Link to Mo. Sup. Ct. Opinion
The Missouri Supreme Court held that if a jury deadlocks at the punishment stage of a capital trial, judges may undergo the required statutory analysis and impose a death sentence despite the jury’s inability to agree on a punishment.
I. Facts and Holding[2]
Scott McLaughlin and Beverly Guenther began dating in 2002. They lived together for several months, but their relationship was marred by breakups and fighting that drove Guenther to obtain restraining orders against McLaughlin. Their relationship ended in spring 2003, but they continued to see each other on social occasions. In October 2003, McLaughlin was arrested and charged with burglarizing Guenther’s home. Guenther obtained an order of protection against McLaughlin.
The following month, while the protective order was in effect, McLaughlin drove to Guenther’s place of employment and waited for her to get off work. When she emerged from her office, he spoke with her as she walked toward her truck. The evidence adduced at trial showed that when the two got to Guenther’s truck, McLaughlin forced her to the ground, raped her and stabbed her repeatedly. McLaughlin then placed Guenther’s body in his hatchback and drove to a nearby river to dispose of the body. Due to some thick underbrush he was unable to dispose of the body in the river and left Guenther’s body along the bank.
McLaughlin was charged with first-degree murder, forcible rape and two counts of armed criminal action (one based on the murder and the other based on the rape). The jury found McLaughlin guilty on all charges, but he was subsequently acquitted of the armed criminal action charge related to the rape conviction.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury heard testimony from a variety of witnesses attesting to both mitigating and aggravating factors. In step one of the penalty phase, the jury found the aggravating factor of depravity of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. In step two, the jury was unable to unanimously conclude that the factors in mitigation outweighed those in aggravation. In step three, the jury was unable to agree that the death penalty was warranted. In Missouri, if the jurors are unable to unanimously agree in step three, the question of punishment goes to the trial court judge. After considering the evidence, the judge sentenced McLaughlin to death. McLaughlin appealed both his conviction and death sentence.
II. Legal Background
A. The Ring v. Arizona Standard in Missouri
In Ring v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that “[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”[3] In State v. Whitfield, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the principles of Ring to Missouri Revised Statutes § 565.030.[4] Section 565.030(4) conditions an increase in punishment from life imprisonment to death on the jury following a three-step process, all but the last of which requires the jury to make specific factual findings.[5] If the jury fails to find one of the three facts enumerated in the statute, it is required to enter a life sentence as opposed to a death sentence.[6]
The final step of the process does not require any specific factual findings. The jury, even if it finds against the defendant in the first three steps, can decide not to assess the punishment of death if it feels the circumstances of the case do not justify imposing the death sentence.[7] The Whitfield jury deadlocked and the trial judge went through the statutory process on his own. He concluded that the death sentence was an appropriate punishment.[8]
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the death sentence the trial judge had imposed and remanded the case for entry of a life sentence.[9] The Court reasoned that, because it was impossible to determine at what point the jury deadlocked, it was impossible to know if the defendant had received his right to a jury trial on all determinations of fact “on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”[10] If the jury had deadlocked in one of the three preliminary steps of the process, then the defendant did not receive a jury trial on all determinations of fact, and the trial judge was not justified in imposing a death sentence.
B. Section 565.030(4)
In the years since Whitfield, the legislature has not changed the portion of section 565.030 (4) that allows the judge to unilaterally impose a death sentence should the jury be unable to reach a verdict on punishment. [11] Currently, the relevant part of the statute reads:
If the trier [of fact] is a jury it shall be instructed before the case is submitted that if it is unable to decide or agree upon punishment the court shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor or death. The court shall follow the same procedure as set out in this section whenever it is required to determine punishment for murder in the first degree.[12]
Interpreting § 565.030(4) and Whitfield, the Missouri Supreme Court in McLaughlin ruled that § 565.030(4) does not prevent a trial judge from entering a death sentence if the jury deadlocks. [13] The Court noted that “under the principles set out in Ring, the jury must [only] make the required factual findings that increase the punishment from a life sentence to death.”[14] If the jury makes the factual determinations enumerated in subsections (1)-(3) of § 565.030(4) and deadlocks on whether to impose a sentence in subsection (4), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial judge is permitted to review the jury’s findings as to subsections (1)-(3), disregard the jury’s inability to agree on an appropriate punishment, and unilaterally impose a death sentence. [15]
III. Commentary
In ruling as it did in McLaughlin, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted a dangerous precedent with respect to a controversial issue in the law. The statute requires the court to inform the jury that “if it is unable to decide or agree upon punishment the court shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor or death.”[16] A jury so informed could reasonably conclude that, if it deadlocked on whether to impose a death sentence, the defendant would receive a life sentence instead. Interpreting the last sentence of § 565.030(4) to allow a trial judge to disregard the jury’s decision and unilaterally impose a death sentence is misleading.
The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision may be consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Ring, as the defendant does receive a jury determination of each of the factual matters present in the statute. Applying this analysis to a state statute that permits a trial judge to disregard the jury’s decisions and unilaterally impose a death sentence, however, is inconsistent with the purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a jury trial in criminal matters. Absent a modification of the statute by the Missouri Legislature, the interpretation offered in McLaughlin misleads the jury as to its powers and responsibilities in capital prosecutions. If the trial judge can assume the role of a twelve-person jury and, disregarding the actual jury’s inability to decide, proffer a death sentence, then the court’s actions may violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.
- Robert J. Morrison
[1] No. SC 88181 (Mo. Aug. 26, 2008) (en banc). The West reporter citation is State v. McLaughlin, 262 S.W.3d 648 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
[2] Id. at **1-3.
[3] 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
[4] 107 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
[5] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030(4) (Supp. 2008).
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 261.
[9] Id. at 264.
[10] McLaughlin, 2008 WL 3906355, at *3 (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 589).
[11] Id. at *4.
[12] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030(4).
[13] McLaughlin, 2008 WL 3906355, at *5.
[14] Id.(citing Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 261-62).
[15] McLaughlin, 2008 WL 3906355, at *5.
[16] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030(4).
