Opinion handed down January 31, 2008[1]
The Missouri Supreme Court held that Missouri Approved Jury Instruction 31.24 "contributing factor" standard can properly be applied at the summary judgment stage of an employment discrimination claim brought under the Missouri Human Rights Act.
I. Facts and Holding
Appellant, a 59-year-old former police captain with the City of Maryland Heights, brought an employment discrimination suit under § 213.055 of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Appellant alleged that his 2002 termination was the result of unlawful age and disability discrimination. The trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment on both claims finding that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case.[2] The court appeals, refusing to apply the MAI 31.24 "contributing factor" standard, affirmed. After a review de novo, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court held that the MAI 31.24 "contributing factor" standard can properly be applied at the summary judgment stage of an employment discrimination claim. The Court explained that Missouri discrimination law in a post-MAI 31.24 environment should more closely reflect the plain language of the MHRA and the standards set forth in MAI 31.24. As a result, the Court rejected the contention that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the MHRA must prove that an employment decision was "motivated" by unlawful discrimination. The Court stated that nothing in the language of the MHRA requires a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial or determining factor in an employment decision. Thus, the Court concluded, that under the facts of the case, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on appellant's claims because there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether appellant's age and perceived disability were "contributing factors" to his termination.
II. Legal Background
Missouri courts have traditionally looked to both Missouri and federal employment discrimination case law when deciding cases under the MHRA.[3] In fact, "MHRA cases have followed a pattern of analysis articulated by the federal courts."[4] However, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated that when the MHRA is clear and unambiguous then contrary federal case law is not binding.[5]
Relying on federal court decisions, Missouri case law has focused its analysis on whether the "challenged employment decision was 'motivated' by an illegitimate purpose."[6] The question of "motivation" has been identified as the "pivotal issue in any claim of unlawful discrimination."[7] The "motivation" requirement under the MHRA was derived from the "burden-shifting analysis" adopted by the federal courts in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,[8] and its progeny.[9]
In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the MHRA has a constitutional right to a trial by jury.[10] As a result of the Court's ruling in Diehl, in 2005, MAI 31.24 was adopted. In pertinent part, MAI 31.24 stated that to prevail on an action under § 213.055 of the MHRA a plaintiff must establish that an illegitimate purpose was a "contributing factor" to the challenged employment decision.[11] MAI 31.24's "contributing factor" standard is at odds with prior Missouri case law which required the illegitimate purpose to be a "motivating" factor.
In Daugherty, the Court explained that "Missouri employment discrimination law in a post-MAI 31.24 environment should more closely reflect the plain language of the MHRA and the standards set forth in MAI 31.24 and rely less on analysis developed through federal case law."[12] Accordingly, the Court relied on the "contributing factor" language in MAI 31.24 and § 213.055 of the MHRA, and rejected the previously relied on "motivating" factor language.[13] Additionally, the Court stated that "[a]nalyzing summary judgment decisions under the standards set forth in MAI 31.24 is appropriate because a plaintiff has no higher standard to survive summary judgment than is required to submit a claim to a jury."[14]
Post-Daugherty, in Barekman v. City of Republic,[15] the Missouri Southern District Court of Appeals applied the "contributing factor" standard as stated in Daugherty.[16] In its opinion the Southern District held that the Daugherty opinion had the effect of changing the burden shifting analysis adopted by prior courts.[17] The court stated that "[i]n Daugherty, our Supreme Court held that, in a claim involving a violation of § 213.055, a plaintiff is not required to prove 'that discrimination was a substantial or determining factor in an employment decision; if consideration of age, disability, or other protected characteristics contributed to the unfair treatment, that is sufficient.' Therefore, we have revised the third element of the claim to be consistent with Daugherty."[18]
III. Commentary
As a matter of semantics, the Court's acceptance of MAI 31.24's "contributing factor" language has strengthened a § 213.055 plaintiff's ability to withstand summary judgment. As a result, a plaintiff need only show that an illegitimate purpose was a "contributing factor" to the negative employment action, and not that the defendant was "motivated" by discriminatory animus. However, in practicality it is unclear what effect the "contributing factor" language will have a § 213.055 analysis. The Court made no attempt to define the confines of the "contributing factor" standard. Additionally, the Court's application of the language to the facts of Daugherty was scant and offered very little guidance for future analysis.
[1] 231 S.W. 3d 814 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
[2] Under Missouri law there are generally three elements to a prima facie case for a claim brought under § 213.055 of the MHRA: first, the plaintiff must show that he is a member of a protected class; second, plaintiff must show a negative employment action; and, third, plaintiff must show that his membership in a protected class was a factor in the negative employment action. Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Commission on Human Rights, 679 S.W. 2d 842, 846 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
[3] Daugherty, 231 S.W. 2d at 818.
[4] Id. at 819.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Commission on Human Rights, 679 S.W. 2d 842, 845 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
[8] 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
[9] Daugherty, 231 S.W. 2d at 819, n6.
[10] Id. at 819.
[11] Mo. Approved Jury Instr. 31.24 (6th ed.). MAI 31.24 states: "Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant (here insert the alleged discriminatory act, such as "failed to hire", "discharged" or other act within the scope of Section 213.055, RSMo) plaintiff, and Second, (here insert one of more of the protected classification supported by the evidence such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disability) was a contributing factor in such (here, repeat alleged discriminatory act, such as "failure to hire", "discharge", etc.), and Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damages…."
[12] Daugherty, 231 S.W. 3d at 819.
[13] Id. at 819-20.
[14] Id. at 820.
[15] 232 S.W. 3d 675 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007).
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 679.
[18] Id.
[2] Under Missouri law there are generally three elements to a prima facie case for a claim brought under § 213.055 of the MHRA: first, the plaintiff must show that he is a member of a protected class; second, plaintiff must show a negative employment action; and, third, plaintiff must show that his membership in a protected class was a factor in the negative employment action. Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Commission on Human Rights, 679 S.W. 2d 842, 846 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
[3] Daugherty, 231 S.W. 2d at 818.
[4] Id. at 819.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Commission on Human Rights, 679 S.W. 2d 842, 845 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
[8] 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
[9] Daugherty, 231 S.W. 2d at 819, n6.
[10] Id. at 819.
[11] Mo. Approved Jury Instr. 31.24 (6th ed.). MAI 31.24 states: "Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant (here insert the alleged discriminatory act, such as "failed to hire", "discharged" or other act within the scope of Section 213.055, RSMo) plaintiff, and Second, (here insert one of more of the protected classification supported by the evidence such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disability) was a contributing factor in such (here, repeat alleged discriminatory act, such as "failure to hire", "discharge", etc.), and Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damages…."
[12] Daugherty, 231 S.W. 3d at 819.
[13] Id. at 819-20.
[14] Id. at 820.
[15] 232 S.W. 3d 675 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007).
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 679.
[18] Id.
Research Sources on Topic:
Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W. 3d 675 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (applying the "contributing factor" standard adopted in Daugherty).
William C. Martucci, Missouri Practice Employment Law and Practice § 4:26 (2007).
