Clayton
dispelled any allegation that the transfer of students was “impossible.”[35]
IV. Comment
This
case serves as a motivational charge by the Missouri Supreme Court to demand
the school districts of Missouri to ensure their educational services are
sufficient. Effectively, the court has
stated that if school districts do not devote their current resources to ensure
the retention of accreditation, the citizens of their districts may bear the
financial burden of ensuring students receive an adequate education. On one
hand, this opinion ensures that students will have access to an accredited
institution regardless of the current state of their resident district. On the other hand, this opinion has the
potential to further strain school district budgets that already suffer from
the pressure of limited resources. There
is a fine line between the aspirational goal of providing appropriate free
public education to all children, regardless of where they live, and the harsh
reality of fiscal crisis and strenuous circumstances. Despite the quandary the Supreme Court was in,
the decision was decided correctly in that the interest of the children seem to
be the prevailing concern.
-
Melesa
Johnson
[1] Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. Of Clayton, 399
S.W.3d 816 (Mo. Banc. 2013).
[2] Id. at 821.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 818.
[7] Id. at 819.
[8] Id. at 821.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 820.
[12] Id. at 821.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 822.
[18] Id. at 823. Defendants projected that
15,740 students would transfer from SLPS to Clayton and cost the transitional
district approximately $262 million. Id.
In addition, a Clayton school administrator testified Clayton’s enrollment
would double and believed it to be impossible to accommodate students without
sufficient notice. Id.
[19] Id. at 824.
[20] Id. at 823.
[21]
Id. at 824.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id. at 825.
[24]
Id. at 825.
[25]
Id. at 827.
[26]
Sch. Dist. Of Oakland v. Sch. Dist. Of
Joplin, 340 Mo. 779, 102 S.W.2d 909, 910 (1937).
[27]
State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson, 221
Mo.App. 9, 297 S.W. 419, 420 (1927).
[28]
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 167.010.
[29]
Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 664.
[30]
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 167.241.
[31]
Ft. Zumwalt Sch. Dist. V. State, 896
S.W.2d 918, 921 (Mo. Banc 1995).
[32]
Mo. Const., art. X, sec. 16.
[33]
Mo. Const., art. X, sec. 21.
[34]
Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218
S.W.3d 417, 422 (Mo. Banc 2007).
[35]
Id.
[36]
Breitenfeld , 399 S.W.3d at 827.
[37]
Id. at 828.
[38]
Id.
[39]
Id. at 829.
[40]
Id. at 830.
[41]
Id. at 837.
[42]
Id. at 832.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Id. at 834.
[45]
Id. at 837.
