Defendant
McNeely was arrested for driving under the influence, and blood was drawn
without consent or a warrant. The
trial court sustained the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence and the
state filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri. On appeal, the state argued that the
dissipating nature of alcohol in the bloodstream creates an exigent
circumstance that evidence will be destroyed, and therefore a warrant is not
required. The court disagreed,
holding that an exigent circumstance exists only if certain other “special
facts” are also present that create an emergency situation that would delay the
patrolman’s ability to procure a warrant, resulting in the destruction of
evidence.
I. Facts and Holding
During
a routine traffic stop, Defendant displayed tell-tale signs of intoxication and
was subsequently arrested for driving while intoxicated.[2] After refusing to submit to a breath
test, the defendant was taken to a local hospital so that a blood sample could
be taken as proof of intoxication.[3]
The patrolman failed to procure a warrant, and a blood sample was taken,
despite the defendant’s refusal to submit to the procedure.[4] The blood sample was analyzed,
revealing that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was well above the legal
limit.[5] The trial court
sustained the Defendant’s motion to have the results of the blood test suppressed
on the grounds that the sample was taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.[6]
On
interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri was asked to determine
under what “special facts” is a nonconsensual and warrantless blood draw in a
DWI case a reasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.[7] The court identified that answering
this question required the balancing of two competing interests: namely,
“society’s interest in preventing the harms caused by drunken driving and an individual’s
Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his or her person and to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures.”[8]
The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Schmerber v. California, which provided a limited exception to the
warrant requirement in alcohol-related cases if “special facts” exist that
“might have caused the officer to reasonably believe he was faced with an
emergency situation in which the delay in obtaining a warrant would threaten
the destruction of evidence.”[9]
The
state argued that this gives officers the broad authority to direct medical
professionals to conduct nonconsensual and warrantless blood draws on DWI
defendants on the mere probable cause of intoxication, on the grounds that the
dissipating nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone constitutes a sufficient
exigency to forego the warrant requirement.[10] The court did not agree with the state’s interpretation of Schmerber, noting that the United
States Supreme Court in Schmerber rejected the notion that the dissipating nature
of alcohol in the blood stream creates a per se exigency and expressly warned
against expansive interpretations beyond the limited facts of the
case.[11] Instead, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that more than the mere fact that alcohol naturally
dissipates in the blood stream is required to provide an exigency to conduct a
warrantless bodily intrusion, and that “special facts,” such as the time delay
caused by investigating the scene of an accident and transporting the defendant
to the hospital, must also be present.[12]
In
the instant case, the court found that no “special facts,” such as an accident
or injuries, existed that would delay the patrolman’s ability to obtain a
warrant for a blood test.[13] As a result, the court found that the blood draw
constituted an illegal search and seizure of the defendant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and upheld the decision of the trial court to suppress the
results.[14]
II. Legal Background
In
Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that “searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject to only
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”[15] One of
these well-delineated exceptions is when exigent circumstances are
present.[16] Exigent circumstances
are present if the time needed to obtain a warrant would allow a suspect to
escape, risk the destruction of evidence, or endanger life.[17]
In
Schmerber,
the defendant and his passenger were injured and required hospital treatment
after the defendant drove his car off the road.[18] After his arrest at the hospital, a
blood sample revealing the defendant’s intoxication was taken from him without
his consent or a warrant, at the direction of police.[19] At trial, the defendant objected to the
admission of the blood analysis into evidence on the grounds that the
warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.[20]
The United States Supreme Court held that drawing an individual’s blood
for evidentiary reasons is a search that implicates the Fourth Amendment and
would ordinarily require a search warrant when a person does not
consent.[21] However, under the
circumstances, the Court carved out a limited exception to the warrant
requirement for a blood draw in alcohol-related cases when “special facts” were
present that might have caused the officer to reasonably believe he was faced
with an emergency situation in which the delay in obtaining a warrant would
threaten the destruction of evidence.[22] The evidence in this case was the
percentage of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, which begins to diminish
shortly after drinking stops.[23] Collecting this evidence was threatened by
the time required to transport the defendant to the hospital and investigate
the scene of the accident.[24]
Since Schmerber, courts have read this exception as an application of the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.[25]
III. Comment
The
decision reached by the Supreme Court of Missouri was both prudent and in
keeping with traditional judicial treatment of the Fourth Amendment. Historically, the United States Supreme
Court has adopted a cautious approach toward permitting exceptions to
constitutionally-guaranteed protections.
Exceptions must be able to accommodate the realities of police work, but
must also be narrowly tailored so as not to abrogate the associated constitutional
right. Therefore, an expansive
interpretation of Schmerber presents a high risk of being overturned by the
United States Supreme Court.
Considering both the administrative and judicial complications that
could result from having to address cases already decided under an expansive
interpretation, the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision to favor a narrow
rather than broad interpretation seems especially appropriate.
-Andrew
C. Hooper
[1] No. SC
91850 (Mo. January 17, 2012) (en banc), available at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=51958. The West Reporter citation is State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d
65 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
[2] Id. at
3.
[3] Id. at
3-4.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at
5.
[8] Id. at
6.
[9] Id. at
6-8.
[10] Id.
at 7-8.
[11] Id.
at 8, 15.
[12] Id.
at 16.
[13] Id.
at 16-17.
[14] Id.
at 17.
[15] Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
[16]
United States v. Cisneros-Gutirrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2010).
[17] Id.
[18]
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966).
[19] Id.
at 758-59.
[20] Id.
at 759.
[21] Id.
at 769-70.
[22] Id.
at 770-72.
[23] Id.
at 770-71.
[24] Id.
[25]
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750
(1984); United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1989); Marshall v.
Columbia Lea Reg'l Hosp., 474 F.3d 733, 740 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Morgan, 33 F. App'x 603, 605 (3d Cir. 2002).
